For the first issue of Carnegie China’s China through a SEA Lens series, we invite scholars from seven Southeast Asian countries to discuss how effective Chinese president Xi Jinping’s diplomacy has been at improving China’s relations with their countries, and ask them to choose one among the five levels: very positive, positive, neutral, negative, or very negative. Below are their takes.
A highlight of China’s charm offensive was the meeting between Xi and Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong during the 2022 APEC summit in Bangkok. The same week, Lee also engaged China’s then premier Li Keqiang during ASEAN meetings in Phnom Penh. Lee met again with Xi and new Premier Li Qiang during the 2023 Boao Forum. These events signified a restart of direct high-level political meetings between the two states. Public readouts suggest an evolutionary development in bilateral ties based on a mutual orientation toward deepening existing economic cooperation and moving forward negotiations already underway. This despite an apparent elevating of relations to a grand-sounding “all-round high-quality future-oriented partnership.” Such contact likely sets the tone for official Singapore-China relations going forward.
China’s recent efforts to win hearts and minds in Singapore are not limited to meetings between top leaders, however. Chinese state-affiliated media available in Singapore, along with like-minded outlets, have been highlighting affinity between the two states and the compatibility of their interests. Such narratives often revolve around ethnic and cultural similarities between the majority ethnic Chinese populations in the two countries, sometimes even noting shared ethnic origins. The newly appointed Chinese ambassador to Singapore has made it a point to reach out to various community organizations, businesses, and Mandarin-language media outlets, and then publicizing such efforts on social media.
Despite Beijing’s best attempts, the results of this charm offensive remain mixed especially among the public. Official agreements and commercial contact aside, opinion polling suggests Beijing’s broad popularity, but separate surveys also show that elites remain cautious about Beijing’s intentions and the effects of its prominence on Singapore’s interests. Singapore’s Malay and South Asian ethnic minorities are less sure about the increasing prominence of Chinese culture, which may obscure their visibility and entrench existing inequalities. The Singapore state also maintains reservations about potential Chinese influence and information operations, even if it is hesitant to identify such concerns publicly possibly due to concerns about punishment. Such sentiments indicate that while Beijing is working hard at winning over Singapore and Singaporeans, China and its representatives in the city-state need to continue working on such initiatives before fuller effects materialize.
China’s diplomacy toward the Philippines had a great start this year, beginning with President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s official state visit to China. The visit was momentous, as far as Chinese diplomacy is concerned. Marcos was the first state leader hosted by Beijing after fully opening up its borders after three years of strict coronavirus controls, signifying the continued importance of the Philippines in China’s neighborhood diplomacy. Investment pledges, representing Beijing’s continued commitment to improving economic ties with Manila, also accompanied the historic visit. They focused on areas of cooperation that could serve to widen the gamut of bilateral relations beyond their territorial disputes.
But what grabbed the attention of most observers, especially in Manila, was the promise to establish a direct line of communication between the countries’ two foreign ministries with respect to concerns in the South China Sea. This is a first for Philippines-China relations and represents continued efforts from both sides to explore diplomatic and peaceful ways to address tensions in the area.
Nonetheless, such promising bilateral initiatives were overtaken by recent reports of Chinese aggression toward the Philippines in the South China Sea. This included an incident of what seemed to be a military-grade laser used against the Philippine Coast Guard’s BRP Malapascua that caused temporary blindness to the crew. While the specific facts of the incident continue to be disputed, this event has sounded the alarm in Manila. For one, it validated the merits of the current steps undertaken by the Marcos administration to proactively revitalize the Philippines-U.S. alliance. While the top leadership in Beijing has undoubtedly shown its willingness and continued commitment to maintain good relations with Manila, China’s actions on the ground continue to provide little evidence of its sincerity.
Beijing’s charm offensive approach in Malaysia is unique in the sense that it is carried out through various fronts of public diplomacy—with emphasis on cultural diplomacy but heavily backed with its phenomenal economic might.
China has been Putrajaya’s largest trading partner for fourteen consecutive years with bilateral trade between the two countries, reaching a record high of $203.6 billion in 2022. Despite the downward pressure from the global economy and multiple challenges posed by the pandemic, bilateral trade increased by 19.7 percent year-on-year. In addition, China has been Malaysia’s largest foreign investor in the manufacturing sector since 2016 and has invested heavily in various Malaysian infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative.
As a result, in order to secure these economic and development benefits, the Malaysian government tends to be more accommodative toward China’s quest in acquiring and projecting its soft power in the country. For instance, Putrajaya has allowed China to establish several new Confucius Institutes across the country in recent years. These Confucius Institutes are not truly independent in nature: they are affiliated to the Hanban, or the Office of Chinese Language Council International, which is an agency in the State Council of China that reports directly to the Chinese Ministry of Education.
However, while China’s economic diplomacy has earned Beijing considerable influence in Malaysia at the moment, such influence has not been translated into Malaysians’ support for its principles nor values, and to certain extent, its policies. In fact, its cultural appeal remains rather limited among Malaysians, especially among non-ethnic Chinese Malaysians. What narrows Chinese soft power here are China’s own political system, ideology, and (most importantly) an element of distrust toward China.
In addition, several issues are irritants in the bilateral relationship, with the potential to tarnish or undermine the positive image Beijing is trying to build. These issues include the South China Sea dispute and the issue of Uighurs in Xinjiang. The two issues show dissonance between the image Beijing aspires to project and its actions. Therefore, if China does not address these shortcomings in a proper manner, it will be difficult for it to sell its cultural products and values abroad, including in Malaysia.
The diplomatic relationship between Cambodia and China can be characterized as very positive after Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen visited Beijing in February. After the visit, Cambodia secured a $44 million grant for a $4 billion express railway project. Cambodia has also welcomed the return of Chinese tourists after three years of absence due to the coronavirus pandemic. Cambodia is quite supportive of China-led stances and initiatives, such as China’s peace plan for Ukraine, and has benefited from China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
During the September handover ceremony of the new Morodok Techo National Stadium built by China, Hun Sen said that the friendship between Cambodia and China has gone from one of trusted friends to one of comprehensive strategic partners with a “stronger than steel” friendship.
Cambodia supports the process of continuing China’s growing role in the region. And likewise, Beijing appreciates the partnership it receives from Phnom Penh. However, both sides should make sure that what is good for the two sides is good for regional interests as well, ensuring that mutual interests are mutually respected.
As far as the reengagement with Southeast Asia is concerned, the visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping in November to Bali to attend the G20 summit and to Bangkok for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Economic Leaders’ meeting, as well as the visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to the ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh that same month, provided a fresh opportunity to renew Xi’s vision of a “community of common destiny” and to uplift China’s influence in the global arena amid a disturbing geopolitical environment.
The military and diplomatic ties have been very positive on the leadership level. Thai-Chinese relations have been developing over a long period, since Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978. The 1997–98 Asian financial crisis represented another positive milestone. The two countries’ relations developed even further following the 2014 coup, when the Thai military ousted then prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s government, hurting Thailand’s relations with the West.
Thailand appreciates that China does not interfere with its internal affairs. As Panithan Wattanayagorn, the government’s security adviser, said in 2017, “the Chinese have been more sophisticated in approaching Thailand. It is beyond a charm offensive, it had achieved another level in a very progressive approach to the relationship in terms of politics.”
The general trend of bilateral relations has progressed, despite the pandemic-related slowdown. Similar to his predecessors, Indonesian President Joko Widodo has practiced a China policy focused heavily on economics. Although the bilateral trade deficit is often criticized, it is decreasing, and China (along with the United States and India) remains equally important contributors to Indonesia’s exports and overall trade surplus.
From the early stages of the BRI from 2012 to 2015, China was barely among the top ten investors in Indonesia, but nowadays, China has climbed into top five. Last year, Indonesia received the highest foreign direct investment inflows in its history, and China ranked second behind Singapore as the largest investor. With the end of China’s Zero COVID policy, optimism among Indonesian businesses is palpable.
Sociopolitical relations have also progressed, albeit at a slower pace. The very active Confucius Center in Al-Azhar University Jakarta, the Sino-Indonesia Friendship Library in Central Java Grand Mosque, and the increasing availability of scholarships for Muslim students are a few anecdotes of China’s soft power drives. These factors, combined with Indonesia’s own domestic complexities and China’s relative discipline to avoid becoming publicly involved in or commenting on Indonesia’s politics, have contributed to the relative silence of Indonesian officials and elites regarding Xinjiang issues—to the dismay of human rights proponents and some Muslim groups.
Regardless of the long-held suspicion and concern over China’s security apparatus, including its maneuvers in the South China Sea, security cooperation has been helpful for Indonesia’s own quest for military modernization. Security and high-tech development, which were highlighted during China’s recent political events, will be an important arena to watch. Technology transfer alongside Chinese investments has been favorable for Indonesia, as seen in high-speed rail construction and vaccine diplomacy.
Institutionally, instead of further optimizing the foreign affairs ministry’s role, Widodo set up a “one door” mechanism through the informal appointment of special envoys to China. The ramifications of such a “centralized” mechanism and its potential risks to the relationship in the long term are worth debating. So far, however, China has been effective in adapting to it.
Despite the symbolism and outcomes of Xi’s meeting with Vietnamese leader Nguyen Phu Trong in October, China’s diplomacy efforts with Vietnam have been neutral at improving relations. The two leaders attached different meanings to their meeting. Xi chose Trong as the first foreign leader to meet after being reelected as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China to showcase the relevance of socialism to international audiences and to consolidate the party’s legitimacy at home. Trong went to China for his first overseas trip since being reelected as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam simply to fulfill a promise that he made to Xi. The thirteen agreements signed during Trong’s visit might look impressive, but that number is still fewer than previous years.
In early February, China started allowing its travel agencies to organize outbound tours to twenty countries. The list did not include Vietnam but seven other Southeast Asian countries. Vietnam was only added to the list in mid-March. China might well remember that Vietnam was one of the first countries to close its border with China at the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak.
Vietnam border control officers have also refused to stamp Chinese passports that feature the nine-dash line and issued a separate visa on arrival for their holders. More importantly, China has not changed its policy toward the South China Sea. Although there has not been any major incident since China’s intrusion into Vietnam’s waters in 2019, China’s coercive behavior could return.
