Thomas MacDonald is no longer with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Thomas MacDonald was a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has an interdisciplinary scientific background which he applies to interesting technical problems which are interwoven with political concerns. His current research focuses on the verification of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation agreements. This work is along two tracks, developing verifiable and feasible arms control proposals to revitalize a flagging arms control establishment, and researching probabilistic methods to find novel approaches to stubborn arms control challenges.
He completed his PhD in nuclear science and engineering at MIT. His dissertation work studied the national security implications of advancing and emerging technologies, specifically remote sensing technologies used to track mobile missiles carrying nuclear weapons. He also completed a MSc in pharmaceutical sciences from the University of Toronto where he synthesized nanoparticles for detecting and treating cancer, and holds a BSc in biochemistry from the University of Waterloo.
To try to find common ground, this report presents nine detailed practical measures that—implemented individually or as part of a package—would help address each state’s specific security concerns and the shared dangers of arms racing and inadvertent escalation.
Tensions between the great powers are rising. A three-way arms race between China, Russia, and the United States is underway. Should a conventional conflict with either Russia or China occur, it could escalate into a nuclear war. Beijing, Moscow, and Washington all say they want to mitigate these dangers through arms control—but is there a practical way forward?
But the greatest danger that this careless stunt highlighted is to a different potential target: high-altitude satellites used for nuclear command and control. Those critical satellites face the threat of being attacked by co-orbital anti-satellite weapons, that is, other spacecraft with offensive capabilities.
While hopes remain for a reboot of nuclear talks with North Korea, a crucial but oft-overlooked question is how compliance with any negotiated agreement would be monitored and verified.
To quickly lower the risk of nuclear escalation, manage arms racing, and avoid a breakdown in future treaty negotiations, the United States, Russia, and China should consider five politically binding proposals to build transparency and confidence.
