Vipin Narang is no longer with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Vipin Narang was a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is the Frank Stanton Professor of Nuclear Security and Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and a member of MIT’s Security Studies Program. His research interests include nuclear proliferation and strategy, South Asian security, and general security studies.
He received his PhD from Harvard University’s Department of Government in May 2010, where he was awarded the Edward M. Chase Prize for the best dissertation in international relations. He holds a BS and MS in chemical engineering with distinction from Stanford University and an MPhil with Distinction in international relations from Balliol College, Oxford University, where he studied on a Marshall Scholarship. He has been a fellow at Harvard University’s John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, a predoctoral fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and a Stanton junior faculty fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.
His first book, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era (Princeton University Press, 2014) on the deterrence strategies of regional nuclear powers, won the 2015 ISA International Security Studies Section Best Book Award. He is currently working on his second book, Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation (Princeton University Press, under contract), which explores how states pursue nuclear weapons. His work has been published in peer-reviewed journals including International Security, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, the Washington Quarterly, and International Organization.
The question of how nuclear aspirants attempt to acquire the bomb has received far less attention but is in many ways more consequential for international peace and security. What strategies have states employed to develop nuclear weapons? And what are the implications of these strategies for proliferation and conflict dynamics?
A broad pool of experts offer their thoughts on the risk of expanding nuclear weapons capabilities.
We hosted Vipin Narang for a discussion on his upcoming book on the dynamics of nuclear proliferation and strategies undertaken by states to pursue nuclear weapons. The discussion was moderated by Srinath Raghavan.
Rajesh Rajagopalan's recent paper, "India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence" argues that even as India has had a long-running debate about many aspects of its nuclear doctrine, the country continues to maintain its posture on the No First Use doctrine.
Vipin Narang joins Srinath Raghavan to analyze India's evolving nuclear strategy and the impact of nuclear weapons around the world.
Today's emerging nuclear landscape is marked by three features making it distinct from the post-Cold War nuclear era—the return to great power nuclear competition, the diffusion of destabilizing nuclear strategies, and the potential for the emergence of several new nuclear powers.
President Trump went to the meeting with Kim Jong-un to try and take the keys to his nuclear kingdom. But Kim Jong-Un is not surrendering North Korea's nuclear weapons and has walked away the winner.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s faulty assumptions and unrealistic expectations could doom prospects for peacefully deescalating one nuclear standoff—and applying these misguided lessons to Iran could manufacture yet another.
How well do the existing theories about nuclear proliferation predict North Korea’s successful nuclearization?
India and Pakistan’s behavior after both countries acquired nuclear weapons provides some context for North Korea's nuclear strategy and rationale.
