Andrey Movchan is a nonresident scholar in the Economic Policy Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center. His research focuses on Russia’s economy, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the future of Russia’s economic relations with the EU.
Movchan has been a top executive for Russian and international financial institutions since 1993. He was an executive director of Troika Dialog for six years. From 2003 to 2009, Movchan headed Renaissance Investment Management Group, which he founded, and from 2006 to 2008, he was the CEO of Renaissance Credit Bank. He also founded the Third Rome investment company, and was its CEO and managing partner from 2009 until the end of 2013.
Movchan is one of Russia’s best known financial managers. He was named “the most successful CEO of an asset management company in Russia” by Forbes in 2006 and “the best CEO of an asset management company” by the Russian magazine Finance in 2008. He has won numerous awards, including the RBC Person of the Year Award in 2006, the Chivas Top 18 Financials Grand Prix in 2007, and SPEAR’s Russia Wealth Management Awards in the Industry Legend category in 2009.
Movchan has also authored numerous publications on economics and finance. His op-eds and commentary regularly appear in the media. He won two PRESSzvanie business journalism awards in 2011 and 2013.
Podcast host Alex Gabuev is joined by Andrey Movchan, a nonresident scholar in the Economic Policy Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, and Maria Shagina, a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for Eastern European Studies at the University of Zurich, to discuss the impact of Western sanctions on the Russian economy.
Falling oil prices leave no chance Russia’s GDP will grow in 2020—a bleak prospect for both ordinary people and once optimistic investors.
The main task of Putin’s economic policy is to collect as much in taxes as possible. This is why the man who successfully transformed the Federal Tax Service is now head of the government.
An impartial reading of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project investigation into Troika Dialog can offer only one conclusion, and it is not remotely innovative: financial institutions where compliance procedures were far less stringent ten years ago than European regulators insist on today could be used for money laundering. That is no more original than concluding that knives can be used to stab people. Yet it hasn’t occurred to anyone to blame crime on the creators of its weapons.
The state is one of nothing other than arbitrariness. After the lawlessness of the mid-1990s in Russia, many hoped that competition between various groups of the elite would force them to create a system of laws and rules to protect them (and everyone else) from arbitrariness. But it didn’t turn out that way: one of the groups—the one furthest from both honest business and from society—won the battle and made arbitrariness the guarantee of its position.
Russia’s crony-capitalist economic model requires an ever-increasing volume of funds to be burned on lavish mega-projects that generate huge profits for a dozen families close to the Kremlin. Now it seems to be pensioners’ turn to make the sacrifices needed to finance the appetites of Russia’s new aristocracy.
Washington thinks punitive measures will change Moscow’s calculus, but the Russian economy is doing just fine.
The Carnegie Moscow Center hosted Christopher Smart for a roundtable discussion on the current trends in global macroeconomics.
On September 19-20, 2018, the Carnegie Moscow Center held its third annual Russian Economic Challenge conference, organized by the Carnegie Moscow Center in partnership with the Moscow School of Management SKOLKOVO.
The new Russian government will cease to be a place for formulating strategies and implementing policies. Instead, it will focus on creatively calculating and reporting Russia’s accomplishments to technically meet the president’s expectations.
