Nonproliferation Issues at the Gleneagles Summit

On July 6, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a discussion meeting of the nonproliferation issues that are to be discussed at the upcoming Gleneagles Summit. The discussants were Michèle Flournoy, Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Rose Gottemoeller, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment, and Laura Holgate, Vice President of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Dmitri Trenin, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Moscow Center, chaired the discussion.

Michèle Flournoy began by stating that despite numerous achievements, the Global Partnership needs to expand the quality and quantity of pledges, as well as pursue a more homogeneous commitment from the Global Partnership members. Those members who have upheld their contributions need to work on steadily increasing their contributions and improving their implementation of the projects.

The four main obstacles that Flournoy had outlined to effective nonproliferation work in Russia were the following: 1) Legal frameworks; this refers to Russia's drawn out bureaucratic process for approval of nonproliferation agreements. 2) Liability disputes between Russia and the Unites States concerning accidents on nuclear related projects. 3) Access to sensitive work sites to monitor project implementation and expenditure of resources. 4) Lack of sustained leadership within G-8 countries, particularly in Russia and the Uniteds States, which leads to a gap between rhetoric and action.

Flournoy also outlined three key recommendations that should be addressed at the Gleneagles Summit by the world leaders. The first recommendation urged the Global Partnership partners to redouble their efforts to resolve various implementation disputes that have slowed down progress. The second recommendation advocated continuation of fund raising to not only meet, but to exceed the $20 billion dollar pledge, which should be perceived as a floor, not a ceiling, of the budget. The last recommendation urged the Global Partnership to refocus its efforts on key issues. These issues include securing fissile material worldwide and keeping WMDs out of the hands of terrorists; raising international support for Department of Energy's GTRI projects; securing dangerous chemical and biological pathogens in Russia and around the world; and expanding efforts to redirect the scientific know-how.

Rose Gottemoeller focused her presentation on the new joint report of the U.S. National and Russian Academies of Sciences, “Strengthening U.S.- Russia Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Recommendations for Action,” which is the culmination of fully bilateral efforts by Russian and American experts on how to speed up and improve the nonproliferation agenda. The report is unique, Gottemoeller underscored, because it contains consensus recommendations from U.S. and Russian experts about how to improve the implementation of U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation both now and in the future. One of the key conclusions of the report was a clear need for a new form of a relationship between Russia and the United States to begin--a relationship of full and equal partnership.

The report addressed various problems, including those that were outlined by Flournoy earlier in the discussion such as problems of access, taxes, and liability protection. The report dealt with these concerns by creating a set of detailed recommendations, which were addressed in a balanced way to the governments in Washington, in Moscow, or both. The report also urged a full partnership to develop, which would involve Russia and the United States working together to address proliferation tough cases, such as North Korea. In developing such a partnership, a dynamic relationship between Russia and the U.S. would allow each country to capitalize on its strengths.

Gottemoeller also outlined three priorities that Russia should place at the top of its agenda as the President of the G-8. The first was developing international fuel supply arrangements. The second was accelerating the Global Cleanout or Global Threat Reduction Initiative to a four-year implementation period instead of ten, thus ensuring that fissile material stays out of the hands of terrorists. The third priority focused on beginning to plan for North Korea and future efforts to dismantle its nuclear facilities, should negotiations in the Six-Party Talks prove successful.

For full text of Rose Gottemoeller's comments please click on the link to the right.

Laura Holgate focused on Russia's future role in the G-8 and the Global Partnership. She stressed the need for Russia to function as a full partner in the nonproliferation agenda and its role as the essential partner. Holgate also suggested that a series of President Putin's recent comments can offer an insight into an effective Russian approach toward the nonproliferation agenda. She stated that the Global Partnership has responded adequately to Russia 's priorities, therefore, she called on Russia to respond equally well to the priorities of the Global Partnership, particularly in the arena of nuclear material and biological agent security.

Holgate also outlined a possible new initiative that can be implemented next year, an extension and acceleration of the blend down of Russia's HEU coming out of the military programs. This could be done with European and Japanese participation. She also addressed the issue of liability that the previous speakers had brought up, noting that another obstacle to tackling the liability issue has been the uncertainty about donor financial commitment to plutonium disposition, and the lack of parallels between Russian and U.S. programs. It is essential, she said, for them to remain linked in policy terms. The U.S.-Russia CTR agreement also needs to be extended, expanded, and ratified.

Some of the recommendations that Holgate outlined involved more dialogue between the U.S. and Russia, highlighting Russia 's capabilities instead of its shortcomings. Holgate also suggested that funding sources need to be re-examined in order to determine what funds are available for countries outside the FSU. She encouraged other countries, not necessarily the countries of origin of nuclear material, to increase participation in the take-back of that material. She urged banishing the use of the word ‘repatriation,' due to the false perceptions that it encourages.

Summary prepared by Alina Tourkova, Junior Fellow with the Russian Eurasian program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.