This publication is part of Europe’s East, a Carnegie Europe project on European policy toward Eastern Europe and Russia.
There has been one constant in Georgia’s foreign policy since the restoration of the country’s independence in 1991. All successive governments, irrespective of their political color or persuasion, have pursued a pro-Western foreign policy. The only way to mitigate the Russian threat and ensure Georgia’s sovereignty, they believed, was by allying with the West and pursuing integration into Western institutions. To achieve this goal, Georgia needed acceptance and recognition as part of the European family of nations.
That desire determined Georgia’s domestic political agenda; the country’s democratization became inseparable from its Westernization. Leaders forged a societal consensus that under the structural conditions of anarchy and power-political competition characteristic of the Caucasus region, Georgia’s long-term security and survival as an independent, sovereign state could be guaranteed only by integration into Western institutions and Georgia’s transformation in accordance with then prevalent liberal-democratic principles. A political choice became underpinned by a narrative that Europe was Georgia’s cultural home and political destiny.
Over the three decades after independence was restored, EU-Georgia relations deepened thanks to several phases of approximation and considerable political, social, economic, and institutional linkages. However, the real window of opportunity appeared only when the EU decided, in response to Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, to revise its policy of pausing further enlargement. In a rare and bold geopolitical move, the EU granted candidate country status to Moldova and Ukraine, and designated Georgia a potential candidate. Although a breakthrough, the differentiated decision nonetheless signaled that Georgia, once a frontrunner in the EU’s Eastern Partnership, which covers the union’s relations with six Eastern European countries, was falling behind. Brussels expressed concerns about domestic political polarization and democratic backsliding in Georgia, while Tbilisi accused the EU of unfair treatment and a desire to drag Georgia into a risky confrontation with Russia.
In December 2023, the European Council will again deliberate whether to grant Georgia candidate country status. It is hoped that the EU heads of state and government will endorse the European Commission’s November 8 recommendation to go ahead with candidate country status for Georgia and start accession talks with Moldova and Ukraine. The commission assessed Georgia’s fulfillment of twelve recommendations that the council had put forward in June 2022. The government in Tbilisi insisted that Georgia had met all conditions, while the EU is fully satisfied only with three. In a carefully worded statement, the commission president indicated that the college of commissioners had made the positive assessment as a sign of support for the genuine aspirations of the overwhelming majority of Georgian citizens to join the EU. The Georgian authorities, however, need to do more to mirror these aspirations, she added.
As the EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, noted during his September visit to Georgia, the EU’s doors are open for Georgia, but the authorities must do their homework better. During a press conference, an acrimonious exchange between Borrell and Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili indicated that relations between Tbilisi and Brussels were tense. Until recently, Georgia’s European aspirations could be taken for granted. But today, the country’s leadership is pushing back against European criticism, building an increasingly illiberal hybrid regime, and looking beyond Brussels and Washington for partnerships and opportunities.
Georgia’s illiberal turn comes after almost a decade of association with the EU and at a time when the country’s European prospects are better than ever. This indicates a wider challenge the EU is facing. The union needs to confront the limits of its normative and transformative power in a world of growing ideological and geopolitical competition. Countries such as Georgia that used to consider European liberal democracy the only possible model to emulate are finding less liberal alternatives more appealing. With the rise of hybrid authoritarianism at home, the Western orientation of Georgia’s foreign policy has also weakened. While maintaining European integration as its declared objective, the Georgian government is avoiding necessary reforms and resorts to populist nationalism in response to criticism. The EU needs to sharpen its tools to better deal with the problem of democratic backsliding and adapt its enlargement methodology to gain greater geopolitical advantage. The union should foster societal backing for genuine institutional change, which would create local demand for democratic governance and raise the domestic costs of authoritarianism.
Europe as a Political Destiny
Georgia’s foreign policy agenda since independence has been dominated by two interconnected themes: containing Russia and seeking integration into Western institutions. The latter was an answer to the former. Georgia was determined to gain Western recognition as a nation that shares Europe’s cultural heritage and political values. National security interests required Georgia to pursue a values-based approach to both foreign and domestic policy by adopting human rights norms, principles of democratic governance, and a system of checks and balances. The process had many limitations because Georgian leaders sought positive international assessments more than genuine and profound transformation. Yet, the effort led to the interlinking of the domestic and foreign policy agendas and to the deliberate and largely successful cultivation of a societal consensus that the Western model of governance and integration into Western structures comprised a policy with no alternatives.
EU-Georgia relations can be divided roughly into four phases, from the post-Soviet period to the current pre-accession stage. Relations advanced with each phase as the political distance between Tbilisi and Brussels shrank. The first phase began with the collapse of the Soviet Union: the EU and its member states recognized Georgia as a sovereign entity and started providing sorely needed humanitarian assistance. Considering Georgia part of Moscow’s near abroad rather than a neighbor, the EU limited its engagement to humanitarian and technical issues.
The second phase, which marked an intensification of EU activities in Georgia, came with the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which entered into force in 1999 and emphasized market-based economic development, democracy promotion, and enhanced political dialogue. In the same year, Georgia also joined the Council of Europe and celebrated this membership as the country’s first official step toward rejoining Europe.
The PCA phase was followed by the third stage, association, which culminated in the full application in 2016 of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement (AA), including provisions to create a Deep and Comprehensive Free-Trade Area. In a breakthrough, the parties committed to contractual and reciprocal obligations for the purpose of bringing Georgian legislation and administrative practice into line with the EU acquis, the body of EU law. In March 2022, the fourth phase commenced when Georgia, following Ukraine’s lead, applied for EU membership.
Having been at the margins of a collapsing empire in 1991, Georgia now counts as one of the EU’s closest partners. The West’s victory in the Cold War and the EU’s eastward enlargement helped generate momentum for the union’s closer engagement with its Eastern neighbors. Yet, Georgia’s commitment to cooperation and willingness to bear the costs of advancing along a European and Euro-Atlantic path were also decisive.
Georgia’s drive toward the West and mobilization of its European heritage as an argument for integration into European political and security structures predate the post-Soviet period. From 1918 to 1921, the Democratic Republic of Georgia promoted itself as a European and Christian state in the East and campaigned for Georgia’s recognition by invoking the country’s ancient civilizational connections to Greek and other European cultural roots. Perhaps Georgia’s historic link with Europe has been severed. But the myth of Georgia’s Europeanness has been an integral part of Georgian national identity and ideology. Consequently, the projection of Europeanness has been a useful tool for Georgian policymakers connected to the restoration of independent statehood.
The current ruling party, Georgian Dream (GD), did not break with the Europeanizing tradition when it came to power in 2012 by ousting former president Mikheil Saakashvili’s United National Movement (UNM) in Georgia’s first democratic transfer of power. Even the most recent foreign policy document, which covers the years from 2019 to 2022, defined the country as European and declared membership in the EU and NATO to be top priorities. It was under GD’s leadership that Georgia signed the AA with the EU in 2014 and concluded a symbolic 2017 agreement that allowed Georgian citizens visa-free, short-term access to the EU’s passport-free Schengen Area. Also in 2017, the Georgian parliament, led by GD’s majority, amended the constitution to make Georgia’s full integration into the EU and NATO a constitutional obligation and tasked the relevant state institutions with achieving this goal.
The Pivot From the West, or Georgia’s New Realpolitik
Against this background, Georgia’s current pivot away from the West is striking and can be explained only as a reassessment of strategic priorities on the part of the Georgian leadership. As Russia’s horrific aggression against Ukraine continues, Georgia’s declared priority is to preserve peace. The Georgian government has prioritized rapprochement with Moscow even at the cost of irritating Western partners. Despite objections from Brussels, Tbilisi agreed in May 2023 to resume suspended flights to and from Russia. Trade with Russia has also increased. Although Georgia opened its doors to many Russians fleeing conscription, it has reportedly denied entry to well-known critics of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Garibashvili not only refused to adhere to Western sanctions against Russia but also criticized their logic and efficacy. In a clear nod to the Russian narrative, he pointed to NATO expansion as a prime cause of the Ukraine war. Members of GD and the government often criticize Brussels and Washington for urging shows of solidarity with Ukraine while ignoring the concomitant risks for Georgia. With the help of pro-government experts and the mass media, they promote the story of a Western conspiracy to open a second front against Russia in Georgia and stir up domestic instability, which would undermine the government.
The strongly pro-European and pro-Western public discourse that dominated Georgia from the 1990s onward and welcomed a greater international presence in the country has been gradually replaced by a discourse of sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, and respect for traditions, identity, and the church. The Orthodox Church is a well-endowed, powerful institution in Georgia that commands authority and popularity among the public. It is also deeply conservative, resistant to reform, and suspicious of Western influence. GD has been courting the church actively, not least by equating criticism of it with an attack on Georgian culture and identity. Support from the church could prove critical in the parliamentary election scheduled for fall 2024.
In parallel, GD has been refashioning itself as a populist, conservative political force, displaying a growing affinity with the illiberal conservativism championed by the likes of Putin. In May 2023, Garibashvili addressed the Conservative Political Action Conference in Budapest, where he slammed those who propagate “false freedoms” aimed at the destruction of traditional values. He expressed admiration for Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, calling him a visionary leader and a true Christian. On a similar note, he heaped praise on China’s President Xi Jinping and the Chinese model of governance during a July visit to Beijing. To the muted disapproval of Georgia’s Western partners, Garibashvili signed a strategic partnership agreement with China, endorsing its Belt and Road Initiative and offering China a share in strategic infrastructure projects, such as the Anaklia deep seaport and a civilian airport to be built in Tbilisi.
States do break with tradition and change course, especially under evolving international circumstances. Georgia’s shift away from its unequivocally Western stance could reflect the multipolarity of the world: the West is one center of power among many. Yet, the timing is odd. Russia has been defending its near abroad from Western influence for decades, particularly under Putin. But that policy did not stop Georgia from pursuing its European and Euro-Atlantic agenda even after absorbing the costs of doing so. The war that Russia launched against Georgia in 2008 and the occupation of Georgian territories since then by Russia comprised a high price for Tbilisi at little gain.
From a neorealist perspective, Georgia should have shown greater restraint vis-à-vis Russia when the doors of the EU and NATO were shut and patience with Moscow was a Western strategy. Today, however, when the EU seems to have abandoned its nonenlargement policy and there is a real chance of making progress toward European integration, Georgia’s newfound realism raises suspicion. Moreover, it is alienating friends and allies and exposing Georgia to Russian harm more than ever.
Despite the evident shift in approach, the Georgian authorities adamantly deny it. They continue to insist that European and Euro-Atlantic integration is Georgia’s strategic priority and maintain that they are sparing no effort in pursuing it. Now, the ball is in the EU’s court, Georgian Parliament Speaker Shalva Papuashvili said in June. Denial serves two purposes. First, it placates public opinion, which remains consistently in favor of the EU and NATO. And second, it amounts to an insurance strategy. If Brussels grants Georgia candidate country status in December, the government can claim credit. If the EU decides against Georgia, the government can blame others: the opposition, civil society, President Salome Zourabichvili, and even European officials who have supposedly defamed Georgia and undermined its European prospects.
Changes in foreign policy have domestic repercussions. Georgia’s earlier drive toward the West generated momentum for democratization and domestic reforms. Now, the pivot away from the West can be correlated with democratic backsliding at home and the cementing of hybrid authoritarianism. Georgia seems to be adopting the Hungarian model: the use of a parliamentary supermajority to consolidate power, dismantle independent institutions, and reduce the political space for democratic political contestation. A failed attempt by GD in March 2023 to enact legislation akin to Russia’s foreign agents law shows that the Georgian government is increasingly wary of Western engagement that supports civil society, democratic governance, and independent thinking At the same time, a big wave of protests under the EU banner showed that the societal consensus in favor of Europe is still strong. As a result, the EU has been feeling pressure to reward the Georgian public, if not the government, in the European Council’s upcoming decision on the country’s candidate status.
Conversely, the strengthening of a hybrid authoritarian regime at home has been affecting Georgia’s options for its foreign affinities, alignments, and alliances. A party-political rivalry between GD and the UNM has colonized foreign policy, and nowhere more evidently than in Georgia’s relations with Ukraine. The two once very close allies have become estranged because the Georgian government is highly suspicious of the ties between the Ukrainian authorities and the UNM. The fact that Ukraine is demanding the release of the imprisoned Saakashvili, who also happens to be a Ukrainian citizen, further complicates the picture.
Until recently, a pro-Western foreign policy was shaping Georgia’s domestic political agenda. Today, domestic politics is pushing Georgia toward a multivector foreign policy of seeking partners that tolerate domestic abuses. Tbilisi’s recent strategic partnership with Beijing, ongoing rapprochement with Moscow, and development of special relations with Budapest all reflect the regime’s domestic political preferences: taking cover behind the norm of noninterference in internal affairs, the government wishes to avoid international scrutiny of its tightening controls and monopolization of power. European conditionality and Western democracy promotion policies go against the self-serving interests of hybrid regimes such as Georgia’s. This is why these regimes often promote external conspiracies of destabilization and label domestic critics as foreign stooges.
Under GD’s leadership, a primacy of foreign policy has had to yield to a primacy of domestic policy. Part of this approach is a deliberate revival of populist and conservative nationalism, with GD and its affiliated parties seeking to tap into nationalist sentiments as an electoral resource. Georgia’s ruling elite has decided to turn to populist nationalism in the run-up to the 2024 election as a cover for potential setbacks on the European integration front. Conservative, populist, and anti-Western, GD’s new nationalism is at odds with the liberal and supranational European project.
Georgia’s modern-day nationalism also differs from the postcommunist nationalist movements that spread across Eastern Europe, Georgia included, after the end of the Cold War. These were driven by a desire to restore independence, banish an alien communist regime, and reunite with Europe. In that sense, postcommunist nationalism was not entirely antithetical to liberalism; it had an emancipatory and pro-European agenda, as opposed to today’s more populist, antiliberal nationalism. The latter is being invoked to dismantle checks and balances, silence critics as traitors, and limit international influence in the name of national pride, cultural self-preservation, and sovereignty. This is a global trend, reinforced in Georgia by local actors.
The Anatomy of Democratic Backsliding
Polling suggests that the Georgian public continues to favor integration with the EU and alignment with the West more generally. Yet, Georgians also support the increasingly illiberal and Euroskeptic GD. Why? Several structural factors, born of recent experiences in Eastern Europe, make sense of the seeming contradiction. First, Georgia’s highly polarized and centralized system of hybrid authoritarianism does not permit the emergence of a viable opposition or allow for meaningful electoral competition. Elections are therefore an unreliable indicator of real political preferences. Second, a highly personalized, adversarial political culture does not attract the best and the brightest into politics. Many skilled, educated, liberal young Georgians pursue careers outside politics or emigrate in search of better opportunities. Across Eastern Europe, that trend has opened up space for what political scientists Stephen Holmes and Ivan Krastev have described as an illiberal revolt. Finally, a perceived decline of the West has made rejection of the Western model of liberal democracy more acceptable and less costly to populist elites.
Western democracy promotion has focused on the transformative effects of multiparty elections. Without legislative safeguards and institutional structures that ensure fair and not simply competitive elections, however, democracy can become a mere facade. An uneven political playing field on which the opposition is drained of material, intellectual, and communication resources undermines genuine electoral competition. One of the markers of Georgia’s democratic backsliding is a skewed electoral system in which the incumbent can monopolize resources, pressure public officials and civil society, control the mass media, and distribute incentives and punishments. The outcome of an election may be decided well in advance of polling day, without visible and outright fraud.
Another factor closely correlated with democratic backsliding is political polarization. In the case of Georgia, polarization manifests itself not so much in substantive, issue-based divisions across the political spectrum but rather in hostilities based on underlying identities. Arguments on substance yield to personal attacks, and political rivals become enemies. In the Georgian case, political elites exchange not arguments and visions but labels and insults. Democratic bargaining and contestation, let alone power sharing, are unlikely. Polarization contributes to single-party dominance and makes nationalist populism attractive as an electoral strategy.
Single-party dominance can make the separation of powers ineffective. Post-Soviet Georgia has repeatedly experienced the collapse of checks and balances, because no ruling party has wanted to risk losing power through fair electoral competition. In that sense, GD confirms the rule. Exceptional, however, is the influence exercised by Bidzina Ivanishvili—Georgia’s single billionaire and one of the founders of GD. After leading the party to victory in 2012, he retreated from open politics. Yet, he is known to pull strings behind the scenes and seems to decide Georgia’s direction unilaterally. Georgia is becoming a case of shadow governance: political power and financial resources are becoming concentrated in the hands of one individual and his closest associates.
Georgian-style democratic backsliding is typically achieved by ostensibly democratic means so as to maintain a facade of legitimacy. A parliamentary majority dismantles independent institutions under the pretext of reforming them. Officials pressure the media not by threatening to shutter them but by means of fines and lawsuits. The government installs party loyalists in key positions, not least on electoral commissions, and discredits civil society organizations by labeling them agents of foreign influence. Because this process unfolds gradually under a veneer of democracy, it often goes unnoticed until it is too late. Admittedly, Georgia’s record of democratization has always been mixed. Democratic breakthroughs followed by periods of backsliding and polarization have been the pattern since the 1990s. Never, however, did backsliding directly affect Georgia’s European prospects—because until very recently, no such prospects were on the table.
The EU’s Twelve Conditions and Enlargement Dilemma
Georgia awaits a decision from the European Council in December on its possible candidate country status, while Moldova and Ukraine hope to open EU accession negotiations. The council has identified twelve preconditions for Georgia’s advancement to the next stage. These include tackling political polarization and oligarchic influence, improving judicial independence, and reforming the electoral system. If implemented in good faith, measures in accordance with the council’s recommendations would undermine Georgia’s hybrid regime. Thus, it would be unreasonable to expect the regime to comply and engage in an act of self-destruction. Rather, Tbilisi will feign compliance and hope that geopolitical considerations will compel the EU to accept the simulacrum.
In this context, vaguely formulated recommendations risk backfiring. The EU’s precondition about depolarization is a case in point. While it is easy to identify indicators of polarization, indicators of the opposite are less straightforward. Illiberal actors may be tempted to depolarize by restricting dissent. Indeed, the Georgian authorities have repeatedly attacked critical voices for contributing to polarization and undermining stability. GD Chairman Irakli Kobakhidze decried the support given by the EU and other international donors to what he called radical civil society organizations in Georgia. “The European Union calls for depolarization with one hand and finances polarization with the other hand,” he fumed.
Similarly, GD lawmakers approached de-oligarchization by drafting personally punitive legislation, which could be manipulated to restrict political competition. The bill contradicted the spirit of the EU’s recommendation, which rested on an understanding that the problem was not personal but systemic. After advancing through two readings in the parliament, the legislation was dropped after the Venice Commission, an advisory body of the Council of Europe composed of legal experts, issued a damning opinion, describing the bill as incompatible with fundamental rights and freedoms. These examples suggest that the EU’s conditionality should be context sensitive, highly specific, and accompanied by concrete indicators for measuring success. It also demonstrates that focused pressure with a clear reward in sight—candidate country status, in this case—can be effective.
At present, the EU considers Georgia to have fulfilled three of the twelve recommendations, shown good progress on several others, and made little or no movement on some, including depoliticization and de-oligarchization. The EU is facing a difficult decision in December. On the one hand, it will want to uphold its conditions and insist on genuine compliance with the criteria. On the other, it will want to send a positive signal to the Georgian public and encourage democratization—instead of abandoning Georgia to the Russian sphere of influence. The latter logic seems to have underpinned the commission’s November 8 decision.
Moreover, denying Georgia candidate country status while advancing Moldova and Ukraine along the path to accession would have splintered the trio and, perhaps, weakened the EU’s leverage over Tbilisi. As regards the technical criteria for EU membership, Georgia has fared well for years and compares favorably with the candidate countries in the Western Balkans. Yet, compliance with these criteria, although important to the EU, has rarely proved sufficient for political decisions, which often reflect geopolitical urgency at the expense of consistency. Serbia, for example, which has candidate country status, has many similar challenges to Georgia and is even more closely aligned with Russia. Bosnia and Herzegovina was also granted candidate country status in December 2022, provided that it undertakes further reforms. Having established such a precedent, the EU has no reason to deny the same status to Georgia.
Conclusion
The dilemma facing the EU is larger than the issue of Georgia’s candidate country status. It is about the effective use of enlargement, an instrument unique to the EU, for geopolitical advantage and normative impact. The old enlargement methodology may be inadequate to the challenges of a new international environment, while assumptions about the EU’s quasi-magical transformational powers have been humbled by experience. The current wave of enlargement is taking place in a context of heightened ideological and power-political competition.
No longer is the EU in the end-of-history moment of 1989, when the Western model of liberal democracy had no viable rivals. Russia has reemerged as a geopolitical and ideological competitor and is encouraging Euroskeptic sentiment in the EU and its neighbors. Politicians such as Orbán and France’s former National Front leader Marine Le Pen are forging a conservative front against what they see as the imperial ambitions of Brussels and in defense of the nation, identity, and traditional values. Russian-style, anti-Western, populist conservativism, with its hypocritical narrative of sovereign equality and noninterference in domestic affairs, is resonating among populist leaders and buttressing hybrid regimes.
The current contenders for integration into the EU, meanwhile, are no longer compliant, newly independent states in need of international recognition. They have benefited from international assistance, created a semblance of democratic governance, and learned to survive in the gray zone of competing regional pressures. Moreover, the economies of the new contenders, while plagued by inequality and underdevelopment, are still more competitive and viable than the economy of the Soviet bloc was in the 1980s—even in the case of war-torn Ukraine.
The power dynamic between the EU and the candidate countries may still be lopsided, but resentment of the traditional mentor-student relationship is generating a nationalist backlash, thanks also to external encouragement. A box-ticking approach to the reforms required for EU accession has not always produced sustainable results and is even less likely to do so in the new candidates. More promising would be a serious effort by the EU at fostering societal buy-in for democratic transformation before pro-European public attitudes prevail. Investment in building wide-ranging political, economic, social, and cultural linkages with candidates would create local demand for democratic governance and increase the domestic costs of authoritarianism.
Georgia’s habit of conducting elections, which are competitive but not fair, deprive voters of a genuine choice and serve as a legitimizing mechanism for an incumbent’s hold on power. They reinforce extreme majoritarianism with a winner-takes-all political culture and encourage political polarization. The 2024 election offers a chance to break from this tradition as it will be held under a fully proportional system and could result in the country’s first-ever coalition government. The EU should redouble its scrutiny of this election by focusing not on short-term, administrative aspects but on long-term observation of structural political inequalities, flagging unfair advantages, and aiming to level the playing field for meaningful electoral competition. If Georgia is to eventually join the EU, learning European-style power sharing would benefit both Georgia and the EU in the long term.
In today’s war of values and geopolitical contestation, Georgia is a frontline state. The country’s leadership is seeking to exploit the EU’s uncomfortable choice between geopolitical calculus and adherence to its own democratizing criteria. Tbilisi hopes to achieve significant progress toward European integration without forcing fundamental reform. The EU must rise to the challenge by using its leverage to ensure that the 2024 election gives Georgian voters a genuine choice and contributes to institutional, democratic change. Losing Georgia to Russian influence, despite its strongly pro-European and pro-Western population, would be a catastrophe for Georgians and a defeat for the European project.
Natalie Sabanadze is a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at Chatham House and a former Georgian ambassador to the EU.
