It's been more than a month since Hamas attacked Israel, reigniting the Middle East crisis once again and switching the focus of other political players to the region. Is Russia benefiting from the escalation in the conflict? How is it affecting the war in Ukraine? And what are the long-term consequences for Russia's position as a global player in the Middle East?
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Alexander Gabuev. Welcome to Carnegie Politika podcast. My name is Alexander Gabuev.
It's been more than a month since Hamas brutal attack on Israel that plunged the region into yet another sad war. Multiple global players are involved in the tragedy in the Middle East. One of them is Russia.
The effect on Russia and Russia's role in the Middle Eastern crisis is not entirely well understood. I think that we hear a lot of voices who say that Russia is behind it and Russia is aiding Hamas in some ways. Other people say, “Oh, it's a big blow to Russia's position in the Middle East.”
Helping us to unpack this complex subject, I think that we couldn't have a better guest. It's doctor Hanna Notte, who is director of the Eurasia program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, CA. Hanna is both a Russia expert and [an] expert in the Middle East. She knows both Russian and Arabic and has spent time in the region and in Russia, including at Carnegie Moscow Center, when it was still there. Now, Hanna works on nonproliferation arms control, Russia's foreign policy, and particularly its role in the Middle East. We couldn't be happier to have you.
Welcome, Hanna!
Hanna Notte. Thank you so much for having me, I'm very excited.
Gabuev. Let's start with a very broad question. I think that if you look at what's happening right now in the Middle East, there are multiple moving pieces. The situation is very dynamic and it's very hard to predict what will happen in a week or two. But overall, if we zoom out, is Russia benefiting from that? Is it bad for Russia or is it neutral? What's your take?
Notte. Thank you, Sasha. My overall take is that Russia is benefiting from this ongoing tragedy in Gaza. Let's take a step back.
In the context of this war against Ukraine, Russia's capacity to cultivate what you could call pressure points or significant distractions from the war in Ukraine and for the West in order to wear down this Western unity and Western stamina regarding support for Ukraine, is really limited.
Russia doesn't have so much capacity and so many tools to create those kinds of distractions. The emergence of a new demanding conflict zone in the Middle East that draws in Western political and military bandwidths is certainly welcome from Russia's point of view.
Even if Russia did not engineer this crisis, this terrible massacre and attack by Hamas on October 7th coincided with Putin's birthday. And we do know that Putin likes to mark special occasions, special dates with violence. Let's remember that Anna Politkovskaya's assassination was also on October 7th and in 2006. Yet there is no smoking gun evidence, that the Russians were in any way behind this attack by Hamas, or supported Hamas directly. Such evidence has not come to light, so Russia is not behind this new cycle of violence in the Middle East. But I do think that it is benefiting from the situation now for what is its main foreign policy priority, and that is the war in Ukraine. And if you want, I'm happy to go through the different ways and levels in which Russia now stands to benefit.
Gabuev. Sure, let's do that. You have written a terrific opinion piece for the New York Times recently that I encourage all the listeners to go and read.
So, one is the direct distraction from the war in Ukraine. We see that there is a discussion about the availability of financial resources to aid both Israel and Ukraine militarily. We have these domestic problems in the US Congress and that the Republicans don't necessarily agree on how you prioritize these two conflicts, how much resources you're going to allocate. There is competition around some systems, like artillery shells, for example. If we are entering a prolonged war, Israel will need some resources that at the same time are required by Ukrainian armed forces.
What are other elements that you see where Russia is benefiting from this conflict?
Notte. Right, you have already perfectly summarized the concern over Western bandwidth to support both Israel and Ukraine militarily. If there is a protracted war, both in Gaza and the continued war of attrition in Ukraine. Let me go through the other levels on which this distraction from Ukraine might benefit Russia.
I think the first level here to mention is media attention. There is now less media scrutiny on the continued Russian bombardment of Ukraine. Inevitably, there is now a lot of media focus on the ongoing situation in Gaza. I think that is one way in which Russia benefits.
The second level is political attention. I think that the Biden administration's agenda is now quite dominated by this crisis in Gaza. I believe [the U.S.] President Biden himself has spoken to [the prime minister of Israel Benjamin] Bibi Netanyahu at least 10 times over the last month. He gave an Oval Office address, he has commented on the situation in other public remarks and his Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, has been highly active in the region. I believe he visited [Israel] at least four times. He concluded another regional tour just last weekend.
This political attention, I think, will not just die down even when this war in Gaza, the Israeli military operation in Gaza, ends. I think there will be a heavy political lift over the medium term as the United States will work with regional partners on some sort of post-war future for the Palestinians - an affirmative future for the Palestinians, and whether that is a renewed effort towards a two-state solution without Hamas being any factor in this. There will be a heavy diplomatic and political lift over a protracted period. I think certainly that will distract from the war in Ukraine, because even an American administration only has so much bandwidth for multiple crises around the world. That is the first way in which Russia benefits.
Let me quickly go through the other two factors that I mentioned in the New York Times op-ed, which you kindly mentioned.
The second thing to mention here is that American diplomacy in the Middle East is now somewhat in disarray. The West had been engaged in a heavy lift towards normalization between Israel and Arab States before October 7th. Now, at a minimum, this effort is now significantly postponed if not derailed. It was already a hard lift before October 7th to foster normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia because of the different moving pieces here: the diplomatic choreography was quite complex with expectations for security guarantees by the Saudis, the desire for a nuclear program, the Palestinian issue, and how that would figure into the equation. It has just become much harder now, [and it remains uncertain] If and when such an effort can be resumed.
Why will Russia not be sad to see these efforts fray? The first thing to say here is that Russia never much liked the Abraham Accords (The Abraham Accords were bilateral agreements between Israel and Arab countries [such as] Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Morocco, concluded in 2020) and any diplomacy flowing from those Abraham Accords, including the normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Why did Russia not like it? I think there was a perception in Moscow that perhaps there could be some economic opportunities for Russian businesses in Gulf capitals, for example. But broadly speaking, this was a US diplomatic effort that sidelined Russia.
Russia liked the Middle East Quartet, which was a format in which the Russians had a seat at the table to solve the Palestinian issue in the Middle East. They had their own initiative for security in the Persian Gulf. They did not like what they called “a monopolization of the peace process” under the Trump administration and the diplomacy flowing from that.
I think their opposition to this kind of diplomacy has hardened since February of last year, and the invasion of Ukraine, because Russia started to look at diplomacy in the Middle East even more through a zero-sum lens - not wanting the Americans to succeed.
Another factor here is that normalization between Israel and Arab States entailed a defense element, defense partnership against Iran, which became an increasingly important partner for Russia. This was another reason why Russia did not like this diplomacy and will not be sad to see it, at a minimum, postponed if not derailed.
The most important way in which Russia stands to benefit from this crisis in Gaza is by scoring points in the court of global public opinion. What we've seen, Sasha, (it's been quite fascinating for me to watch) is how Moscow has adopted quite overt pro-Palestinian position in this crisis. It's not completely out of line with historical precedent because there has been affinity for the Palestinians a long way back to the Soviet times. Even in recent years, as Russia was fostering a closer relationship with Israel under President Putin, there was always a concern for the Palestinian cause in the Russian MFA (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation).
But what we've seen since October 7th is really a break with that previous more even-handed or balanced positioning, with Russia avoiding really any censure of Hamas, hosting a Hamas delegation in Moscow just two weeks after the massacre.
If you watch RT [and] look at Russian media, including media internationally, there's a heavy focus on the suffering of the Palestinians in Gaza. Of course, Russia has also milked this stunt at the United Nations in the draft resolutions it has put forward on the UN Security Council. There's a real clear effort to distance Russia from this unequivocal pro-Israel stance that has been adopted by the United States. Vasily Nebenzya, who is the permanent Representative of Russia to the United Nations, he recently even questioned Israel's right to self-defense at the UN, calling Israel an occupying power. There's of course a lot of West blaming in Russia's narrative right now. [For example, Russia uses] The argument that we are only in this situation because of destructive US policies in the Middle East over the last years.
In doing all of this, Russia understands very well that it aligns itself with constituencies across the Middle East and even beyond - in the Global South, in their views on the Palestinian issue where the Palestinian cause continues to resonate.
You see this now shaking out in diplomacy where some left-leaning governments in Latin America have severed their diplomatic ties with Israel over the military campaign in Gaza. The countries in Africa have now frictions with Israel diplomatically. I believe South Africa just recalled diplomats in Israel. Russia benefits here from this pro-Palestinian messaging.
I would say one last point here. I think that Russia is also trying to embed this conflict in Gaza into its broader (what I would call a) meta-narrative on the war in Ukraine. This anti-colonial narrative, which frames Russia somehow as leading the charge against US hegemony and dominance. Israel is viewed in parts of the non-West as an extension of this US hegemony and dominance in the Middle East.
This is how Russia sort of combines these two conflicts in an overarching narrative. For these three reasons that we discussed - the diversion of attention from Ukraine, the fraying of US diplomacy in the Middle East, and Russia scoring some points in the court of public opinion - the best-case scenario here for the Kremlin is if there is the slow boil of an inconclusive war in Gaza, that consumes both Israeli and U.S. military resources and political attention that stirs up some unrest in the Middle East, but also European societies are less united because of what's going on in Gaza. All this benefits Russia for waging a long war of attrition against Ukraine. There are some risks for the Kremlin, and we could talk about those as well. But I do think that the benefits here outweigh the risks, at least at the moment.
Gabuev. Thanks for this Tour de force, Hanna. That's very comprehensive and I agree on most parts. There is this gloating about western hypocrisy. You see a lot of Russian propagandists saying, “Oh, the West blames us for erasing Ukrainian cities, which we of course, don't do because these are Ukrainian fascists who are doing this. But OK. The West blames us on this and in return we get support for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia. And here Israel is doing exactly the same and there is no support for Palestinians, but instead military support for Israel and no sanctions. So how hypocritical can the West be?”
This narrative falls on fertile ground not only in the region, in the Middle East, but also globally. There is plenty [for Russia] to like.
You mentioned something which is very interesting. You said that before the full-blown invasion of Ukraine on February 24th last year, Russia tried to have a balanced relationship in the [Middle East] region. It was there for itself and the relationship with Israel was a very important relationship, [and also] with Iran and Saudi Arabia. Russia tried to balance its presence and engagement with other players in the region.
Now this balance seems to be tilting. My explanation is it's because the war is becoming the organizing principle of Russian foreign policy and [because of] ties with Iran, which brings military material to the table. Central Russian war effort is more important than, for example, relationship with Israel.
I want to ask you how you see that and what is driving this tilt and change in Russia's position in the region that you are observing?
Notte. I think you put it very rightly. If we look at Russia's overall foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region before February 2022, this pursuit of flexible partnerships and balancing act - this effort to keep equidistance between mutually antagonistic players - was a defining feature of Russia's approach to the region. [This included] balancing between Iran and Israel, between Gulf Arab States and Iran, between Türkiye and the Kurds (to some extent, we saw that play out for a number of years).
Russia prided itself on that ability and therefore claimed that it needed to have a seat at the table in every conflict in the region, because it could talk to all sides, even on the Israel-Palestine file. That's what Russia claimed for the longest time, hosting these different Palestinian factions in Moscow, even to forge a united Palestinian political front, saying, “We are the one player that can talk to all the Palestinians, including Hamas, but we also talk to the Israelis.”
It's true that this is now tilting or shifting a little bit. I agree with that, and I agree that it has to do with the war against Ukraine becoming the overarching organizing principle of Russian foreign policy. The Middle Eastern dossiers are now subsumed under the requirements as Russia sees them to wage the war against Ukraine successfully. As a result of the war, Sasha, I think some dynamics for Russia have shifted in the [Middle East] region.
The first, that you already mentioned, that's quite important, is the changed nature of the Russia-Iran relationship. Russia has become more dependent on Iran and has lost some leverage, vis-à-vis Iran, because of Iran's importance in providing Russia with military assistance for the war against Ukraine. (Assistance that started at a minimum last summer with the Shahed drones and continues to date and remains important for Russia).
I think there is also a greater dependence now on Türkiye and a reduced leverage vis-à-vis Türkiye, which is an important factor. Türkiye is a market for Russian goods, it's become a conduit for Russia's so-called roundabout trade. It's a country within NATO that has refused to join other members of the alliance in sanctioning and isolating Russia. Türkiye is very important for Russia now.
I think there's now a greater dependence on both Iran and Türkiye, which is having all sorts of spillover effects for how the Russians can navigate in the region. I think already before October 7th there was a less stable working relationship with Israel, because Israel was not giving lethal weapons to Ukraine, but it did support Ukraine in other ways. It is a strong ally of the United States in the Middle East.
There was friction in the Israeli-Russian relationship already before October 7th. There was a concern on both sides not to see the relationship deteriorate too much or unravel. The main factor here, Sasha, was the fact that they deconflicted their military activities in Syria and still have a deconfliction line. Israel is wanting the freedom to maneuver and go against Iranian proxies on Syrian soil. Russia is present militarily in Syria and has military assets there. There was a tacit understanding that Russia would not interfere with Israel's room to maneuver in Syria. But already, before Bibi Netanyahu came back into power late last year, the relationship was more frosty.
Gabuev. Thank you. You mentioned the risks for Russia. We see that Russia has plenty to like about the current escalation and current tragedy in the Middle East. What are the potential downsides for Russia now and in two-three years going forward?
Notte. Sure. I think there's perhaps a domestic risk or vulnerability and there's a regional factor. Let’s start with the domestic.
We have seen the Kremlin using anti-Semitism rather instrumentally as part of its war of narrative, already predating October 7th by questioning the Jewish heritage of Ukrainian President [Volodymyr] Zelensky. Russian officials at the highest level engaging in anti-Semitic remarks. That was something that we've seen over the last 21 months. I think we've now seen a spike in anti-Semitic tropes and remarks in Russian state media since October 7th, [and] a campaign against Russian liberal Jewish opposition intellectuals, who have left Russia for Israel, given their opposition to the war in Ukraine, and they are being portrayed in Russian media as unpatriotic or as traitors. We have seen a surge in that.
That has combined with heavy pro-Palestinian media messaging that I mentioned earlier. A lot of focus on the suffering of the Palestinian civilians in Gaza. I think the confluence of these two strands has created an environment where something like the incident in Makhachkala in Dagestan, the storming of the airport, became possible. Of course, there's also local factors, local context that needs to be taken into account here. It's not just the product of media messaging. I do think that Russia, through its pro-Palestinian tilt, is helping to foster an environment in which resurgence of extremism could become a problem for the inter-faith and inter-ethnic harmony that Russia likes to portray in terms of the Russian Federation.
I think regarding dynamics in the North Caucasus, Russia needs to tread carefully in how it manages this war in the Middle East, especially if it's a protracted war. At the same time, I don't think there's a big risk here for instability or things blowing up in the North Caucasus. I don't believe that risk to be high or imminent in any way, but there is a domestic factor here, at least to take into consideration.
The second risk for Russia is this alienation of Israel that we're now seeing. You do feel that Israeli officials, even though they're not criticizing Russia at the highest level of government, they are angry with Russia. You see it in statements by the Israeli Permanent Representative to the UN. Select Israeli officials, pundits or parliamentarians calling for a revision of relations with Russia. I don't think that this is going to happen anytime soon, because the priority in Israel right now is to navigate this current crisis, dealing with this trauma, fighting the war in Gaza. I don't think there's going to be a radical revision of Israel's foreign policy anytime soon. Even after the war in Gaza, I don't think that there will be a full break in Israel's relations with Russia, but the relationship will be more icy, more frosty, and that has some downsides for Russia.
The biggest risk from this situation for Russia would emerge if there was to be a significant regional escalation of this war. What we have at present is a war in Gaza and an elevated level of kinetic action between Israel and members of the so-called Axis of Resistance (Iranian proxies, whether it's the Houthis firing missiles towards Israel, whether it's Iraqi factions or Syrian factions becoming more active vis-à-vis Israel, and of course, you have Hezbollah in Lebanon)
I think if somehow the situation was to escalate into a full-blown regional war (which I don't consider likely at present, but it certainly also isn't inconceivable), then Russia's gains in Syria could be threatened. Russia has an important military presence in Syria, which it wants to preserve and safeguard. It's important for Russian power projection not only into the Middle East, but even into North Africa. If things were to blow up in the Middle East, then Russia's bandwidth to get involved in defense of its gains would be very limited, because the Russian military and most of its military assets are tied down in Ukraine and will be tied down there for the foreseeable future.
I don't think that Russia wants to see this situation escalate into a full-blown regional war. It's basically a small fire. A small slow burning fire in the Middle East that serves the Kremlin's interests best, but a larger conflagration could become dangerous for Russia.
Gabuev. Thank you, Hanna. What a sad, tragic reality overall. Unfortunately, I believe that we will have to come back to this topic in the coming episodes. Thank you very much for being today with me and helping me and the listeners to unpack this very complex situation and looking forward to host you in the future. Thanks, Hanna.
Notte. Thank you so much for having me.
