South Asia’s Battle With the Coronavirus

Afghanistan’s early measures to stem the spread of the coronavirus have yielded limited success. On February 24, the country reported its first confirmed case and three suspected cases—all patients in Herat province who had recently returned from Qom, the epicenter of the outbreak in neighboring Iran. Within days, the national government indefinitely closed all schools and banned public gatherings in the province. To enhance preparedness, the government also set up a high-level emergency coordination committee and various subcommittees tasked with raising public awareness and surveilling new cases.

Within a month of its first case, Afghanistan had not only confirmed cases in twelve of its thirty-four provinces, but also reported its first fatality, an individual with no history of foreign travel. Further, with just two laboratories—one in Kabul that could conduct over fifty tests per day and another that was recently established in Herat—limited testing capacity severely restricted the country’s ability to detect and contain cases. Faced with an impending crisis, on March 25, Afghan Minister of Public Health Ferozuddin Feroz stressed that if guidelines are ignored, “it is predicted that about 80 percent of Afghans will be infected with the coronavirus and about 70,000 will be hospitalized.”

By early April, Afghanistan entered the community transmission phase. As of May 20, the coronavirus had spread to every province, with Afghanistan reporting 8,145 confirmed cases, and 187 deaths. Doubling down on its efforts to combat the disease, the Afghan government decentralized decisionmaking to empower governors to lead the coronavirus response. Kabul and Herat provinces were the first to enforce measured lockdowns in late March that restricted nonessential travel, limited the number of people who can travel together, imposed curfews, or closed parts of cities. While eighteen additional provinces instituted similar measures, many began to ease lockdowns around the start of Ramadan in April, although the national government had extended the nationwide lockdown through May 24.

With assistance from the World Health Organization (WHO), Afghanistan has quadrupled testing capacity. Currently, nine laboratories are operational, with plans for an additional eleven. Nevertheless, with only around 22,600 samples tested through May 14, coronavirus diagnostics remain limited. Limited lab capacity is exacerbated by a shortage of reagents and RNA extraction kits that persists despite international assistance.

Beyond testing, Afghanistan’s crisis is compounded by several other factors. First, protracted conflict has left a fragile healthcare system plagued by shortages of resources and health professionals, especially in rural areas. Second, cases of people escaping from quarantine facilities indicate low public awareness and lack of trust in the public health system. Finally, the government’s response is constrained by continuing conflict, a fragile political order, and largely open borders with Pakistan and Iran, through which returning migrants have poured in. While Afghanistan is making efforts to tackle the public health crisis, its limited resources, security situation, and political fragmentation present serious challenges.

Sharanya Rajiv is a former senior program coordinator and research assistant at Carnegie India.

 

Interview with David Loyn, Senior Visiting Research Fellow, War Studies Department, King’s College, London

How does Afghanistan perceive the role of international institutions in combating this pandemic?

The WHO has set up new testing laboratories and training programs in Afghanistan with particular support from the EU and USAID. U.S. military forces are the only entity with significant air transport capacity, which they are using to move emergency supplies around the country. A prolonged drought has led to significant food shortages, which are worsened by the lockdown and its associated increase in poverty, so there will be further calls for food aid by the World Food Program. Major humanitarian organizations in the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN families have a substantial footprint in Afghanistan and are bound to scale up their programs accordingly—despite a fractious relationship with the government of President Ashraf Ghani in recent years. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan has a new head—Deborah Lyons, the former Canadian ambassador to Afghanistan—who is likely to play a more activist role than her predecessor, the long-serving Tadamichi Yamamoto.

Given that South Asia is the most densely populated region in the world, what are the opportunities and challenges for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) amid this pandemic?

Afghanistan’s long border with Iran represents one of the key routes for infection into South Asia. Tens of thousands of Afghan refugees who had made their home in Iran have returned to Afghanistan since Iran became an early hotspot for the virus, putting more pressure on weak health systems. Iran has shown little global solidarity in managing the crisis, disguising its own losses and failing to disclose information, and the early lifting of its lockdown has sparked fears of a second spike.

Within SAARC, India’s delivery of hydroxychloroquine to Afghanistan and offer of medical support teams represent positive signs of regional cooperation. In contrast, there has been little cross-border cooperation with Pakistan, although a recent dispute over border crossings was quickly resolved between Ghani and Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, General Qamar Bajwa. The likelihood at this western edge of the SAARC region is that the pandemic will reduce the capacity of Afghanistan to seek cooperation from its regional neighbors. Since Afghanistan links South and Central Asia, this could be one of the worst strategic consequences of the crisis.

Given Afghanistan’s reliance on international aid, vast informal economy, and labor migration to neighboring countries, what are the implications of the coronavirus-induced global economic crisis?

As one of the most fragile economies in the world, Afghanistan faces a serious threat from the global slowdown. Aid fatigue from donor nations was already evident in 2014 following the steep reduction at a moment of political and security transition. A further hit this year will have profound implications for security. In the past, periods of poverty have made it easier for the Taliban to recruit. The threat of infection from the new virus is not being taken seriously in the Afghan countryside, where extended families living in close proximity would find social distancing hard. In the south, the poppy harvest is now in full swing and will not stop for a lockdown imposed by Kabul.

How will the coronavirus pandemic affect the peace process in Afghanistan?

The most obvious impact on prospects for peace is the loss of trust that could be built up in face-to-face contacts. When peace processes have worked in the past, they have always required leaps of faith, which only come through building personal trust—the lubricating oil necessary to build a workable negotiation with an enduring outcome.

It has taken the Ghani government some time to build a negotiating position after being sidelined by the United States, which negotiated its withdrawal with the Taliban. The recent appointment of the highly experienced former minister Masoom Stanekzai as the chief negotiator is a positive sign, although the appointment of Abdullah Abdullah, former chief executive of Afghanistan’s national unity government, to oversee the process as part of a power-sharing deal could slow things down. The process has inevitably become bogged down over prisoner exchanges, demanded by the United States as a confidence-building step in its deal with the Taliban. To avoid mass casualties in jails from COVID-19, the disease caused by the coronavirus, separate agreements have been reached in the meantime to release more than 60 percent of all prisoners.

Amid continued political fragmentation and in the absence of a nationwide ceasefire, how can Afghanistan bolster its response to the pandemic?

The Taliban tried to win public support by filming themselves in masks and gowns telling people to self-isolate. However, there has been no letup in the fighting on either side, which would be the best scenario for Afghan public health. The Taliban’s response to Ghani’s call for a ceasefire was to blame international and Afghan government forces for increasing levels of violence that supposedly forced them to respond.

It took two months and a cut of $1 billion in aid by the United States to force a political compromise after parallel presidential inaugurations at the beginning of March by both the leading candidates in the Afghan election. Abdullah won 50 percent of the posts available for appointment—again curtailing Ghani’s ability to run his own government. The end of the stalemate will mean that the government can now focus on the pandemic as well as other urgent business.

One advantage of the lockdown in cities is that it was impossible for the armed gangs who were gathering in support of Abdullah to make trouble, so the negotiations were not carried out against the specific threat of violence.

The coronavirus pandemic has exposed tears and fault lines in Bangladesh’s social fabric, economy, and public health sector. One of the world’s most densely populated countries, with a headcount of over 160 million, Bangladesh has been under a nationwide lockdown since March 26 to contain the spread of the virus. As of May 20, the country has reported 26,738 confirmed cases and 370 related deaths.

The lockdown has been hard to implement in parts of the country, especially in congested places like Cox’s Bazar, the origin of the nation’s outbreak and home to one of the largest Rohingya refugee camps in South Asia. For vulnerable communities across the country, social distancing is difficult if not impossible. The lack of urban planning and the prevalence of slums exacerbate hygiene and sanitation risks, accelerating community transmission and further amplifying socioeconomic divides.

Bangladesh’s booming economy has been largely driven by its thriving garment trade and other export-oriented industries. The drop in global demand for garments and textiles caused a huge economic shock that has compounded the effects of the national lockdown and put over 2 million jobs at risk. The pandemic has also affected the unskilled, informal sector, which contributes roughly 65 percent of the country’s GDP. While the government has been unveiling various economic stimulus packages, the uncertainty surrounding the pandemic has proved detrimental on its own.

Inadequacies in Bangladesh’s healthcare system have created other hurdles. As of May 18, the country had only forty-two testing laboratories, but the government is racing to set up more. Shortages of testing kits, personal protective equipment (PPE), and intensive care unit beds have greatly strained the country’s limited public and private healthcare systems. A UN situation report noted that Bangladesh’s Directorate General of Health Services “secured 364,000 PPE sets, most of which were distributed to government hospitals” and had only 42,8770 sets left as of April 5.

The Bangladeshi diaspora and multilateral and regional organizations have been instrumental in raising funds and providing economic and medical assistance. But if the lockdown is sustained and the pandemic continues to spread across the country, the effects on Bangladesh’s economy and social fabric could be catastrophic.

Rhea Menon is a senior communications coordinator and research assistant at Carnegie India.

 

Interview with Shahab E. Khan, Research Director at the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute and senior faculty in the Department of International Relations at Jahangirnagar University

How does Bangladesh perceive the role of international institutions in combating this pandemic?

The coronavirus pandemic has exposed a void in the global public health system. Bangladesh recognizes the important ways that regional and multilateral organizations are seeking to address the inadequacies and gaps and appropriately tackle the pandemic. Given its limited resources and capacity constraints, Bangladesh is largely dependent on international institutions for technical assistance. It is an active member of regional organizations like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, which provides a bridge between South and Southeast Asia and already has a mandate for public health.

While contributions of international aid to Bangladesh’s economy have fallen, the international community plays a crucial role in boosting trade, investment, and security. The country receives substantial financial support from the World Bank and other development partners and continues to work closely with the UN on various regional and international agendas. It also prioritizes multilateral institutions aiming to advance peace, stability, and poverty eradication.

The pandemic provides an opportunity to build faith in international institutions, especially among developing nations whose domestic priorities have come to the forefront. Bangladesh is keen to collaborate with international organizations, particularly on the postpandemic rehabilitation and repatriation of Rohingya refugees.

Given that South Asia is the most densely populated region in the world, what are the opportunities and challenges for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) amid this pandemic?

While SAARC has been functional for the last few decades, it has traditionally focused on standard security issues. Such national security concerns, many of which stem from the presence of two nuclear powers in the region, need to give way to a broader, more pragmatic approach. First, given that over 70 percent of South Asians work in the informal sector and that poverty levels can run high, SAARC should devote more attention to common economic governance. Second, and more importantly, SAARC needs to amend its charter to allow bilateral talks among members and strengthen its mandate to rehabilitate the organization. The establishment of SAARC’s coronavirus development fund is a positive sign, especially as South Asian nations need to pool their resources for healthcare, governance, and energy to curb the spread of the pandemic.

In the last decade, Bangladesh has emerged as a leading hub of the global garment industry. What are the implications of the coronavirus on the country’s export-driven economy?

Bangladesh’s success as a top global player in the garment industry has led to a related problem: lack of economic diversification. In the last month alone, Bangladesh has lost over $3 billion worth of exports. As global demand for clothing and textiles declines, the government’s stimulus package included roughly $600 million in funding to support the garment sector and other export-oriented industries. The country’s total allotted financial relief packages amount to almost 2.5 percent of GDP, yet the poverty rate has gone up. A crucial question now is when to lift the lockdown, as citizens’ limited access to food, cash, essential services, and healthcare adds to social strife.

China has been a crucial investor in key infrastructure projects in Bangladesh. Has the pandemic impacted local perceptions of China and its investments?

Bangladesh and China share a critical economic relationship. India’s proposed changes in its foreign direct investment policy, focused on China, will also impact its existing policies toward Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Pakistan. Hence, Bangladesh may seek to rebalance its economic ties with China, a trade relationship that could still have positive spillover effects for India.

Trade financing, trade facilitation, and investment are key to sustaining the Bangladeshi economy of more than 160 million people—needs that can be met in part through Chinese economic interests. China not only has been a crucial economic partner but also has provided Bangladesh with technology, soft grants, and development assistance. China was also one of the first foreign nations to provide medical assistance and equipment to Bangladesh during the coronavirus pandemic, including aid for the Rohingya refugee population.

How can Bangladesh minimize the impact of the pandemic on Rohingya refugees, migrant workers, and those engaged in the informal sector?

Since Bangladesh’s lockdown began, closures of schools, universities, and small- and medium-sized businesses—combined with limited transportation options—have increased social stratification, as only certain segments of the urban population have been able to adhere to lockdown measures. Many migrant workers, Rohingya refugees, and others in the informal sector have potentially exposed themselves to the virus while seeking work or essential goods. Without strong preventive measures, Rohingya refugee camps could face particularly devastating outbreaks.

The coronavirus pandemic has put a major strain on Bangladesh’s public health system. As the virus continues to spread, the lack of medical equipment and testing facilities is becoming more apparent, and vulnerable populations have been most often marginalized. Moves in recent years to privatize the country’s public health system have exacerbated the challenges of accessing care, giving rise to a larger, even more pressing policy debate during the pandemic.

Landlocked Bhutan has managed to keep its coronavirus cases contained so far, but the pandemic will still have far-reaching economic and societal spillover effects. As of May 20, Bhutan has reported twenty-one confirmed cases of COVID-19, the disease caused by the coronavirus.

Most early cases were foreigners or recent returnees from affected countries, mainly in the Middle East. The country’s first confirmed case was reported on March 5. After recovering, the patient flew home to the United States on March 13 and was followed on April 20 by his partner, Bhutan’s second patient. Bhutan has so far seen very little evidence of community transmission.

On March 22, Bhutan sealed its land border with India and one week later curbed public gatherings, travel, and business. On March 30, the government mandated a twenty-one-day quarantine for anyone arriving from abroad.

Healthcare in Bhutan is largely public-funded, and the government has borne the costs of testing, medical facilities, and quarantines. The Ministry of Health produced a preparedness and response document that details the healthcare sector’s capacities in terms of surveillance, early detection, control and prevention, response, and recovery.

The government has also developed a contact-tracing app called Druk Trace. All offices, businesses, and transportation hubs are mandated to display the QR code generated by the contact-tracing app, and all individuals using these services are required to scan the code. A manual log is kept by service providers and offices for those who do not have smartphones.

Bhutan has created a national COVID-19 response fund to ease the financial stress on citizens, as well as a high-level task force to focus on infection control, the economy, and security. The Royal Monetary Authority announced a series of measures aimed at helping businesses and citizens, including by providing working capital, waiving interest on loans, and issuing microloans for agriculture. The crisis is likely to disrupt many sectors vital to Bhutan’s economy, such as hydropower plants, agricultural exports, and tourism. The World Bank estimates that Bhutan’s real GDP growth rate will drop to 2.2–2.9 percent, down from its pre-crisis estimate of 6.5 percent.

Bhutan has devised a four-stage COVID-19 alert system and is currently in stage three, which denotes confirmed cases without evidence of secondary transmission. Compared to other countries in South Asia, Bhutan appears to be keeping the crisis under control.

Surya Valliappan Krishna is a senior project coordinator and development manager at Carnegie India.

  

Interview with Dr. Tandi Dorji, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bhutan

How does Bhutan perceive the role of international institutions in combating this pandemic?

The coronavirus does not recognize national boundaries, nor does it discriminate based on gender, race, creed, or social status. It is a pandemic that has affected the whole world. Therefore, containment and response measures must also be international in nature. No nation can fight the pandemic alone. The past few months have highlighted that global solidarity and international cooperation are crucial in fighting this common enemy of humankind, which has not seen a crisis of such scale and impact in decades.

International institutions like the United Nations and its specialized agencies, particularly the World Health Organization (WHO), have to play a critical role in the response. This role includes setting norms and regulations, mobilizing resources, mustering technical know-how for researching and developing drugs and vaccines, and managing the supply chains for medical test kits and personal protective equipment. International financial institutions must redouble their efforts to help poor and vulnerable countries cope with the adverse impacts of the pandemic on their healthcare systems, economies, and populations. International cooperation is also crucial for getting economies back on track after the pandemic and planning for the long-term recovery.

Given that South Asia is the most densely populated region in the world, what are the opportunities and challenges for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) amid this pandemic?

The most significant opportunity for SAARC is to promote greater cooperation among its members, which have a chance to build greater trust and confidence as they fight the shared threat of COVID-19. The SAARC leaders’ video conference on March 15 and the launch of its COVID-19 emergency fund are good examples.

This is also a chance for SAARC to demonstrate its renewed relevance through new initiatives like a common telemedicine framework, which would be highly beneficial for all members. Existing mechanisms such as the SAARC Disaster Management Center and the SAARC Development Fund could be strengthened.

The current situation could also help promote intraregional trade and economic integration. The SAARC members can remove technical barriers and make the movement of goods and services easy and free in areas affected by COVID-19.

A lack of resources and inadequate healthcare infrastructure remain two of the biggest challenges. In addition, highly porous borders and cultural habits of citizens accustomed to living in close proximity in multigenerational households make it difficult to implement health safety measures such as social distancing and self-quarantining. Further, most countries in the region are facing the added burdens of poverty, food and water scarcity, and other diseases that mainly affect societies’ most vulnerable groups.

In Bhutan, the hydropower, tourism, and agriculture sectors are key contributors to GDP. Given that there are likely to be delays in the completion of hydropower projects, fewer tourists, and a drop in agricultural exports (mainly to India), what are the implications of COVID-19 for Bhutan’s economy?

A slowdown in overall economic growth is inevitable. The 6–7 percent GDP growth target in the country’s Twelfth Five Year Plan (2018–2023) is expected to drop to 4–5 percent growth if the situation does not improve soon. More precise economic forecasts are difficult to project, given the high level of uncertainty surrounding the spread of the virus and the impacts of national, regional, and global containment measures.

As elsewhere, tourism was the first sector of Bhutan’s economy impacted by the pandemic. The service sector accounts for 43 percent of GDP, of which tourism and associated services such as hospitality and transportation comprise about a third. Early forecasts, considering only the impact on that sector, predict a deceleration of growth in 2020. The real impact, however, could be far greater, given that both actual data and forecasts do not capture the informal economy or secondary impacts such as those from supply chain disruptions.

Preventive public health measures such as closing schools, institutes, and recreational venues have led to a significant decline in economic activity. Physical distancing measures are also lowering overall demand for many goods and services. The construction sector, a traditional driver of growth for Bhutan, relies heavily on imported labor and raw materials and thus is experiencing disruptions due to the closure of most entry points into the country.

While the tourism sector and government coffers will lose substantial foreign exchange earnings, the government’s key concern is addressing the needs of citizens who have lost their jobs and livelihoods, especially if the present situation escalates or is prolonged.

There are opportunities for freed-up laborers to move into the agricultural and construction sectors. Investments in automation, mechanization, and wage support may be crucial to helping these sectors attract and retain a young workforce. Containment measures have also boosted demand for innovative technology-based solutions in education, e-commerce, and delivery services.

Given that Bhutan is increasingly reliant on India, how might the lengthy lockdown and the rapidly evolving situation in India impact Bhutan?

India is Bhutan’s largest and most important trading partner, and the two economies are closely linked. As Bhutan’s closest neighbor, India is important both as a source and market for its trading goods and commerce. Moreover, as a landlocked country, Bhutan must route its third-country imports and exports through India, which provides it with unhindered access to transit hubs.

India’s prolonged lockdown will impact Bhutan’s trade, commerce, and industries. India is the biggest market for several of Bhutan’s exports, including electricity, dolomite, ferrosilicon, and semi-finished products. If India imposes restrictions on imports and on the use of its transit facilities, Bhutan’s export-driven industries will struggle to sustain themselves due to a lack of market access. Moreover, Bhutan’s manufacturing and construction industries would be adversely affected, since they largely rely on India for raw materials and labor. Small and medium-sized enterprises would also be impacted, as the majority of commodities and essential items sold in Bhutan are imported from or through India. And the livelihoods of people, particularly those with lower incomes, will be further hurt if the current economic situation leads to inflationary pressures.

If there is a significant increase in COVID-19 cases in India and the lockdown is extended, there would be further disruptions to the supply of essential commodities. However, given the ties of friendship and cooperation between the two countries, India will likely facilitate the flow of goods to Bhutan, as it has for essential goods and medicines since the lockdown began.

Given that Bhutan’s healthcare system is largely public-funded, how is the government evaluating the role of national and international private healthcare in helping tackle the crisis?

Few healthcare systems around the world are equipped to handle pandemics, as many countries’ experiences with COVID-19 have already shown. Containing the coronavirus requires rapid responses and national, regional, and global cooperation.

While Bhutan is a developing country confronting its first modern pandemic, its constitution mandates the provision of free healthcare for all its people, and the country is in a better position than many of its regional neighbors thanks to its successful containment of local transmission so far. The private healthcare system is nascent, with only a handful of private selective diagnostic centers in the capital. There are private pharmacies, but the state provides most essential and lifesaving medicines for free.

As in many countries, the most pressing concern for Bhutan is the global shortage of essential medical supplies such as testing kits and personal protective equipment. But strong regional and international cooperation should provide sufficient resources.

In Bhutan, we are fortunate to have the visionary leadership of His Majesty The King during such a crucial time. Since the start of the COVID-19 outbreak, His Majesty has always emphasized that Bhutan’s priority must be to prevent community transmission at all costs. Therefore, we enhanced our containment efforts by starting screening processes at the points of entry and setting up quarantine facilities at hotels and isolation facilities at health centers for everyone entering Bhutan. All expenses for quarantine are borne by the state. With these proactive efforts, all the positive cases in the country were detected in the quarantine facilities, greatly reducing the risks of local and community transmission.

Furthermore, in terms of human resources, in addition to the 225 doctors that we currently have, the government has identified private individuals with health backgrounds, private health workers and doctors, as well as retired doctors to stand by should the COVID-19 situation worsen in Bhutan and require reinforcement. The Ministry of Health has also trained volunteers, law enforcement and military personnel, and Desuung (Bhutan’s volunteer service force) in basic health interventions so that they can be deployed to carry out screening and surveillance processes at points of entry.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has taken a multifaceted approach to fighting the coronavirus pandemic, guided by an array of national task forces. He has suspended international and domestic travel, implemented contact tracing and exposure notification, expanded diagnostic capacity, and scaled up manufacturing of medical equipment. “Had India not adopted a holistic and integrated approach,” he noted when extending the nationwide lockdown, “taking quick and decisive action, the situation in India today would have been completely different.”

This well-coordinated strategy has involved the scientific community and private sector in the development and production of testing kits, personal protective equipment, ventilators, and other respiratory devices. Recognizing the need to scale up testing, New Delhi expanded its diagnostic network to include 391 government laboratories and 164 private labs. With its ramped-up capacity, India has tested 2,512,388 samples as of May 20. Following the model pursued by other countries, the government has also launched a contact tracing app to identify, notify, and support people who may have been exposed to infected patients.

Despite these aggressive measures, the caseload had steadily mounted, reaching 107,819 reported cases and 3,434 deaths as of May 20. More than 1,200 coronavirus cases reported in Asia’s largest slum, Dharavi, only add to the bleak reality of the situation. Moreover, the sudden nationwide lockdown has proved to be a massive logistical challenge for migrant workers. Travel disruptions, vulnerable supply chains, and confusion about which essential services can operate have greatly affected those engaged in the informal sector. Although the Indian government has announced a relief package and is closely working with states and NGOs to provide food and shelter to these stranded workers, the measures do not seem sufficient to assuage the plight of those affected by an extended lockdown.

India is currently considering how best to ease its restrictions. Despite scaled-up testing and enhanced contact tracing, the country’s public health infrastructure must also be prepared for a rapid surge in cases in the period after May 31, when the nationwide lockdown is scheduled to end.

Shruti Sharma is a research analyst with the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She works primarily on the safety, security, and ethical implications of emerging biotechnologies.

  

Interview with Rakesh Sood, former Indian diplomat and Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, India

How does India perceive the role of international institutions in combating this pandemic?

All international institutions have been found wanting. Political organizations like the UN Security Council, G7, and G20 have failed to take action because of lack of leadership. The United States has been reluctant to lead, European countries are preoccupied, and China is more intent on changing global perceptions of its role than taking a lead by investing effort and capital. The specialized World Health Organization could have been the natural driver for collective policy action but has been caught up in the U.S.-China blame game and lost credibility.

Given that South Asia is the most densely populated region in the world, what are the opportunities and challenges for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) amid this pandemic?

Since even countries in better integrated regions like the EU and Southeast Asia—with much more efficient regional mechanisms and institutions—have leaned on national measures rather than regional coordination to respond to the pandemic, it is unrealistic to expect SAARC to play an effective role. As the region’s largest economy, India alone can support its neighbors. That support is bound to be limited and, in most cases, bilateral.

Confronting the risks of complex global supply chains has reinforced nationalistic rhetoric around economic protectionism. What will be the implications for the global economy if more countries remodel their supply chains and use domestic industry to bridge the gap?

Extended global supply chains were already being strained, largely on account of U.S.-China trade tensions that had spilled over into the technology sector. The coronavirus pandemic has highlighted additional concerns about supply chains for medical equipment and pharmaceutical products. Where possible, supply chains will certainly be shortened and national capacities further developed. However, not all countries have equal recourse to such policies. Larger economies will have a natural advantage, while smaller economies will do what they can to make their supply chains more resilient.

Given that India is mostly dependent on China for the supply of raw materials needed to manufacture hydroxychloroquine and other pharmaceuticals, why did India choose to remove exemptions for drug exports?

Its decision was driven by political factors. These drugs had already been brought under a restricted category that authorized the government to clear exports on a case-by-case basis. The previous decision to impose a blanket ban was ill-advised: it took away the government’s leeway and its quick reversal caused avoidable embarrassment.

How do you assess the impact of this pandemic on the informal economy of India? What measures can be taken to support the job market?

Estimates suggest 85–93 percent of the total workforce is engaged in the informal economy, largely in agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and trade. These roughly 430 million workers labor without protection or regulation by the state; amid the disruptions of the pandemic, they will need food and income support for at least four to six months. At a ballpark figure of 10,000 Indian rupees per worker ($132), this works out to over 2 trillion Indian rupees ($26.4 billion), approximately 1 percent of India’s GDP. However, the longer the lockdown continues, even if partially eased, the more the economy will shrink. India will also have to bear significant medical costs, though those may be somewhat constrained by the limited capacity of its healthcare system.

The spread of the coronavirus pandemic poses dire threats to small island nations like Maldives. With its very foundation at stake, Maldives has invested in enhancing its bilateral and multilateral partnerships to curb the spread of the virus and reinvigorate its economy.

On March 12, Maldives declared one of South Asia’s first states of public health emergency, allowing authorities to enact restrictive containment measures such as a nationwide shutdown of educational institutions, guesthouses and hotels, and nonessential services. To limit the spread of the virus, the country closed its borders to arrivals from some of the worst-hit countries and later suspended on-arrival visas. The government also decided to postpone local council elections that had been scheduled to be held in April.

By May 20, the archipelagic nation had reported a total of 1,186 confirmed cases of COVID-19, the disease caused by the coronavirus, including four deaths. Given the country’s capacity constraints, the Maldivian government has relied heavily on bilateral relationships and multilateral organizations for essential medical supplies. To enhance testing capacity, the World Health Organization (WHO) donated 11,000 test kits to Maldives, and the government has revealed plans to bring in over 19,000 test kits. Private actors like Medtech Maldives have also stepped up by bringing in shipments of test kits and personal protective equipment.

With its limited medical infrastructure, Maldives would face particularly high risks from a serious outbreak among its population of more than half a million people. The nation’s large migrant worker population could prove to be another big hurdle. As a major recipient of aid from China, India, and other Asian countries, Maldives has often looked for other avenues of humanitarian and medical assistance over the years. Maldives has also continued to work closely with the Indian government to evacuate its citizens from Wuhan, China, the origin of the coronavirus outbreak.

For the Maldives, the slowdown in the global tourism industry will have dire consequences, as will suppressed construction activity. Tourism directly and indirectly accounts for two-thirds of Maldives’ GDP. While the government has already announced an economic recovery plan of 2.5 billion Maldivian rufiyaa ($161.3 million), only time will tell the full financial impact of the pandemic and the way forward for the country.

Rhea Menon is a senior communications coordinator and research assistant at Carnegie India.

  

Interview with Nilanthi Samaranayake, Director of the Strategy and Policy Analysis Program at CNA, a nonprofit research and analysis organization in Arlington, Virginia

How does Maldives perceive the role of international institutions in combating this pandemic?

As a small island nation, Maldives appears to understand its need for contributions from international institutions to combat the coronavirus. It is seeking financial assistance from the Asian Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The World Bank recently approved a $7.3 million project to help Maldives respond to the virus and build capacity in its health system to enhance virus detection.

Given that South Asia is the most densely populated region in the world, what are the opportunities and challenges for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) amid this pandemic?

SAARC has generally been viewed as a moribund institution inasmuch as the long-standing conflict between India and Pakistan has limited its ability to reach consensus on important issues. However, the SAARC Disaster Management Center has played a critical coordinating function to limit the spread of the virus, with its website serving as a central data repository.

At the outset, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi brought together regional leaders and proposed a SAARC emergency fund. His decision to work through SAARC was surprising given how much emphasis his administration has placed on the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation as an alternative regional institution. India offered $10 million to the emergency fund, while Sri Lanka pledged $5 million, and even Bhutan offered $100,000. For its part, Maldives offered $200,000 to the fund, despite its own significant domestic needs. Though these early developments are encouraging, the persistent India-Pakistan conflict will likely continue to limit the potential for regional cooperation through SAARC.

What are the implications of the pandemic on the country’s tourism-driven economy?

The pandemic is unquestionably affecting Maldives’ luxury tourism industry, which accounts for up to two-thirds of the country’s gross domestic product. Maldives has already had its credit rating downgraded, and one estimate projects it could face a foreign currency shortfall of up to $450 million. However, the pandemic is in part exacerbating economic troubles and external debt burdens that Maldives was struggling with even before the crisis. Foreign currency earnings from tourism are critical for the country to pay off debts and maintain sufficient exchange reserves. These are the long-term challenges that Maldives has confronted in the past decade as it has become an upper-middle-income economy. While this is an overall positive development, countries achieving this status lose access to the concessionary loans from international institutions, including the Asian Development Bank and the IMF, on which their growth had depended.

The IMF has approved roughly $29 million to help alleviate the pressure on Maldives’ economy and foreign exchange reserves. India has also offered to swap $150 million in currency to help Maldives manage its cash flow during this difficult period. However, these stopgap measures will not address the long-term, structural threats to the country’s economy that can only be alleviated through the adoption of effective debt-management strategies.

Given the nature of the virus and its transmission, many countries are turning inward. Is Maldives trying to reduce its dependence on imports of staple foods and medicines during this pandemic?

There is no concrete evidence that Maldives is actively pursuing broad-based steps to reduce its dependence on imports. Like many other island nations, Maldives has geographic circumstances that necessitate the import of critical goods such as food and medicine. Currently, the low-lying, archipelagic country’s biggest existential threat is rising sea levels.

Delivery of health services has been hampered by the country’s geography, limited numbers of tertiary hospitals, and lack of skilled professionals. How does the government plan to address these issues both during and after the crisis?

Maldives has consistently relied on external assistance to compensate for its insufficient domestic capacity to respond to the pandemic. India’s assistance is significant; this is not surprising given the history of close bilateral military cooperation between the two countries. The Indian Army set up a laboratory in Maldives for testing presumed coronavirus patients, staffed by a fourteen-person medical team. Meanwhile, the Indian Air Force delivered tons of medicine and hospital supplies. Other countries have provided supplies as well, such as China and Bangladesh, but India appears to be the largest source of aid.

Nepal so far has had fewer cases of the coronavirus than its neighbors, but it has adopted a similar strategy of enforcing social distancing to combat the pandemic. As of May 20, Nepal had reported only 427 confirmed cases, including forty-two recoveries and two fatalities. Although the first coronavirus case in Nepal was detected in January, the government only began imposing restrictions in March, when India experienced an uptick in cases.

On March 20, Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli announced a partial lockdown—halting nonessential services, sealing Nepal’s borders, and placing temporary bans on flights and long-haul transportation across the country. While the lockdown was supposed to be lifted after two weeks, Oli clarified that as long as the number of coronavirus cases in India continued to rise, the government could not lift the restrictions. This is mainly because of the porous nature of the Indo-Nepali border, which makes it almost impossible to curb movement. Nepal’s easing of restrictions is thus likely to mirror India’s.

The Nepali government has thrown its weight behind enforcing social distancing to contain the spread of the coronavirus, knowing full well that the country’s fragile healthcare system leaves it ill-equipped to confront a major outbreak. Since early April, Kathmandu has expanded testing to eleven laboratories across the country. The government has focused on collecting samples in western Nepal and the Terai districts, regions that have seen an influx of returning migrant workers from India. But as in other countries, questions have been raised about the reliability of results generated by rapid diagnostic tests, which are more convenient than polymerase chain reaction tests but are known to return to false negatives.

The international community has been actively assisting Nepal in combating the pandemic. In early April, the World Bank approved $29 million in development aid to boost Kathmandu’s capacity to detect new cases and trace their contacts. The funding will also help the Ministry of Health and Population set up new isolation facilities and intensive care units. Nepal has received additional assistance from China, which sent testing kits, thermometers, and personal protective equipment in late March. India recently sent Nepal 23 tons of essential medicines, including doses of paracetamol (acetaminophen) and hydroxychloroquine, and its health professionals are working with their Nepali counterparts on the ground.

The pandemic has already impacted the Nepali economy. Tourism, a source of both employment and foreign exchange, has come to a near standstill, as have manufacturing and agriculture. Additionally, remittances sent by Nepali workers abroad—which accounted for nearly 26 percent of the country’s GDP in 2019—have significantly declined due to the global economic downturn.

Rahul Bhatia is a research assistant at Carnegie India.

  

Interview with Sujeev Shakya, Chair, Nepal Economic Forum

How does Nepal perceive the role of international institutions in combating the coronavirus pandemic?

Nepal understands the challenges that countries across the world are facing as a result of the pandemic. As a result, it does not expect support to pour in from either international institutions or the international community at large at the same pace as it did after the 2015 earthquake. Overall, Nepal is in good international standing and receives aid from the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Further, the country benefits from its geographic location—nestled between India and China—and receives support from both. Once the pandemic subsides, Nepal will look to international institutions for support—specifically, investments to boost economic activity, rather than grants or donations.

Given that South Asia is the most densely populated region in the world, what are the opportunities and challenges for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) amid this pandemic?

South Asia is densely populated, adding to the challenges of containing the coronavirus. More than SAARC as an organization—or even the governments of its member countries—it is up to the people of the region to follow their local health measures. Containing the outbreak requires people to enforce social distancing, keep their environments clean, and help each other in this time of need.

How would you describe Nepal’s preparedness to tackle the coronavirus outbreak? Does Kathmandu require further international assistance?

As in many parts of the world, preparations in Nepal weren’t up to the mark. However, given that the trillion-dollar economies of the United States and Europe are suffering, it would not be fair to expect the Nepali government to do much better. Nevertheless, Kathmandu should have done more testing during the initial phase of the lockdown. Instead, the government became embroiled in chain-of-command issues and there was a lack of coordination among government agencies.

Confusion about the procurement of medical supplies also hindered Nepal’s preparation. The government was forced to cancel its contract with the Omni Group—the firm contracted to supply the country with testing kits, personal protective equipment, and thermal cyclers for laboratory tests—owing to delivery delays and the receipt of substandard equipment. The government subsequently contracted the Nepali Army to procure medical equipment from China. Fortunately, the country is at least well situated to reach out to its two large neighbors, India and China, for help.

What is the likely impact of the pandemic on Nepal’s informal workers and what can the Nepalese government do to help them?

Nepal is facing challenges with regard to employment, but its people are typically prepared for such disruptions, following their recent experiences during the earthquake, blockade, and other breakdowns from strikes and the insurgency. Even most of the poor would have saved enough food and cash to last two or three months. In the long run, the economy is likely to bounce back quickly, and people’s income levels will be restored.

With regard to Nepali migrant workers, it is true that Nepal has a large remittance inflow that has been impacted by the pandemic. But the behavioral pattern is unlikely to change—Nepalis will continue to go abroad and work because of continued labor demand in those regions, particularly the Middle East. Fewer migrant workers may go abroad over the next six to eight months, but as the pandemic lets up, this travel is likely to resume.

Given that Nepal has witnessed prolonged political turbulence in the last three decades, is the coronavirus likely to have an impact on the political stability of the country?

The political situation in Nepal only calmed two years ago after nearly fifteen years of instability. However, the current government is utilizing the current lockdown to strengthen its political position. Recently, the government issued two controversial ordinances that drew criticism from both the opposition parties and from within the ruling party. The first dealt with the splitting of a political party. Under the current Political Parties Act, a party can split only if a split vote secures 40 percent support in the party central committee as well as the parliamentary party. The new ordinance required only 40 percent support in either the party central committee or the parliamentary party, drawing accusations that the Oli administration was engineering a political split. The second ordinance sought to change the functioning of the Constitutional Council, allowing decisions to be taken if they enjoyed the support of two out of its six members. Nepali President Bidhya Devi Bhandari was criticized for approving these ordinances, and her independence from the executive was called into question. As a result, she ultimately repealed them both.

The ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP), which was formed from different communist factions, continues to be divided and is likely to see more intraparty fighting. Different factions within the party have sought to take advantage of the pandemic and have been quick to criticize Oli’s handling of the outbreak. Further, the co-chair of the NCP, former prime minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal, will continue to challenge Oli’s party leadership. But because the NCP holds nearly two-thirds of the seats in the Nepali Parliament, a major upheaval is unlikely. As the pandemic unfolds, the government is likely to continue its tendency to push authoritarian measures by introducing legislation and taking actions that curtail freedom of speech, censor the media, and co-opt the judiciary.

The coronavirus pandemic in Pakistan took root due to inadequate testing of travelers returning from Iran, including the country’s first confirmed case, a patient diagnosed in Karachi on February 26. The disease spread during March and then spiked in April as community transmission accelerated. As of May 20, Pakistan has reported 45,898 confirmed cases, including 985 deaths and 13,101 recovered patients. While Pakistan’s government aimed to conduct 25,000 tests a day by the end of April, to date, the highest number it has conducted is 14,818 on May 15.

One of the biggest challenges for Pakistan will be the economic impact of the virus. Less than a year ago, Pakistan was forced to comply with its thirteenth bailout agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which included a devaluation of the rupee and an increase in utility prices. In February, Pakistan’s economy had been showing certain positive, albeit limited, trends—such as reserves of the State Bank of Pakistan hitting a twenty-one-month high. Now, however, the World Bank expects Pakistan’s real GDP growth will contract by 1.3 percent in 2020 and reach only 0.9 percent in 2021 under its baseline scenario. Pakistan’s informal economy, accounting for 72 percent of employment, has weathered previous financial crises but will be hit particularly hard as tens of millions of workers, who rely on cash-based sectors to meet their daily demands, will see their movement, and the movement of goods, curtailed.

Another consequence of the pandemic has been an increase in the Pakistani army’s involvement in everyday affairs. Even as the virus was spreading, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan resisted calls to impose a sweeping lockdown out of concern for the economic costs. On March 22, Khan affirmed that the government would not institute lockdown measures. However, within twenty-four hours, the army announced that it would oversee a shutdown to curb the spread of the virus—a swift step that marked a sharp contrast with Khan’s indecisiveness.

The Pakistani army has been fanned out across the country to assist civilian authorities. Its deployment is pursuant to Article 245 of the constitution, which has never before been invoked nationwide and states that no high court enjoys power in any area where the armed forces are operating, thus granting the army unchecked power. In addition to being sidelined by the army, the central government has also been criticized by opposition leaders in provincial governments, who are taking autonomous decisions to combat the pandemic.

Recognizing the challenges faced by society’s most vulnerable populations, the government has announced a financial stimulus package that includes 150 billion Pakistani rupees ($937.5 million) for low-income families to support monthly cash payments to households of 3,000 Pakistani rupees ($18.75). Despite these measures, Pakistan’s battle with the pandemic will still have to contend with a stronger army, political polarization, and weak health infrastructure.

Shreyas Shende is a research assistant and executive assistant to the director at Carnegie India.

  

Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa, research associate at SOAS South Asia Institute, SOAS University of London

How does Pakistan perceive the role of international institutions in combating this pandemic?

Pakistan has a long-standing relationship with the World Health Organization (WHO), which is guiding countries around the world during the pandemic. While COVID-19, the disease caused by the coronavirus, is a new and immediate concern, polio and other infectious diseases have started to resurface in Pakistan. However, Islamabad is also keen to seek further bilateral cooperation from allies like China, which has already sent medical equipment and aid.

The most important category of international organizations for Pakistan appear to be those in control of resources. Pakistan’s government has approached multilateral aid donors like the IMF, the Paris Club, and G20 to seek relief in debt repayment and help with meeting its other expenses. Yet Islamabad’s overall strategy during this period does not preclude its military-strategic sensitivities. It has remained focused on the UN to bring international attention to Indian-occupied Kashmir and the state of pandemic there.

Given that South Asia is the most densely populated region in the world, what are the opportunities and challenges for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) amid this pandemic?

Regional organizations like SAARC must cooperate to share strategies, medicine, and even personnel to fight the pandemic. However, the Pakistani government’s suspicion of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has impeded progress on most regional initiatives. During a recent SAARC meeting initiated by India, Pakistan’s representative drew attention to the Kashmir crisis. Important as the situation in Kashmir is, Islamabad’s position has kept SAARC from moving forward on a range of other issues. Of course, this does not rule out bilateral cooperation between countries of the region.

With the Pakistani army deployed to assist federal and provincial governments with the pandemic response, how will its role evolve with respect to matters apart from foreign policy and security?

The military’s role has grown in part because civilian leadership has proved ineffective and unable to negotiate with provincial governments. Though units deployed around the country are cautious in approaching civilians due to fear of contracting the virus, the army has seen a tremendous increase in its organizational power. Khan has also suggested use of the Inter-Services Intelligence agency’s tracking system to deal with the pandemic, which could be used more broadly to counter dissent.

The hybrid civil-military regime in Pakistan creates greater comfort with military involvement in civilian affairs, which helps explain why former director general of inter-services public relations, Lt. General (retd) Asim Bajwa, was brought in as a special adviser to the prime minister for information. The civilian government and the military share opposition to the eighteenth amendment to Pakistan’s constitution, which grants financial autonomy to the provinces at the expense of the federal budget (including national defense). The civilian government is also centralizing overall decisionmaking and has set up a National Coordination Committee (NCC), headed by a three-star general, to fight the pandemic. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), a key organization in dealing with natural emergencies, is already headed by an army officer. Both the NCC and NDMA deal with international agencies and distribute resources, acting as the face of the state response.

As the virus emerged in China, Pakistan’s all-weather ally, has there been an impact on local perceptions of China?

Sino-Pakistani relations are strong but nevertheless have their limits. The Pakistani government did not stop flights to and from China until late in the course of the pandemic. The two states cooperated on the understanding that China would not send home Pakistani students, especially those studying in Wuhan. Beijing agreed to take care of these students and keep them in quarantine. Moreover, China provided medical assistance to Pakistan, including ventilators and a team of doctors. Such decisions have maintained positive perceptions of Beijing, and China may play an even more central role in Pakistan’s postpandemic economic recovery.

Given preexisting challenges, the crucial role of the informal economy, and substantial unemployment, what steps can Pakistan take to mitigate the economic impact of the virus?

Pakistan must sustain its core industries and feed its population of 212 million people, while servicing its $110 billion in debt. Its rate of GDP growth has slowed from 5.5 percent in 2018 to 2.4 percent in 2020, according to the World Bank, though the IMF predicts a further fall to -1.5 percent this year. So far, the government has adopted a conservative approach, seeking funds from multilateral aid donors and assistance from the Pakistani diaspora network. The IMF provided a $1.39 billion relief package that will likely help pay off external debts. Islamabad is also negotiating with China for extensions on $30 billion in Belt and Road Initiative loans.

There is a serious need to renegotiate foreign debt and divert resources to health, education, and fiscal support to individuals and families. In addition, the government must reform domestic taxation to increase the share paid by the rich. However, there is very little momentum behind plans for economic restructuring.

Sri Lanka was one of the few countries in South Asia to take proactive measures as the coronavirus pandemic spread, yet its fight against the virus has still hit political and economic roadblocks. As of May 20, the country has reported a total of 1,027 coronavirus cases and nine deaths.

Sri Lanka’s first coronavirus case was confirmed in late January, when a Chinese tourist was hospitalized after falling sick. As the number of cases rose, the government decreed a nationwide curfew starting March 20. The curfew played an important role in reducing community transmission and enabling better surveillance, noted Deepa Gamage, a consultant epidemiologist at Sri Lanka’s health ministry. The government also deployed large numbers of armed forces to aid the civilian government’s fight against the pandemic, particularly by building quarantine centers and conducting contact tracing. Sri Lanka eventually lifted its curfew on April 20, but then quickly reinstated it after a spike in new cases, largely within the Sri Lankan navy.

Overall, Sri Lanka’s pandemic strategy has been effective. Thanks in part to help from abroad, it can now test more than 1,000 people per day. China donated 20,000 test kits, 100,000 surgical masks, and 50,000 pairs of medical gloves. In addition, Australia pledged 10,200 pairs of protective overalls and 200,000 gloves for Sri Lankan defense forces involved in the fight against the virus. India has also stepped in by providing thirteen metric tons of essential medicine and medical gloves.

The pandemic has important implications for Sri Lanka’s domestic politics and ethnic relations. As of this writing, the Sri Lankan parliament remains dissolved, concentrating unprecedented power in the hands of the central leadership with no democratic opposition. Given the strict restrictions on movement, the parliamentary elections scheduled to take place on April 25 were postponed. Meanwhile, religious tensions were inflamed when several Muslims were forced to cremate their dead, contrary to Islamic tradition. Sri Lanka’s social fabric had already been under added strain since the 2019 Easter bombings.

The coronavirus has seriously weakened Sri Lanka’s economy. The tea and garment industries—which produce some of the country’s top exports—have come to a grinding halt. While the tea industry is aiming to ameliorate the impact by reviving regular tea auctions, which would provide the government with foreign exchange reserves, the garment industry faces the threat of mass unemployment due to loss of cash flow. Meanwhile, Sri Lankan tourism has seen a massive dip owing to border closures. Nearly two-thirds of Sri Lanka’s workforce is informal, and the restrictions on mobility have severely affected workers’ daily earnings. To provide support, the government has announced an allowance for workers from the informal sector. It remains to be seen if these economic strategies can see the country through a prolonged lockdown, as domestic politics grow fractious and ethnoreligious tensions escalate.

Raghuveer Nidumolu is a Knowledge Transfer program coordinator at Carnegie India.

  

Interview with Jayanath Colombage, Additional Secretary to the President of Sri Lanka for Foreign Relations and Director General of the Institute of National Security Studies

How does Sri Lanka perceive the role of international institutions in combating this pandemic?

International institutions like the World Health Organization (WHO) are the leading multilateral authority for handling a pandemic, but its credibility is now under threat. Given that this coronavirus is a new strain, WHO officials needed time to identify its RNA and behavior before they could recommend ways to tackle it. Although international institutions are important, they take time to respond effectively, so individual countries must do what they can to prepare for future pandemics.

Like many developing countries, Sri Lanka has received loans in the past from institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank. These institutions can help countries weather the pandemic by declaring a moratorium on such loans, postponing repayment until their economies can bounce back.

Given that South Asia is the most densely populated region in the world, what are the opportunities and challenges for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) amid this pandemic?

The initiatives undertaken by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi—including recent video conference calls and a coronavirus development fund—have pulled SAARC out of three years of relative hibernation. The organization can now better serve as a platform for South Asian countries to come together and face this disastrous situation together.

For a country like Sri Lanka, SAARC can provide various opportunities. Sri Lanka’s top export markets are in Europe and the United States, where trade has collapsed because of the pandemic. Sri Lanka and other South Asian countries would benefit from a regional approach to economic ties rather than relying totally on a globalized world. During the pandemic, such an approach is especially important for the production and distribution of test kits, personal protective equipment (PPE), and other medical supplies. The region—and, indeed, much of the world—already depends heavily on India’s exports of medicines and pharmaceuticals.

How has the Sri Lankan government handled the coronavirus outbreak?

When the coronavirus was spreading in the central Chinese city of Wuhan, Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa set up a committee to study the crisis and make recommendations on prevention, testing, and treatment measures. The committee took into account WHO guidelines and regularly monitored the situation in China. These measures helped Sri Lanka promptly detect its first patient. The government brought back Sri Lankan students from Wuhan and other parts of China and sent them to quarantine centers almost immediately.

Currently, with the Sri Lankan parliament dissolved, the government has made decisions more quickly. The president, the prime minister, and a team of fifteen cabinet members are now directly involved in coronavirus response strategies—monitoring the situation, consulting experts, and issuing directives and guidelines.

Given Sri Lanka’s history of civil strife, will it be easy or difficult for the government to employ military aid alongside civilian government initiatives?

The Sri Lankan military was only called in when there was a need to set up quarantine centers and provide medical assistance. The military was also involved in contact tracing and in producing and sourcing ventilators, ICU beds, PPE, and other supplies. No other organization in Sri Lanka would have been able to take on those tasks as readily.

When the virus hit the country, it did not respect ethnicity. Although initially there were some protests in Tamil-dominated areas when medical camps were being set up, resistance to military assistance cooled as the gravity of the pandemic set in.

How has the pandemic impacted Sri Lanka’s informal economy? What steps, if any, are being taken to address this issue?

Financial assistance is being provided to workers in the informal sector, which has been hit hard by curfew measures and mobility restrictions. The government has also allowed a six-month moratorium on loan payments and plans to provide more economic relief through reduced interest rates. Sri Lanka is also keen to revive critical economic sectors like the tea and garment industries that produce a major share of the country’s exports and generate substantial foreign exchange revenue. In the future, focusing development attention on agriculture and small- and medium-sized enterprises will reduce the economy’s dependence on global markets.