2015 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference

Opening Remarks from William J. Burns (as delivered)

Good morning. Let me begin by congratulating Toby and his colleagues for putting together another extraordinary conference this year. It’s no small feat to organize the year’s wonkiest conference. But you all have it down to a science.

My only issue is with your timing. After all, the nuclear landscape seems eerily calm these days. It’s not as if nuclear negotiations between long-time adversaries were reaching their moment of truth. Or that we were in the midst of a dangerous crisis involving the world’s two biggest nuclear powers. Or that a rogue regime was testing nuclear weapons and threatening nuclear war.

The reality, as all of you know very well, is that all these things are happening as we speak. And they all underscore the fragility of the nonproliferation regime. But they are also a reminder of the regime’s resilience. Our worst fears about the pace and scale of nuclear proliferation have not come to pass. The number of states actively participating in initiatives to strengthen nuclear security has never been higher. And the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty – for all its imperfections – has largely stood the test of time.

This is not just a product of chance and circumstance. It is the product of far-sighted leadership, courage, and imagination. As President Obama urged in Prague six years ago, we have to summon these same qualities today. We have to avoid the temptations of complacency and fatalism. And we have to reshape pro-actively the global nuclear order before unpredictable and uncontrollable events reshape it for us.

Over the next two days, we will cover nearly every dimension of the nuclear challenge. This morning, I would like to offer just a few introductory remarks about two of these dimensions -- the crisis with Russia and Iran’s nuclear program.

Russia

There is no question that Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is a brazen violation of international law and Moscow’s obligation to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its neighbors. No amount of Russian posturing can obscure that fact. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, its intervention in eastern Ukraine, its threatening behavior against its neighbors, and its non-compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, pose the biggest threat to the vision of a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace since the end of the Cold War. We have to be clear-eyed and honest about that undeniable and unfortunate reality.

But we also have to be clear-eyed about another undeniable reality. As vexing and threatening as Putin’s Russia has become, it remains a consequential player, still a major producer of hydrocarbons, still a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and still the keeper of the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.

I spent a good deal of my checkered diplomatic career helping Administrations of both parties navigate the complexities of the U.S.-Russia relationship. My hair is gray for a reason. I’ve lived through moments of great promise in that relationship, as well as periods of very sharp differences. Through it all, I’ve tried my best to keep focused on what’s at stake for America’s own interests.

In the coldest days of the Cold War, the United States and Russia worked together to lay the foundations of the global nuclear order. And in better days, we worked together to strengthen it, by creating communication and transparency measures to stabilize our relationship, reducing our weapons stockpiles, strengthening the IAEA safeguards regime, and preventing nuclear proliferation.

The economic and human costs of the current crisis – for Russia, Ukraine, and Europe – are evident. But we cannot lose sight of the opportunity costs as well. Nowhere are these more vivid than in the nuclear arena. As the world’s two largest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia should continue to have a shared sense of responsibility for safeguarding the nuclear order. We will both pay a price, and the wider cause of global nuclear order will be set back significantly, if we can’t find a way to exercise that shared responsibility to help keep the world safe from nuclear dangers.

Iran

One of the most serious of those dangers, which continues to serve as a basis for solid U.S.-Russian cooperation, is the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program. We should have no illusions about Iran’s ambitions or its conduct. It is important to embed our approach to the nuclear issue in a wider strategy, which continues to reassure our friends and push back against Iranian behavior threatening many parts of the Middle East, as well as the human rights of its own citizens. While all of these concerns are important and serious, the nuclear issue remains the most urgent, not only because of the way in which a nuclear-armed Iran would multiply exponentially all those concerns, but also because of the way in which it could unravel the nonproliferation regime.

Since his first day in office, President Obama has made very clear that he will do whatever it takes to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. He has also emphasized his determination to seek a strong negotiated resolution, which is the best of the alternatives before us. To get there, the Administration worked with Congress and international partners to build up leverage, principally through an unprecedented set of sanctions that have dramatically increased the pressures on Iran’s economy and leadership. The diplomatic challenge is how to translate that leverage into a strong negotiated agreement that can guarantee the peaceful nature – and peaceful future -- of Iran’s nuclear program.

The elements of a good deal are pretty clear. A good deal will close off all the pathways Iran has to a nuclear weapon, whether it’s through uranium or plutonium production. It will sharply constrain Iran’s nuclear program for a long duration. It will set out intrusive monitoring, verification, and inspection procedures that go beyond the requirements of the Additional Protocol. And it will phase sanctions relief gradually, with credible snap-back provisions in the event of any violation of the agreement.

A good deal can credibly deter Iran from nuclear breakout. A good deal can give confidence to our friends and partners that violations will be detected quickly and addressed effectively. A good deal will be embedded within a broader regional strategy that will push back against threatening Iranian behavior. And a good deal can serve as a precedent for building a widely shared international consensus around what distinguishes purely peaceful nuclear programs from those with illegitimate military purposes.

Firewall

Amidst the storm and stress of negotiations with Iran, it is easy to lose sight of the wider implications for the nonproliferation regime. This regime is not self-sustaining. It requires constant renewal and re-examination if it is to continue to serve as the backbone of the global nuclear order in the century unfolding before us.

The Iran case has exposed a number of potential vulnerabilities in the Treaty. The most significant, in my view, is the absence of a clear definition – a clear firewall – between civil and nuclear weapons programs. The gray zone between Article IV rights and Article II prohibitions on the “manufacture” of nuclear weapons is too wide, making it easier for proliferators to use the cover of nuclear energy programs to pursue nuclear weapons.

As nuclear technology and know-how become more diffuse and as states turn to nuclear power to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, building this firewall between military and peaceful activities is becoming an increasingly urgent task – the kind of task that demands the foresight and imagination that our leaders demonstrated at earlier moments of testing for the nonproliferation regime.

Building a nuclear firewall is obviously much easier said than done. While many states might agree that peaceful nuclear programs should not conduct nuclear tests, enrich uranium beyond 20%, or develop computer codes for modelling what happens when plutonium is compressed by high explosives, others worry that a firewall might limit basic and legitimate research and development or conventional military applications.

Both nuclear-weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states have a role to play in defining this firewall. Non-nuclear weapons states will likely need to foreswear some particularly sensitive activities and provide greater transparency and confidence-building measures around others. And nuclear weapons states will need to sharpen the distinction in their own nuclear programs, by making available for IAEA safeguards all civilian nuclear facilities, and over time ceasing practices that blur the line, such as the use of highly enriched uranium for naval nuclear propulsion. It’s a tall task, but it shouldn’t be impossible.

Conclusion

The nuclear landscape may be everything but calm these days. But we’ve overcome seemingly insurmountable obstacles in the past. And I remain hopeful that we can do so again today. This will require brainpower, leadership, and daring – three qualities that this morning’s keynote speaker has in abundance. We are very fortunate that Secretary Moniz has brought his Fall River toughness and MIT smarts to Washington – a city that could use more of each. And we are especially fortunate that he has agreed to join us this morning. So it is my great privilege to introduce a remarkable colleague, and a remarkable public servant, U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernie Moniz.

Thank you very much.

As United States Secretary of Energy, Dr. Ernest Moniz is tasked with implementing critical Department of Energy missions in support of President Obama’s goals of growing the economy, enhancing security and protecting the environment. This encompasses advancing the President’s all-of-the-above energy strategy, maintaining the nuclear deterrent and reducing the nuclear danger, promoting American leadership in science and clean energy technology innovation, cleaning up the legacy of the cold war, and strengthening management and performance.

Prior to his appointment, Dr. Moniz was the Cecil and Ida Green Professor of Physics and Engineering Systems at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where he was a faculty member since 1973. At MIT, he headed the Department of Physics and the Bates Linear Accelerator Center. Most recently, Dr. Moniz served as the founding Director of the MIT Energy Initiative and as Director of the MIT Laboratory for Energy and the Environment where he was a leader of multidisciplinary technology and policy studies on the future of nuclear power, coal, nuclear fuel cycles, natural gas and solar energy in a low-carbon world.

Transcript available here. 

Lieutenant General (retired) Khalid Kidwai is advisor to Pakistan’s National Command Authority and pioneer Director General of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, which he headed for an unprecedented 15 years. He is one of the most decorated generals in Pakistan and was awarded the highest civil award Nishan-i-Imtiaz, as well as Hilal-i-Imtiaz and Hilal-i-Imtiaz (Military). Winner of the Sword of Honor at Pakistan's Military Academy, he later saw frontline combat action in erstwhile East Pakistan and was a prisoner of war in Pakistan’s 1971 war with India. General Kidwai conceived, articulated and executed Pakistan’s nuclear policy and deterrence doctrines into a tangible and robust nuclear force structure. General Kidwai is also the architect of Pakistan’s civilian Nuclear Energy Program and National Space Program.

Transcript available here. 

Against the backdrop of modest reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, growing threats from North Korea and Russia, and greater Chinese assertiveness, questions about U.S. security guarantees to its allies are receiving new and critical attention. What kind of commitments do U.S. allies want? What practical steps do they believe would help to address perceived threats? And to what extent should these commitments and steps involve U.S. nuclear weapons as opposed to conventional or non-military capabilities? 

Transcript available here. 

Yukiya Amano is Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Mr. Amano served as Chair of the Agency’s Board of Governors from September 2005 to September 2006 and was Japan's Resident Representative to the Agency from 2005 until his election as Director General in July 2009. At the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Mr. Amano was Director-General for the Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science Department from 2002 until 2005. He previously served as a governmental expert on the U.N. Panel on Missiles and on the U.N. Expert Group on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education. A graduate of the Tokyo University Faculty of Law, Mr. Amano joined the Japanese Foreign Ministry in April 1972, when he began a series of international postings in Belgium, France, Laos, Switzerland, and the United States.

Transcript available here. 

Following a series of nuclear-weapon handling mistakes and personnel problems, senior U.S. officials have acknowledged that the United States has lost focus on the nuclear mission. The U.S. Department of Defense is now engaged in a comprehensive effort to restore standards. What were the underlying problems? How is the Department of Defense planning to solve them? And, are there lessons from the U.S. experience that are relevant to other states seeking to ensure the security of their nuclear enterprises, whether civilian or military?

Transcript available here. 

American allies in Europe and Asia perceive growing threats that challenge the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments. In an era of fiscal limitations, however, Washington will have to make some important choices about how to develop and deploy capabilities that will best reassure allies. What commitments should the United States be prepared to offer? Should there be limitations on these commitments? What practical steps should be taken to help address perceived threats? How central should U.S. nuclear weapons, as opposed to conventional or non-military capabilities, be in extended deterrence planning? 

Transcript available here. 

The 2015 NPT Review Conference promises to be highly contentious. Disagreements among NPT parties regarding the approach and pace of nuclear disarmament have been growing, especially since consultations among the P5 states have been slow to produce results. The initiative focusing on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons has entered the stage, creating new pressures on the weapon states. A lack of progress on organizing a conference to discuss the Middle East WMD Free Zone is very likely to prove divisive. The outcome of negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program will also color views on the vitality of the regime. Meanwhile, states party to the NPT will have to decide whether and how to address events in Ukraine, including Russia’s violation of the Budapest Memorandum. How are these issues likely to play out in New York when the Review Conference convenes in April 2015 and what is the probable outcome?

Transcript available here. 

Since the Fukushima accident, nuclear regulatory agencies have been under increasing pressure to demonstrate credibility in their oversight of the nuclear energy sector. This challenge is common to almost all regulators, from countries with nascent nuclear power programs to those with an established fleet of reactors. What are the challenges in ensuring credible regulation? How important is independence and how should it be achieved? Are there risks that too much regulation could strangle the development of new technologies? And how can public confidence in nuclear power be improved? 

Transcript available here. 

For several years efforts to strengthen the norm against nuclear testing and to advance the entry into force of Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty have seemed to stall. Various narratives purport to explain the perceived lack of progress: obstructionism by several key states in troubled regions, doubts about the viability of the international verification regime, and concerns, within the United States particularly, about the continued reliability of nuclear arsenals. But do these narratives stand up to scrutiny? What is standing in the way of ratification of the treaty by states in the Middle East, South Asia, and elsewhere? How robust is the international monitoring system? Can the United States (and other nuclear weapon states) maintain the reliability of their arsenals under the CTBT? What is next for the global nuclear test ban? 

Transcript available here. 

The Nunn-Lugar Award was established in 2012 in honor of U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, who were also the award’s first recipients. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Carnegie Corporation of New York created the award to recognize an individual or institution whose work has helped strengthen global security and further peaceful co-existence among nations by preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and reducing the risk of their use. The award is a tribute to Andrew Carnegie, who dedicated much of his philanthropy to the goal of achieving world peace. 

Made possible by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

China’s emergence as a global power—one that is beginning to project not just economic but also military power—poses serious security challenges to states on its periphery. These challenges create dilemmas for Washington, too, which enjoys alliance relations with many of the states in East and Southeast Asia that are experiencing increasing friction with Beijing. How should the United States and its allies interpret China’s military capabilities as well as its policies towards its neighbors? How should these states respond to Beijing’s rise? Which sources of tension could potentially escalate to direct confrontation and consequently are most in need of active management? What opportunities are there to build trust?

Transcript available here. 

China is slowly modernizing its nuclear arsenal, in particular by deploying new mobile, land-based missiles and by building a fleet of submarines to carry a newly developed sea-launched ballistic missile. It has also tested various long-range, high-precision conventional weapons and appears to have tested multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle technology. What are the drivers—technical, bureaucratic, doctrinal—of these developments? What strategic end-state is China seeking? And what do these developments mean for stability in the region?

Transcript available here. 

The last 15 months have witnessed a precipitous decline in Russia’s relations with the West. In July, the United States formally accused Russia of violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty—sparking counter-accusations from Moscow. Against this background, what is the future for the INF Treaty and other existing bilateral security agreements? Are there any opportunities for moving the U.S.-Russia arms control agenda forward in the next two years? To what extent is there value in trying to expand the agenda to bilateral agreements with others states, multilateral treaties, or agreements covering non-nuclear weapons? 

Transcript availabe here. 

From its announcement in 2005 to today, the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal has been controversial. Proponents of the deal argued that it would allow both states to forge a strategic partnership; that it would facilitate an expansion of nuclear energy in India; and that it would bring India into the nonproliferation “mainstream.” Opponents argued that the structure of U.S and Indian interests are sufficiently divergent that a strategic partnership would prove impossible; that India would not be able to adopt nuclear power on the scale described by the deal’s advocates; and that it would undermine the nonproliferation regime by institutionalizing a double standard, when NPT universality had long been a consensus objective. A decade after the fact, how should we assess the impact of the deal? 

Transcript available here. 

The Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award is presented to an individual who has rendered exceptional service to the nongovernmental nuclear policy community. Exceptional service includes major intellectual contributions to critical debates, but it also encompasses the time-consuming and often unrecognized work needed to sustain and strengthen our community: mentoring young women and men, constructively critiquing the work of others, creating fora for discussion, and building expert networks. 

Such activities benefit the community as a whole in its efforts to reduce nuclear dangers. Importantly, the award is also intended to recognize individuals who, through friendship, collegiality, and respect, help mold a collection of individual researchers into a community worthy of the name. In short, the award recognizes exceptional creativity, integrity, humanity, and amity—four qualities embodied by Thérèse Delpech, a long-time strategic adviser to the French Atomic Energy Commission, an author, and a distinguished public intellectual.

The award was presented, for the first time at the 2013 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference to Amb. Linton F. Brooks.

Over the course of the last decade, debates on IAEA safeguards have become increasingly politicized. Several states with significant nuclear programs have refused to adopt the Additional Protocol. Others object to the IAEA’s development of a so-called State Level safeguards concept and to its use of information obtained by member states’ intelligence agencies. What are the causes of the political tensions surrounding the development and application of IAEA safeguards? What steps should members states take to mitigate political tensions? And what steps should the agency take in order to strengthen global confidence in the safeguards system?

Transcript available here. 

Seven states are now commercial suppliers of nuclear power plants to the international market—and this list is only likely to grow. What implications does this multinationalization of nuclear industry have for bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements? Should suppliers agree to use such agreements to establish minimum international standards for nuclear energy cooperation, and specifically to bolster nonproliferation, nuclear security, and nuclear safety? More pointedly, with the UAE having signed up to a “gold standard” by declaring it will forego enrichment and reprocessing on a unilateral basis, should other states be encouraged to do so too? 

Transcript available here. 

Concern about the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons has provided one of the sharpest intellectual challenges to nuclear deterrence in recent decades. Although the United Kingdom and the United States sent representatives to the most recent international conference on the subject, the nuclear-weapon states have generally been reluctant to respond. Do nuclear weapon states fail to appreciate the consequences of nuclear use? Moreover, what implications do these consequences have for policy? Specifically, are there circumstances under which the use of nuclear weapons could still be consistent with both international law and morality in spite of the consequences?

Transcript available here. 

Forecasting future events is fraught with obvious difficulties but also essential for effective policy making. So how can it be improved? Specifically, do large groups make better predictions than individual experts? At this session, audience members had the opportunity to answer a series of yes/no questions about future events. The results were discussed by a panel of experts, who compared the audience’s answers to their own. We plan to assess these predictions against reality at the 2017 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference. 

Transcript available here.

After several years of negotiations, an interim agreement, and two extensions, where are talks between Iran, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States heading? Is there an intersection between what negotiators can agree and what domestic politics in Tehran and Washington can bear? If a comprehensive agreement is possible, can it be insulated against future political shocks and with incentives for compliance by all sides? 

Transcript available here.