The system of treaties, agreements, and institutions underpinning the nonproliferation regime is increasingly stressed by burgeoning arms races and growing discord over the lack of progress toward disarmament. What steps can be taken to halt, and if possible, reverse this trend?
Great power competition between the United States and both Russia and China, the return of war and nuclear threats to Europe, and the emergence of new technologies have created a turning point in Germany. In Berlin, policymakers are discussing potential adaptations to Germany's nuclear policies.
In 1994, Ukraine relinquished Soviet nuclear weapons. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion, critics have asked– was Ukraine’s decision to denuclearize a mistake? Would nuclear weapons have deterred Russia? What lessons does the Ukraine case impart for other states that might contemplate nuclear possession?
Kazakhstan’s leadership on nuclear and biological risk reduction for the last 30 years serves as a core model for regional and international security. Please join us for a moderated discussion on the history of this work and Kazakhstan’s increasingly global role in the changing WMD threat landscape.
Nuclear and nonnuclear missile capabilities are quickly spreading the Indo-Pacific. What is driving this surge, and what are the consequences for possible nuclear escalation in future crises on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait? Join Carnegie for an event addressing this and more.
Under what conditions does nuclear latency—the technical capacity to build the bomb—enable states to pursue effective coercion? And what are the consequences of using nuclear and rocket technology as a bargaining tool in world politics?
The concerns that motivate interest in and demand for nuclear disarmament are formidable and deserve fuller and deeper address than they have received thus far in the policy deliberations of many States and international bodies.
States and experts preoccupied with winning (or at least not losing) wars that could go nuclear have largely ignored questions of post facto accountability.
What model for nuclear disarmament might a nuclear-armed state demand of its adversaries and accept for itself? If states were to commit to dismantle their nuclear arsenals, what would be the key benchmarks for assessing the progressive implementation of such a commitment?
If some nuclear arsenals and operational plans are especially likely to threaten the global environment and food supply, all states would benefit from actions to reduce such risks.
Responding directly to the invitation in the United States’ working paper presented to the states preparing to review the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, this paper aims to encourage governments, international experts, and civil society to undertake dialogue on Creating the Conditions for Nuclear Disarmament.
The world is vastly different from when the nuclear order was built: proliferation risks and interest in nuclear energy are much lower, but regional insecurities raise danger of escalatory warfare. Meanwhile, the have/have not inequities impair cooperation to restore the foundation of order.
