Because strategic, economic, and ideological perceptions of China contain multiple, sometimes contradictory facets in Southeast Asia, receptions of and responses to Beijing diverge across and within state lines.

Most Southeast Asian states behave as if the actions of their Northeast Asian neighbors and the Philippines will be sufficient to maintain a regional status quo from which they can benefit.

Malaysia’s actions indicate that it continues to pursue an inclusive and prudent “equidistance” policy.

Beijing could seek to limit the spillover from a Taiwan conflict into the South China Sea and offer to assist in evacuation operations for Southeast Asian citizens.

China’s role in the Mekong region demonstrates that development cooperation often requires closer security cooperation.

As the world undergoes a new round of fragmentation and major power rivalry that includes the advancing of divergent visions of global order, Singapore is discovering that its interests are increasingly being pulled in different directions.

Washington aims to convince Southeast Asian countries that U.S. military power in the region is benign, while Beijing aims to convince the region that its rise offers economic opportunities. Malaysia assesses both powers as having constructive roles to play.

Beijing says that over 180 countries accept its “one China principle” regarding Taiwan, but the reality is more complicated.

For now, Malaysia remains committed to maintaining public displays of friendly relations with China while handling any differences quietly. But the difficulties and pressures of keeping the friendship real, alive, and substantive are greater than ever.

This article distills several potential principles for Beijing to adopt in its competition with the United States, including two each in the following three areas: Marxism, traditional Chinese culture, and China’s historical experiences since 1949.