The second anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24 will be a reminder to Europeans that a safe and secure security paradigm for Europe is not to be taken for granted. However, there are other challenges in Europe’s wider neighborhood. As the war in Gaza rages on, the European Union (EU) as an institution, and Europe as a continent, must recognize there are serious security imperatives arising from the conflict as well.
During Lithuania’s “Snow Meeting” of security experts in January, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis noted, “We see other tyrants and terrorists emboldened as they see us struggling to equip Ukraine to win.” He was right. Many have learned the wrong lessons from Ukraine. But when it comes to areas bordering Europe to the south, we have also learned the wrong lessons, and many bad actors have been emboldened as a result. This poses a security threat to our continent, one with tremendous ramifications that are likely to increase in the medium and long term. These will impact Europe’s immediate hard security as well as its long-range credibility. In both of these arenas, Europe faces a direct and present danger, and the EU ought to take each seriously by adopting the appropriate policies.
When it comes to Europe’s immediate hard security, the conflict in Gaza is no longer limited to Gaza, where around 25,000–30,000 Palestinians, most of them civilians, have been killed as a result of Israeli bombardment since October 7. The tense border between Lebanon and Israel has also led to a significant possibility that the Israelis will succeed in drawing Hezbollah and Lebanon into a wider conflict, despite clear indications from Hezbollah that this is not the preferred course for the Lebanese. East Jerusalem and the West Bank are also facing a substantial crisis, due to the Israeli occupation and violence by Israeli settlers, which has led to hundreds of Palestinian deaths. All of this is close to Cyprus on the EU’s southern flank, and only a little further away from Greece (as well as non-EU member state Turkey). At least half of the states that come under the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy—Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Syria, Palestine, Tunisia, and Ukraine—may potentially be impacted as a result of what is going on in the Middle East.
Beyond Gaza and Lebanon, the attacks in the Red Sea by Ansar Allah, more commonly known as the Houthis, which were initiated to impose a ceasefire in Gaza, have had major implications for the future of international maritime trade, with a deep knock-on effect for Europe’s economic security. The United States and Iran have also seen their own conflict intensify and widen, albeit on Syrian and Iraqi territory. Some may try to delink this from the situation in Gaza, even though it is clearly connected to what is going on there.
We may try to live under an illusion that what happens in the Middle East and North Africa remains in the region, but the reality is different. If the Gaza conflict becomes more regionalized, which is entirely possible owing to the strife in Iraq and destabilizing Iranian interventions, along with U.S. reprisals, then Europe may be drawn into cycles of escalation for which it will pay a price.
Europe has an additional problem, one more of its own making, that relates to its credibility with international partners. European states don’t simply engage with each other, they also engage with countries in Africa, Asia, and South America, where there is widespread anger with, and opposition to, the Israeli bombardment of Gaza. While some European states, such as Ireland, Belgium, and Spain, have voiced similar sentiments and voted at the United Nations in alignment with the rest of international opinion on the conflict, others have taken a different route. Germany, in particular, has been steadfast in standing with Israel, to the point of intervening on its behalf before the International Court of Justice, after South Africa had accused Israel of perpetrating genocide against the Palestinians.
It cannot be overestimated how much the credibility of Europe in particular, and the West in general, has been harmed internationally for being seen as failing to support international law and an equitable global order. For most of the world’s nations, while the Hamas attacks on October 7 were horrendous and unjustified, they did not take place in a vacuum, but came against the backdrop of the decades-long Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. They do not cast Hamas as the equivalent of Russia and Israel as the equivalent of Ukraine, but rather Israel as the equivalent of Russia and the Palestinians as the equivalent of Ukraine.
Europeans have a deep-seated interest in promoting a world order underpinned by international law. If they are perceived as behaving selectively, and, worse, defending an ally, Israel, when it is in flagrant violation of international law against a people recognized as being militarily occupied, they will find it difficult to hold others around the world to a universal standard.
Different though these challenges are, there is a unitary solution for addressing them, namely that Europe should approach such situations by upholding its own values. This would not only work in terms of the EU’s own declared aims, it would also be in line with European interests internationally. The EU’s aims are laid out in article 3 of the Lisbon Treaty, which clearly upholds human rights and the rule of law, not only at home but in the world. It’s due to this insistence that the EU has had the moral authority that other groupings or individual states have lacked, and it has allowed European multilateral activity to be successful internationally.
However, this influence is at risk today, as the EU is divided over Palestine. On Ukraine, Hungary remains the sole outlier, while on Palestine, Germany is hardly alone in its pro-Israel stance. A consistent EU policy in line with European values, which would include support for international law, would mean a more universal push toward a permanent ceasefire in Gaza, while taking seriously a comprehensive political solution for the Israeli occupation. The former is a straightforward initial step for achieving the latter, which is far more complex. For many years, the focus has been on a two-state solution. Yet the Israelis have made it abundantly clear that they do not see the establishment of a Palestinian state on the horizon.
But this ought not to be an obstacle for European policymakers. Europe may not be able to command the same kind of hard power that the United States has, but it does have the ability to control its own policies, and, by virtue of that, how it is regarded in the world. As it stands now, the EU is merely following in Washington’s footsteps, such as the recent discussion over whether to impose sanctions on a handful of Israeli settlers. European leaders should understand the importance of returning to law- and rights-based frameworks for addressing the challenges of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which would ensure that their engagement with the Israelis is dependent on clear stipulations of international law. That would make the discussion over sanctioning settlers moot. Israeli settlements are, by definition, illegal, and sanctioning a few violent settlers rather than the entire settlement enterprise and those facilitating it, seems peculiar.
Such an approach will make for a more complex relationship in an interim period with Israel, particularly as the far-right takes on a more mainstream governing role there. But it will bolster European security and European credibility now and for many years to come. Europe’s interests at home and abroad will not be served by betraying its agency, or its values.
