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On December 9, the Philippines reported that Chinese Coast Guard ships used water cannons against Filipino vessels near the Scarborough Shoal, a high-tide feature within West Philippine Sea, the name for the part of the South China Sea under Philippine jurisdiction. The Filipino boats were on a humanitarian and support mission to provide resources to more than thirty fishing vessels near the shoal. The Chinese Coast Guard used its water cannons at least eight times, significantly damaging one of the humanitarian vessel’s communication and navigation equipment. Additionally, the coast guard blocked the fishing vessels awaiting the humanitarian ships.
A day later, the Chinese Coast Guard fired its water cannons again, this time on the Philippine Coast Guard. The incident near the Second Thomas Shoal severely damaged the engine of a Filipino Coast Guard vessel after it was hit by a Chinese boat. Following the two incidents, the Philippines filed protests before China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and it summoned the Chinese ambassador.
China’s coercive measures in the contested maritime region have increased in 2023. Before the December incidents, China deployed dangerous maneuvers to block and harass the Philippines from conducting resupply missions. Some of these activities included the use of military-grade lasers, water cannons, ramming vessels, and swarming incidents that demonstrated a show of force. For the Philippines, China’s actions are alarming, and the costs of not doing anything—or not doing enough—come with a high price. For the international community, the risks—for states, the regional architecture, and the rules-based international order—are too significant to ignore.
China’s actions undermine the sovereign and territorial integrity of the Philippines as enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and clarified in a 2016 arbitration award. The creation of artificial islands and military installations within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone boosts its maritime militia, which has been reported to chase Filipino fisherfolk away from their traditional fishing grounds. The inability to fish translates to less income, and it can impact the country’s food security, so sovereignty and territoriality are essential, but how these concepts are articulated as human security issues are critical to the Philippines.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is also at risk if China’s actions are not addressed. ASEAN has been heavily criticized over the years, such as in its inability to make headway on a code of conduct for the South China Sea or to take definitive action in Myanmar. But its inability to act also reveals its constraints. The Philippines will take its turn as the ASEAN chair in 2026, and now is the perfect time to start planning the direction it wants the code of conduct negotiations to take. China’s insistence that talks about the code are ongoing belies the truth that the negotiations are stalled.
Finally, not doing anything or not doing enough to stanch China’s actions has implications at the international level, especially in light of the strategic rivalry between the United States and China. The trajectory of the competition in 2024 will have to include factors such as the elections in Taiwan in January and those in the United States in November. In these two cases, domestic dynamics will inevitably shape China’s and the United States’ foreign policies, which can either bolster or further undermine the post-1945 rules-based international order.
Although the risks are high, some measures can be taken to minimize the costs.
The Philippines can continue to diversify its international relations. While it has recently boosted its alliance with the United States by identifying new sites under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement and signing a landmark deal on developing small modular nuclear reactors for the development of civilian nuclear energy infrastructure, it should equally deepen its partnerships with other powers. In November, Japan and the Philippines signed a security assistance deal worth $4.2 million. The security cooperation underscores maritime domain awareness (MDA) that can be used to detect and track Chinese Coast Guard vessels in the region. Additionally, MDA can strengthen maritime law enforcement to address piracy and armed robbery at sea and identify and regulate illegal fishing activities. These will entail increased coordination between the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard with their counterparts in ASEAN through joint maritime training exercises.
MDA also has nonmilitary applications. In particular, it can be used to address the development needs of coastal communities. Civil maritime security programs can include coastal management, coral reef protection and restoration, and capacity building of and for local communities. Australia is working closely with the Philippines on this end. Ultimately, civil maritime security programs can minimize the effects of climate change in the long run.
The Philippines also can impose economic sanctions that can cancel or limit the extent of existing Chinese business operations in the country, which can include joint oil and gas exploration deals in the West Philippine Sea, as well as completely shutting down the notorious offshore gaming operators in the Philippines. Recently, the Philippines deported 180 Chinese nationals involved in such operations in Manila. In this context, the Philippine government must also work on countering Chinese information campaigns about a potential economic backlash if targeted sanctions are imposed. One way to fight this misinformation is to emphasize trade between China and the Philippines has remained constant as a percentage of gross domestic product, despite tensions between the two countries. These measures can lead the Philippines to build a collective of likeminded states to hold China accountable for its actions.
At the regional level, ASEAN can lead initiatives on nontraditional security issues, such as transnational crime, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response. These are low-lying fruits, and ASEAN has proved effective here. The organization can also leverage its convening power to bring together its dialogue partners on various platforms like the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Forum.
Finally, at the international level, concerted efforts need to be made towards derisking and preventing the further escalation of tensions with China. High levels of interdependence can indeed lead to conflict, but the international community must manage their responses toward China and their relationships with each other. Sober foreign policies that put one’s national interests at the core are fertile ground for prudent China strategies.
