Sergei Aleksashenko is no longer with the Carnegie Endowment.
Sergei Aleksashenko, former deputy minister of finance of the Russian Federation and former deputy governor of the Russian central bank, was a scholar-in-residence in the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Economic Policy Program. His research focused on Russia’s integration into the global economy and its recovery from the global financial crisis, including analyzing the causes and potential long-term consequences of the crisis for the country, as well as the measures taken by the Russian government to stabilize the situation.
Aleksashenko is also the director of Macroeconomic Studies at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, a position he has held since 2008. He served as managing director and head of Merrill Lynch’s Moscow office from 2006 to 2008, and as deputy director general and managing director of Interros, a Russian private investment company, from 2000 to 2004. From 1995 to 1998, he was first deputy chairman of the Russian central bank, where he was responsible for monetary and currency policy.
From 1993 to 1995, he served as deputy minister of finance, responsible for macroeconomic and taxation policy. While working for both the Russian central bank and the Ministry of Finance, Aleksashenko was in charge of negotiations with the International Monetary Fund.
The author of numerous articles on Russia’s economy, he is also the author of Battle for the Ruble (Alma Mater, Moscow, 1999; Vremya, 2008). He currently serves on the board of Aeroflot-Russian Airlines and the Russian National Reserve Bank.
Eurasia Outlook asked several experts what, if anything, can be done by Russian policymakers in order to weather the perfect storm descending on the country’s economy.
Ukraine’s position as an important transport corridor for Russian gas has resulted in various periods of conflict between Ukraine and Russian-state owned gas companies. But, even though both recognize they will not reach a long-term agreement quickly, one can easily see that the number of disagreements between them is not great. Both realize the need to compromise.
There are few if any reasons for Russia to worry about an immediate negative impact on trade and economic interests of signing of the AA/DCFTA by Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. The Russian government’s position is more likely to reflect concerns about the loss of geopolitical influence rather than trade and economic relations.
The initiatives outlined by Putin in his speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum may lay the groundwork for radical changes in economic policy.
Russian troops in Crimea are necessary not simply to protect it from a possible invasion by the Ukrainian army, but rather to incorporate Crimea into Russia’s financial infrastructure as soon as possible.
It may seem that Russia's political scene has finally stabilized. But tensions persist and permeate the highest levels of government and structural economic factors cannot be counted on to favor the Russian establishment.
Putin's economic agenda offers only more of the same heavy-handed policies that have failed to modernize Russia and made the country more vulnerable to external shocks.
Russia faces serious economic challenges, including a demographic crisis, corruption, weak enforcement of property rights, and over-reliance on hydrocarbons. A combination of structural political and economic reforms is required to save the country from stagnation.
The political turmoil in Russia, though not directly affecting the economic landscape, could expose vulnerabilities in the Russian economy if nervous foreign investors continue to retreat.
Tens of thousands of Russians took to the street in protest over voter fraud allegations in the country’s parliamentary elections. It remains to be seen what this public response and the election results will mean for the country’s future.
