As Russia, China, and the United States build new nuclear weapons systems, the prospects for negotiating formal arms control treaties appear dim. The Biden administration continues to explore and support new pathways to manage nuclear risks, but Moscow and Beijing have thus far refused offers to substantively engage. Please join us for a discussion of the present and future of nuclear arms control.

In 1994, Ukraine relinquished Soviet nuclear weapons. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion, critics have asked– was Ukraine’s decision to denuclearize a mistake? Would nuclear weapons have deterred Russia? What lessons does the Ukraine case impart for other states that might contemplate nuclear possession?

Nuclear and nonnuclear missile capabilities are quickly spreading the Indo-Pacific. What is driving this surge, and what are the consequences for possible nuclear escalation in future crises on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait? Join Carnegie for an event addressing this and more.

Rising nuclear dangers demand the recruitment of new and diverse voices to the nuclear policy field. This one-day, interactive event for interns, students, and young professionals will provide opportunities for networking, mentorship, and substantive nuclear policy discussions with guest speakers.

Under what conditions does nuclear latency—the technical capacity to build the bomb—enable states to pursue effective coercion? And what are the consequences of using nuclear and rocket technology as a bargaining tool in world politics?

To try to find common ground, this report presents nine detailed practical measures that—implemented individually or as part of a package—would help address each state’s specific security concerns and the shared dangers of arms racing and inadvertent escalation.

The consolidation of nuclear and missile capabilities by North Korea points to the need for a new strategy to mitigate the potential for conflict: to pursue progress toward peace and denuclearization simultaneously.

A potential five-year extension of the treaty is welcome news, but there is still more work to be done on reducing nuclear risks, halting arms races with Russia and China, and keeping Americans safe.

After the end of the INF Treaty, the United States and its Allies in Europe and East Asia face a choice of what to do to enhance security: give arms control another chance or provide the ground for another missile buildup.

To quickly lower the risk of nuclear escalation, manage arms racing, and avoid a breakdown in future treaty negotiations, the United States, Russia, and China should consider five politically binding proposals to build transparency and confidence.

There are three guiding principles that can help make future arms control dialogues more successful.

The United States and China must cooperate on arms control. But to do so, the two countries need an innovative approach.