The best option already has a successful playbook from 2013.

The United States must take the lead in seeking an off-ramp with Iran that constrains its nuclear activities well short of a bomb.

Before jumping on the proliferation bandwagon, policymakers in Washington and Seoul should consider five critical questions that are being ignored today. The answers to these questions suggest that the imagined benefits of friendly proliferation do not clearly outweigh the risks.

There is a persistent question over how to communicate U.S.-ROK alliance deterrence posture, particularly in the event of a nuclear attack by North Korea.

To navigate the twin problems of dealing with Iran and preventing the nuclear threshold from becoming a desirable status for others, policymakers ultimately will need to reconfigure nuclear energy and nonproliferation policy.

The U.S. could cooperate with foreign partners on uranium enrichment to wean nuclear power plants off Russian fuel. But should it?

As Russia’s calculus shifts in response to its war in Ukraine, U.S.-Russian alignment to manage global nuclear risks, especially from Iran and North Korea, is unraveling.

South Korea has long been on the list of potential over-the-horizon proliferation challenges, but growing debates in Seoul about its nuclear options are quickly moving it toward the front of the U.S. nonproliferation agenda.

Although the geopolitical rationale for the arrangement is understandable, the parties have failed to come to terms with its core problems.

If the steps today encourage South Korea to fixate on nuclear weapons, they will end up like past nuclear assurance measures—just more water poured into the bucket and out the hole in the bottom.