This publication is a product of Carnegie China. For more work by Carnegie China, click here.
Amid escalating tensions between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, concerns over a military confrontation at the Second Thomas Shoal—potentially involving the United States—loom large. Despite these fears, there are substantial reasons to believe that both Beijing and Manila will strive to avoid military conflict. Chinese leaders must seriously consider the regional geopolitical consequences and the significant distraction from their current focus on domestic socioeconomic challenges. For Manila, the immediate constraint is the unfavorable balance of military power compared to China. Many uncertainties remain regarding how the United States, an ally of the Philippines, may react if a naval skirmish occurs in the South China Sea.
A crucial issue is how Manila and its allies will ultimately respond to China’s gray zone tactics in the South China Sea. These tactics have proven difficult for regional states that lay claim to parts of the South China Sea and their supporters for over a decade and are increasingly the most crucial factor in deciding the outcome of ongoing tensions between Beijing and Manila.
Escalating Tensions Between Beijing and Manila
Beijing appears determined to seize what it believes to be a good opportunity to occupy the Second Thomas Shoal. It has attempted to do this through actions such as using water cannons to prevent Filipino vessels from transporting construction materials to repair the BRP Sierra Madre, a Philippine Navy ship deliberately run aground that now serves as a Philippine military detachment on the Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratley Islands.
The Philippines has a strong incentive to reinforce the BRP Sierra Madre so it can continue occupying the feature in the long term, potentially permanently. Amid the ongoing dispute, Manila has provided subsistence goods to its marines on the BRP Sierra Madre, which Beijing says it has permitted under humanitarian considerations. The Philippines might have also discreetly supplied limited construction materials to the BRP Sierra Madre during this time. Still, there remain concerns that the vessel may disintegrate if it is not substantially strengthened. The two countries’ objectives seem irreconcilable, and the escalation of conflict is quite possible and may lead to war.
From another perspective, however, China may choose to continue gray zone tactics in the South China Sea, which may eventually exhaust Manila’s resources and policy options, allowing Beijing to achieve its near-term goals.
Several questions arise in this context: Will China’s gray zone tactics continue to be effective? Will Manila and its allies find ways to circumvent China’s approach and reinforce the BRP Sierra Madre? If no other options exist, will Manila risk using more forceful means, perhaps with support from its allies, to break China’s blockade? If Manila’s assertive actions render China’s gray zone tactics ineffective, military conflict in the area is likely.
Geostrategic Constraints for China
China may not readily decide to use forceful means to achieve its goals. Since 1949, China has settled most territorial disputes on land with neighboring countries without resorting to armed force, often seeking mutual compromise instead. However, one can also point to naval conflicts in the South China Sea in 1974 and 1988.
Second, China’s South China Sea policy is closely associated with its neighborhood diplomacy and foreign policy toward the United States. For decades, China has emphasized the importance of its foreign relations with neighboring states. Some Chinese analysts argue that Beijing should continue to exhibit strategic patience and tactical flexibility in resolving territorial and maritime disputes and advocate “setting aside disputes and pursuing joint development.”
On the other hand, China has become more assertive in pushing for its claims in the South China Sea as its capabilities have grown rapidly. Beijing has developed a stronger desire to use its newfound power to assert what it regards as its legitimate sovereign and maritime rights. Numerous conflicts have occurred in the South China Sea between China and other claimant countries since the 2010s. One may argue that Washington’s pivot to Asia has contributed to Beijing’s assertive policy and major-power strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.
Despite their assertiveness in recent years, Chinese decisionmakers still face a difficult strategic choice between asserting maritime rights and managing regional geopolitical alignments. The territorial dispute with Manila intersects with China’s foreign policy toward other neighboring states and extra-regional powers. Beijing must consider how to safeguard claimed territory and maritime rights without provoking fear among its neighbors.
Beijing understands that if it resorts to military action, other neighboring states will likely offer diplomatic, if not military, support to Manila. In particular, states with overlapping territorial and maritime claims with China may fear Beijing will employ a similar approach to resolve their disputes and consequently align even more closely with extra-regional powers. Hence, Beijing must exercise caution, as these outcomes contradict its regional strategic objectives. Many Chinese analysts are already concerned about the growing security cooperation between the Philippines, the United States, Japan, and Australia in the South China Sea in the past months, in addition to their worries about the growth of various U.S.-led minilateral security arrangements in the region such as the Quad (a strategic security dialogue between the United States, Australia, India, and Japan) and AUKUS (a trilateral security partnership involving Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
What's Going to Happen to Beijing’s Gray Zone Tactics?
While Chinese leaders understand these geopolitical constraints, they also want to expand China’s presence and influence in the South China Sea. In the current conflict with the Philippines, Beijing’s strategy appears to be maximally leveraging gray zone tactics to exhaust the survival of the Filipino vessel on the Second Thomas Shoal. When the vessel collapses, the shoal may quickly fall into Chinese control. Beijing hopes this approach will help avoid the worst-case regional geopolitical consequences of an outright military conflict.
Many Chinese policy elites believe that China’s gray zone approach is the best option to address the abovementioned geostrategic dilemma. For over a year, China has effectively blocked the Philippines’ resupply missions and halted ship repairs through gray zone tactics. Consequently, the Philippines faces a challenging predicament between responding to China’s blockade and saving its occupation of the Second Thomas Shoal. A power imbalance and logistical complexities hinder the Philippines’ ability to counter China’s approach.
In the worst-case scenario, Manila may consider military measures or seek military support from extra-regional powers to counter China’s actions. If this occurs, China will likely respond with overwhelming military power, justifying it as retaliation and self-defense. Beijing may end up controlling the Second Thomas Shoal as a result of such a military conflict.
Conclusion
Due to its historical policy preference, regional strategic interests, and the usefulness of gray zone tactics, Beijing may want to avoid the blatant use of force against Manila to settle territorial and maritime disputes. However, this does not mean Beijing will exclude the use of military force as a tool for resolving disputes. The risk of armed confrontation exists, particularly if Manila undertakes more forceful actions to render China’s gray zone approach ineffective. Efforts to de-escalate the South China Sea conflict and restart Beijing-Manila bilateral dialogue would be the surest ways to prevent tensions and conflict from escalating into war. A challenging yet intriguing policy proposal for decision-makers in Beijing and Manila to consider would be jointly establishing a marine park at the Second Thomas Shoal aimed at promoting scientific research, environmental protection, and fishery cooperation. While this idea has occasionally been discussed among scholars from China and Southeast Asian countries over the past decade, it has yet to be addressed at the official level. If China and the Philippines consider this possibility, it could positively impact regional peace and stability.
