Paul Schulte is no longer with the Carnegie Endowment.
Paul Schulte was a nonresident senior associate in the Carnegie Endowment’s Nuclear Policy Program, where his research focuses on the future of deterrence, nuclear strategy, nuclear nonproliferation, cybersecurity, and military ethics as well as their political implications.
He is also a senior visiting fellow at the Center for Defense Studies at King’s College, University of London, and at the Defense Academy of the United Kingdom. He is a research associate at the Center for International Studies and Diplomacy at the School of Oriental and African Studies.
Schulte’s previous positions in the UK government include early desk-level appointments in security policy in the Northern Ireland Office in Belfast and British defense commitments between Morocco and Bangladesh. After promotion to the senior civil service and policy-level appointments in Land Systems Procurement and the Defense Medical Service, he became director of proliferation and arms control at the UK Ministry of Defense in 1997 (and therefore UK commissioner on the UN commissions for Iraqi disarmament).
He was director of defense organization in the Coalition Provisional Authority for Iraq in Baghdad in 2004 and, later that year, was selected as founding head of the UK’s interdepartmental Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (now the Stabilization Unit). Between 2006 and 2007, he was chief speechwriter for two UK defense secretaries.
He is (a rigorously secular) joint chair of the UK’s Council on Christian Approaches to Defense and Disarmament. His academic background includes a fellowship at Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. He is also a qualified, and formerly practicing, group psychotherapist.
If the Syrian regime has decided it is going to give up its chemical weapons, the international community might want to revisit what happened to the chemical weapons stockpiles in Iraq after the 1991 conflict.
Transparency Measures involve voluntary exchanges of sensitive information, possibly developing a standard reporting form, perhaps, eventually, with legal status, or new forms of access and engagement.
A number of areas may prove challenging for allied governments, Alliance politicians, or other international actors in supporting and sustaining NATO's new contributions to international stability.
North Korea's latest rocket launch is part of an established behavior, where it hopes that generating international anxiety will bring the global community to offer aid, assistance, and toleration of the regime.
Syria is widely believed to possess weapons of mass destruction, in particular a large chemical weapons arsenal.
Though leaders on both sides of the Atlantic are preoccupied with a number of current pressing issues, NATO's nuclear dilemmas cannot be put off much longer without undermining its cohesion and strength.
At its Chicago summit, NATO reaffirmed its commitment to its European-based arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons.
While NATO can extend the status quo in the short term, it cannot postpone resolving its defense and deterrence dilemmas without undermining Alliance confidence and cohesion.
As Turkey’s regional role evolves, so does its relations with neighbors and in turn, its security challenges.
During a visit to Russia, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il said he would be ready to discuss Pyongyang's nuclear production if international six-party talks, which ended in 2008, resume.