“They make a desert and call it peace.” This phrase from Tacitus’s Agricola is frequently quoted, and while few political leaders have read the Roman historian’s work, many have applied the same principle in their policies. Throughout the world, from Syria to Nagorno-Karabakh to Gaza, leaders have engaged in massive levels of abuse to impose peace. This has included forcing, or contemplating forcing, defiant populations out of their land to quell armed resistance and eradicate the social support base rebellions enjoy. Such actions can be regarded, perversely, as a form of conflict management, despite their harshness and the fact that they may involve ethnic cleansing or genocide.
In Syria from 2016 to 2018, some 200,000 people were displaced by President Bashar al-Assad’s regime from former opposition-held areas. Similarly, in September 2023, over 100,000 ethnic Armenians were forcibly supplanted from Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan, echoing Syria’s multiple displacements. Israeli officials, both present and former, have also lobbied for or encouraged a similar approach in Gaza after the October 7 Hamas attacks, so as to prevent the resurgence of armed resistance there.
The implication of expelling populations from their ancestral land extends beyond the humanitarian or moral ramifications of such behavior. It also challenges the Western liberal peacebuilding model that gained prominence during the 1990s. This model emphasizes a respect for rights, diversity, consensus, and compromise through dialogue, while authoritarian conflict management mechanisms promote illiberal, often repressive, and violent methods to reimpose tranquility, effectively turning them into conflict resolution mechanisms.
The consequences of this are many. The inability of liberal Western states to deter or prevent authoritarian regimes from managing conflict through violence and repression will only encourage countries to replicate such practices when it suits them, making the “no people, no rebellion” strategy more appealing. The ensuing harm done to democratic and humanitarian values that liberal countries seek to turn into a foundation of the international system could undermine prospects for a rules-based global order anchored in international law.
A Proven Authoritarian Approach
The behavior of the Assad regime in Syria, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s regime in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Israeli government in Gaza has prompted pushback from many in the liberal democratic West. That is not surprising, as their methods tend to view elimination as an efficient basis to resolve conflicts. The compulsory transfer of populations, which all three have implemented or are thinking of implementing, is prohibited by international humanitarian law and can constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Authoritarian regimes regard liberal conflict resolution methods not only as ineffective but also as potential security threats, as these may threaten the stability of their ruling systems. That is why Syria and Azerbaijan are examples of states that have conceptualized population transfer (of combatants and noncombatants) as a mode of conflict management. The core aim of their regimes has been to do away, rather than reconcile, with the societies spawning resistance against their rule. Israel is somewhat different. It scores higher on democracy indexes; however, open discussion in the country about expelling Palestinians from Gaza, as a way of preventing the reemergence of armed opposition, resembles the reasoning in Syria and Azerbaijan.
Syria: Depopulation and Peace
Around 12.1 million people have been displaced by Syria’s conflict, including 200,000 who were systematically transferred by the regime, with Russia’s support, in 2016–2018 to northwest Syria, mostly to Idlib Governorate. This was the final stage in a process involving sieges, starvation, the politicization of aid, and the misuse of aid delivery mechanisms, as well as the demonization and delegitimization of opposition grievances.
Forcible transfer to the northwest was one of the “choices” offered by the regime to the residents of about two dozen besieged areas. The other was to return to the “embrace of the motherland” (al-‘awde ila hudn al-watan), which entailed facing a clearance process supervised by the regime’s infamous security services. While some took the risk, about 200,000 chose to leave. The process was inhumane, but the expulsions were decisive in ending the rebellion in those areas, mostly around Damascus, which bolstered Assad’s hold on power.
The regime sought to filter the rebels and their support base (al-hadine al-ijtimaaiyyeh) out of local society, ending any possibility of a revival of opposition. What constituted this support base was not set in stone. A Major general from the Fourth Armored Division viewed the base as conservative with sectarian tendencies and described its members as individuals with flawed convictions regarding the regime, yet who remained convinced of the validity of their beliefs.1 Three senior regime military officers viewed coexistence with this social base as impossible, as the base sought to eliminate the regime.2 Another military official considered this segment of the population as “time bombs” who could revitalize resistance in the future.3 Areas controlled by the regime after the expulsion of the local population show no signs of insurrection over five years later. While, on the contrary in Daraa, where the Syria army was unable to uproot rebels and their supporters, government control remains weak.
The success of the regime’s demographic engineering also hinged on factors beyond its control. Russia’s military support from 2015 on, along with Western and Arab acceptance that Assad was there to stay, provided a geopolitical climate conducive to a depopulation drive, without anticipation of serious repercussions. The shift in the balance of power represented a significant blow to the Western-dominated Geneva peace process. Russia, Türkiye, and Iran went on to create the Astana track in January 2017, which over time became the main process for resolving the Syrian conflict.
Another factor allowing the regime to engage in forcible population transfers was the availability of a territory beyond its control to which it could send people. Northwestern Syria, particularly Idlib Governorate, was controlled by opposition groups and became a convenient destination. This also fed into local and regional agendas: while the Syrian opposition and its social base were a threat to Assad, they became a political, demographic, and military resource for Türkiye, which dominated the northwest.
The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh
In the southern Caucasus, a region with important links to the Levant, Azerbaijan launched a military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, which resulted in the forced eviction of most of the area’s Armenians. Karabakh is an Armenian-majority area that had seceded from Azerbaijan in the 1990s and taken over neighboring Azerbaijani lands with Armenia’s help, displacing nearly 600,000 people. In November 2020, Azerbaijan recaptured most of its lost territories, with significant backing from Türkiye and Israel.
Once that war ended, Russian peacekeepers were deployed to protect what was left of the isolated enclave. However, Russia’s power waned after it invaded Ukraine, while the Azerbaijani presence around the enclave increased. Starting in December 2022, Baku imposed a blockade by cutting communications with the outside world and essential supplies such as gas, electricity, and baby formula, while politicizing aid. Although the humanitarian situation in Karabakh did not reach the levels seen in Syria’s Madaya, for example, where hunger was widespread among the 40,000 residents and dozens died of starvation and malnutrition, the tactics bore similarities to what is remembered in Syria as the “starvation until submission” campaign.
After its September 2023 offensive, Azerbaijan offered Armenians amnesty, citizenship, and integration into Azerbaijan’s “free society.” Within days, however, almost no Armenians chose to remain in Karabakh. As in Syria, nothing encouraged them to stay, whether a viable mechanism of reconciliation or an independent judiciary. Instead, people recalled Azerbaijan’s years of cultural warfare against local Armenian heritage and its gruesome human rights violations, not just against Armenians but also Azerbaijani dissidents and opposition figures hostile to Aliyev’s hereditary dictatorship.
While the inner workings of the Aliyev regime remain unknown, there are indications that its policies toward the Karabakh Armenians carried a similar rationale as that of the Assad regime in Syria. One of these was Baku’s refusal to provide security guarantees, autonomy, or even an elected local government to Karabakh Armenians. This was noteworthy given that Karabakh had been autonomous even during the Soviet era.
Another telling indication was the timing of Azerbaijan’s offensive. It came amid U.S.- and European Union (EU)-backed Azerbaijan-Armenia peace talks and despite the Karabakh Armenians’ willingness to discuss integration with Baku. The resort to military action, considered a redline by the United States and the EU, undermined the negotiations and Baku’s “repeated assurances to refrain from the use of force.” Crucially, it was a historic opportunity for the Aliyev regime to end the Armenian presence in Karabakh and, with it, any chance of being challenged in the future.
As in Syria, Azerbaijan was helped by a favorable geopolitical situation and a territory to which to expel Armenians. After the 2020 war, Azerbaijan’s status rose as an oil- and gas-rich country, with a prime location along the Central Asia-Europe corridor, bordering Russia and Iran, militarily allied with Turkey and Israel, and enjoying improved economic ties with the European Union. Moreover, because of the Ukraine conflict, Russia, the traditional regional hegemon, was occupied elsewhere. As Armenia drew closer to the West, Russia tilted toward Baku, going “from patron to partner in an illiberal order,” as one observer put it. That’s why, once the September 2023 attack unfolded, Russian peacekeepers failed to intervene. Nor did Armenia, earning Aliyev’s praise. Instead, Yerevan found itself hosting caravans of fleeing Armenians.
Israel and the Dream of a Gaza Without Palestinians
As the war in Gaza has continued in recent months, numerous Israeli officials or representatives have been defending the idea that only by driving the Palestinians out of the territory could Israel’s security be guaranteed. Given the demographics of the Jewish and Palestinian populations between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River, with the latter likely to become a, the question of displacing Palestinians is a preoccupation that cuts across Israel’s political spectrum. Indeed, in the early weeks of the conflict, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly sought to secure European backing to pressure Egypt into accepting Palestinians from Gaza, “at least during the conflict.” To some observers, this caveat was disingenuous, as it is unlikely that Israel, if it could, would ever allow their return.
Among the staunchest advocates of this approach is Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who also plays a leading role in administering the West Bank. In 2017, he published his “decisive plan” for “ending the conflict and bringing about real peace.” Smotrich proposed a phased approach: expanding settlements to deter a Palestinian state, offering integration for Palestinians who abandoned their national aspirations, facilitating emigration for the rest, and confronting those who continued to fight. When the Gaza war began, he supported the “voluntary migration” of Gaza’s Palestinians.
He was not alone. Knesset members Danny Danon and Ram Ben-Barak, in a Wall Street Journal article, urged countries to accept Gaza refugees “who have expressed a desire” to relocate, while entirely omitting Israel’s role in making Gaza virtually uninhabitable. Similarly, Israel’s Intelligence Ministry published a policy paper in the aftermath of the October 7 attacks, presenting the option of expelling Gaza’s population to the Sinai. The document warned that a generation raised under Hamas and facing Israeli occupation could revive the organization and potentially fuel more extremism.
The Intelligence Ministry reportedly lacks decisionmaking power, while Netanyahu has denied that Israel seeks to expel Gaza’s population. However, because the path of transferring Palestinians is tied mainly to Israel’s right-wing nationalist religious parties, on which Netanyahu relies to remain in power, he has avoided opposing them. Moreover, Netanyahu’s rejection of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, like his repeated calls to annex the West Bank, suggests he would not be unhappy with a transfer of Palestinians out of those areas, regardless of his denials, as this would advance his stated political agenda.
The debate in Israel around transferring Palestinians replicates the rationale employed in Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh: namely to empty the land of a society that can generate resistance. This has not happened yet in Gaza. Nor do the Israelis have a territory to which they can send Gaza’s Palestinians. The main obstacles are Egypt, which opposes any transfer of Palestinians to Sinai, and the United States, which refuses to endorse such a step.
In the absence of a transfer option, Israel has adopted an alternative strategy to deny Hamas a social base. This can be called “domicide,” the mass destruction of dwellings to make Gaza unfit for life. Satellite analysis published by the Wall Street Journal and the Economist shows vast devastation in the territory, with nearly 70 percent of its 439,000 homes and about half of its buildings damaged by December 2023. Many Gazans will have no place to which to return, and Israel will likely control, and potentially restrict, the financial and logistical aspects of reconstruction. This may compel the population to slowly abandon Gaza when possible, denying Hamas the protective covering of a cohesive society in which to operate.
Challenging Liberal Conflict Resolution and Its Repercussions
Uprooting people from their land is a human tragedy. However, as a mode of conflict management, it has wider implications, especially in undermining liberal approaches to peacebuilding whose components are ingrained—at least in theory—in Western concepts of democracy, human rights, dialogue, and a rules-based international order. This is particularly pressing given that influential countries, prominent among them China and Russia, are pushing back against concepts of liberal internationalism.
First, the prevalence of an illiberal approach reinforces a trend that has been gaining currency in the past decade. Historically, violence has been a more likely factor deciding the outcome of conflicts than any desire to conclude consensual peace agreements. During a rare interregnum in the 1990s, negotiated settlements, often with international backing, occurred in places such as Bosnia, South Africa, the Philippines, Mozambique, and others. However, toward the end of the first decade of the new century, this trend was reversed, implying that countries may have begun losing confidence in the viability of negotiated settlements. In light of this, more countries may try to resolve conflicts through violence, which could heighten global instability.
A second dangerous implication of the illiberal approach is that successful authoritarian tactics set precedents for others to adopt. Because authoritarian regimes learn from each other, they are in a better position to institutionalize a global system that stands in the way of a rules-based order. For example, Jamil al-Hassan, the notorious former head of Syria’s Air Force Intelligence Agency, admitted to taking notes on how China suppressed the Tiananmen student protests in 1989. He pointed out that Syria should have acted similarly with protesters in 2011. Those observations must have made their way into his reports to the Syrian leadership during the uprising.
Another example comes from Israel. The Israeli response to the October 7 attacks saw leading parliamentarians commend an illiberal approach. Former defense minister Avigdor Lieberman praised Azerbaijan’s success in Karabakh. He said that despite “pressure from Brussels, the EU, and the West, [Azerbaijan] brought [the conflict] to [an] end brilliantly. I hope we will be able to do the same.” The literature on authoritarian conflict management shows that democracies sometimes adopt illiberal conflict management methods as well, and Israel’s destruction of Gaza proves this.
A third implication of the illiberal approach is that it often highlights the inability of Western countries to defend their liberal internationalist principles, which only further discredits the sustainability of liberal conflict resolution mechanisms and a rules-based international order. In the Syrian, Azerbaijani, and Israeli cases, the West through its timid reactions failed to deter, let alone prevent, authoritarian policies. This bolstered an impression that Western indignation is usually without great consequence.
Syria, Türkiye, Iran, and Russia—all reflecting different shades of authoritarianism—were able to undermine a liberal peace-building process for Syria, replacing it with Astana. Aliyev proceeded with a military solution in September 2023 in Nagorno-Karabakh, despite U.S.- and EU-sponsored talks. And Israel’s war in Gaza has shown that when the West is itself divided, liberal values are a casualty. Western divisions over how Israel should respond to October 7, and U.S. support for a continuation of Israeli military operations in Gaza, allowed the Israelis to devastate the territory and even consider ethnically cleansing its population, with few negative repercussions.
Conclusion
The success of authoritarian conflict management practices denotes a broader shift in the Western-dominated international order. Western powers, particularly in the EU, are facing challenges to their influence from emerging powers, including assertive authoritarian states. Those states are now combining their efforts to erode Western domination. Two relatively small authoritarian regimes, in Azerbaijan and Syria, have managed to defy Western-led peace initiatives with the backing of other autocracies,
Türkiye and Russia. Similarly, China’s role in facilitating a reconciliation between authoritarian Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023 marked a departure from the past.
Major Western states continue to be pivotal players in global politics. The United States remains the world’s strongest military power, while both the U.S. and EU economies are still the largest globally. However, the growing challenges to the international order they forged have prompted a critical inquiry when it comes to conflict resolution: were the 1990s a turning point in resolving conflicts or merely a brief hiatus in a long-standing period in which violence, rather than consensual agreements, was the decisive factor in ending them? The future trajectory will depend on the resolve of the West to implement, and even enforce, its normative principles in the face of actors committed to reducing its influence internationally.
Notes
1 Interview conducted by the author’s research assistant with a major general from the Fourth Armored Division who has been involved in the Syrian war since the beginning, Damascus, November 2023.
2 Interview conducted with a major general from the Fourth Armored Division, Damascus, November 2023; interview conducted by the author’s research assistant with another Syrian major general, Damascus, April 2023; and interview conducted by the author’s research assistant with a colonel from the Fourth Armored Division, Damascus, November 2023.
3 Interview conducted by the author’s research assistant with a Syrian major general, Damascus, April 2023.
