he structure of the competitive environment in which violent extremists operate greatly shapes each group’s strategies and target choices.

While Tunisia has made noteworthy progress in its counterterrorism efforts, much more work remains to be done in the qualitative aspects of these efforts if progress is to be sustained.

The complex relations between the state and Islamic institutions in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Libya, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco shed light on evolving governance and have important implications for Western policies of countering violent extremism and conflict resolution.

Existing studies help explain how extremist insurgencies erupt and evolve, and why some countries are more affected than others. But there are still notable gaps in understanding the choices, tactics, and strategies of violent extremist groups.

The story of Mauritania’s transformation from the weakest link in the crisis-ridden Sahel to one of its most resilient is instructive.

To contain the coronavirus, Arab governments are mobilizing official Islamic institutions. The most pressing goal is to shut down sites of potential contagion as Ramadan approaches.

A dynamic region amidst great change, the Maghreb is also home to the conservative, literalist interpretation of Islam known as Salafism, which has emerged as a major social and political force.

The Arab Maghreb is a vitally important region that impacts the security and politics of Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, and the broader Middle East. It is also home to the conservative, literalist interpretation of Islam known as Salafism, which has emerged as a major social and political force.

Tunisia’s run-off election between two political outsiders reflects both the growing independence of Tunisia’s democratic institutions and the pent-up public demands for improved service delivery and redressing social inequities.

The G5 Sahel Joint Force shows that improvised security initiatives are becoming more common in Africa.