Paul Haenle is no longer with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Paul Haenle held the Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is a visiting senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore.
Prior to joining Carnegie, he served from June 2007 to June 2009 as the director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia Affairs on the National Security Council staffs of former presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. From June 2007 to January 2009, Haenle also played a key role as the White House representative to the U.S. negotiating team at the six-party-talks nuclear negotiations. From May 2004 to June 2007, he served as the executive assistant to the U.S. national security adviser.
Trained as a China foreign area officer in the U.S. Army, Haenle has been assigned twice to the U.S. embassy in Beijing, served as a U.S. Army company commander during a two-year tour to the Republic of Korea, and worked in the Pentagon as an adviser on China, Taiwan, and Mongolia Affairs on the staff of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Early assignments in the U.S. Army included postings in Germany, Desert Storm, Korea, and Kuwait. He retired from the U.S. Army as a lieutenant colonel in October 2009.
The Chinese foreign policy establishment will likely continue to actively promote the Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative and Global Civilisation Initiative as the new pillars of China’s foreign policy.
Carnegie China scholars share their assessment of the Biden-Xi meeting and its implications for U.S.-China relations going forward.
Southeast Asian capitals would prefer that the U.S. and PRC manage their relationship, if not get along.
There is a certain level of restraint, but there is also a lingering distrust.
The Biden administration identified the order as part of its de-risking strategy but limiting the flow of investment into China takes the approach to a new level.
U.S.-China relations appear to be set on a trajectory towards long-term competition and rivalry.
A fragile reconnection in U.S.-China diplomacy presents an opportunity to begin to set the terms of strategic competition.
Even though Beijing is competing, it doesn’t want to define bilateral relations in competitive terms.
U.S.-China relations have entered the most difficult period since bilateral normalization in the 1970s.
Transactional relationships are stable but can be shallow.
