2011 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference

Brazil’s former Minister of External Relations, Ambassador Celso Amorim, explores how the nuclear nonproliferation regime fits into the broader dynamic of international relations. How can or should the interests of established nuclear-weapon states be reconciled with the interests and perspectives of emerging major powers such as Brazil? What kind of nuclear order does Brazil want, and what does its uranium enrichment program say about Brazil’s vision? What lessons should be drawn from the Iran-Turkey-Brazil negotiations that produced the May 2010 Tehran Declaration?

The disaster in Japan, although a monumental tragedy, is also an opportunity to take stock of challenges on the horizon. Has anything fundamentally changed in terms of the assessment of the viability and robustness of nuclear energy? Were there flaws in the plant design, life-extension plan, or safety-culture that partially augmented the disaster?

International laws and policies require industry to comply with nonproliferation regulations by all means. Corporate responsibility, however, goes far beyond pure legal compliance and relies on self-triggered caution and restraint toward questionable business as well as building partnerships with governmental authorities and international bodies alike. Pro-active information sharing with government authorities and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), without putting political and commercial interests first, is a pragmatic approach to preventing WMD and missile proliferation in sensitive countries. “Atoms for peace” is, therefore, a responsibility for both industry and government.

The Iran case shows how lacunae in nonproliferation rules regarding the definition of peaceful uses of atomic energy and the fulfillment of peaceful nuclear cooperation can complicate efforts to enforce compliance in a rule-based system, especially as global political power shifts along a North-South axis. Looking ahead, can a working consensus be established among key states, and on what basis? What are the implications for peaceful nuclear cooperation and international security if a consensus cannot be achieved?

A ban on all nuclear tests for all time is vaunted as a critical measure of disarmament progress. What are the prospects for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification in the United States and in the other countries required for the treaty to enter into force? What steps can be taken in the meantime to prevent, detect, and punish further testing?

How should the IAEA manage the growing safeguards workload resulting from the increasing quantities of nuclear material and a larger number of nuclear facilities on a limited budget? Will its current approach suffice, or is a more fundamental rethink of safeguards required?

Interest in abolishing nuclear weapons has increased the prospect of deep U.S.-Russian reductions. Yet many American and Russian analysts see deterrence at low numbers as intrinsically problematic and potentially unstable. Why is this? Interestingly, the United States and Russia are the only states to have built arsenals larger than a few hundred weapons. Do the United States and Russia have unique deterrence requirements, or can other nuclear-armed states provide a model for them?

What fuel cycle technologies will dominate the commercial nuclear world a generation from now? Why should nuclear power investors commit themselves to expensive, risk-laden, and potentially unprofitable fuel cycle technologies? Will there ever be a plutonium fuel cycle based on commercially viable, fast reactors?

India and Pakistan nearly went to war in 2001–2002 and faced another crisis after the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India. India is developing a “Cold Start” military doctrine and capabilities to conduct a quick invasion of Pakistan in response to a future terrorist attack, so as to force Pakistan to negotiate on terms favorable to India. Pakistan says it will respond with “Hot End”—nuclear weapon use. This would be a disaster to two of the world’s largest developing countries, not to mention the global nuclear order. This session will promote ideas for preventing nuclear escalation in South Asia.

Every few decades, a movement arises to secure world peace by eliminating weapons of war.  The trouble with these approaches to disarmament is that they confuse cause and effect, the symptom with the underlying disease, argued Senator Jon Kyl.  It’s not the weapons that are the cause of the problem but rather the fundamental reality of the international system.  

Notwithstanding the moderate success of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, many observers feel that the nuclear order is breaking down or failing to keep up with technological developments and the emergence of new powers. Formal multilateral negotiations to develop new rules seem stymied or impossible. What alternatives are there for strengthening nuclear governance?

In the coming years, the United States will negotiate new bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with a raft of states that see nuclear power as critical for their energy development. In the past, some of these agreements imposed limitations on the fuel cycle activities of U.S. partners. Today, potential buyers resist such limitations and other supplier states may not insist on similar limitations.

The U.S., Russia, and China drive each other’s nuclear requirements. China and Pakistan drive India’s nuclear requirements, and India’s capabilities, now augmented by U.S. and other foreign assistance, play back on Pakistan and China. What happens in one of these triads affects the other, most likely through the common point of China. In the balance hang prospects for a ban on fissile material production and future multilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament. Are these dynamics sufficiently understood? Can they be managed in a stabilizing way? What are the implications for the nonproliferation regime?

The 2010 NPT Review Conference called for the convening of a conference to address the creation of a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East. What would feasibly constitute a successful conference? What steps, and by which actors, are necessary to enable success?

In the 20th century, extended deterrence was synonymous with nuclear deterrence, but will nuclear use be credible to deter the most likely 21st century threats? In the 20th century, extended deterrence helped prevent proliferation, but in the 21st century, will it impede nonproliferation and disarmament? What are the capabilities and policies needed for reassurance, deterrence, and nonproliferation?

The NSG, the world’s most comprehensive nuclear trade rule-making organization, is at a crossroads. How will it interact with emerging vendor countries from the developing world? How will it manage the aspirations of Israel and Pakistan in the wake of the NSG’s 2008 accommodation of India? Will North-South political conflict prevent the NSG from making future decisions by consensus?

According to Western media reporting, the trend lines in Pakistan are decidedly negative: the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is in doubt, Pakistani politicians are unable to rescue the economy, and the India obsession of Pakistan’s military leaders ignores the threat to internal security posed by the terrorist groups Pakistan harbors. This reporting obscures a more nuanced reality, in particular, the complexity and reality of Pakistani society and the factors which are likely to shape a positive future. Javed Jabbar, a leader of civil society, talked about how the past and present merge and may separate to build a stable future for Pakistan and South Asia.

The negotiation and entry into force of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) heralded the return of verified nuclear arms reductions between the United States and Russia. Looming on the horizon are many difficult issues, in particular, U.S. missile defense plans, which will make future bilateral negotiations more difficult and potentially more contentious. U.S. and Russian officials with responsibility for arms control will discuss what is next on the arms control agenda and how the administrations in Moscow and Washington intend to pursue progress toward disarmament.

U.S. National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon addresses how progress can be measured if, as many expect, prospects of ratifying the CTBT in the next two years are dim, future negotiations with Russia on tactical nuclear weapons and remaining strategic arsenals will take years, and Iran and North Korea continue to confound the international community.