Nearly Nuclear: How Small States Compel Concessions from Big States

Over the last seven decades, some small states successfully leveraged the threat of acquiring nuclear weapons to compel concessions from superpowers. This strategy remains alluring today. South Korea, Japan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have all used the prospect of fielding nuclear forces to pressure the United States for security and other benefits. Investments in nuclear energy programs alongside conventional strike and space launch capabilities make such threats more credible.

But under what conditions does nuclear latency—the technical capacity to build the bomb—enable states to pursue effective coercion? What are the consequences of using nuclear and rocket technology as a bargaining tool in world politics? And how might the further spread of such dual-use capabilities shape the incentives for great powers to consider arms control agreements over their arsenals?

Join Carnegie for a hybrid event to discuss how the availability of nuclear and missile technologies affects the future of the global nuclear order. Drawing on his new book, Leveraging Latency: How the Weak Compel the Strong with Nuclear Technology, Tristan Volpe will discuss how nations can coerce concessions from great powers by threatening to acquire atomic weapons. He will be joined in discussion by Chen Kane, Ankit Panda, and Heather Williams. Toby Dalton will moderate.

Tea, coffee, and pastries will be served.