The approval of U.S. aid to Ukraine, long overdue and needlessly controversial, is a major milestone. But a milestone on the way to what? The money, or the hardware it will pay for, is desperately needed to keep the Ukrainian military in the fight, to protect Ukraine’s people and infrastructure from Russia’s aerial onslaught, and to keep grinding down the Russian military machine. But a lot has happened in the eight months it took Congress to act. The key question that needs an answer now is: what are Ukraine’s war aims and strategy to achieve them? As serious doubts about the viability of Kyiv’s current strategy are being raised, Ukraine and—just as important—its allies on both sides of the Atlantic must address this dilemma.
The dynamics of the war and the prevailing discourse about it have changed dramatically. Eight months ago, the Ukrainian counteroffensive was still underway. The counteroffensive was the embodiment of a theory of victory that called for piercing Russian defenses, cutting off Crimea from the land bridge Russia had seized earlier in the war, and forcing Moscow to negotiate an end to the war on the terms favorable to Kyiv. Until the word “stalemate” was brought into the public discussion by none other than Ukraine’s lauded former military commander Valeriy Zaluzhnyy, the use of the term was often treated as a sign of unwarranted pessimism, defeatism, or even the parroting of Russian propaganda.
After congressional delays of the assistance package and setbacks on the battlefield, Ukraine faces a far more challenging situation. In recent weeks, a new narrative has gained ground: that the stalemate actually may not hold and Russia may instead achieve a major breakthrough.
Despite its obvious disappointments, the Ukrainian counteroffensive offers several important lessons. First, size matters. Military planners have long believed that successful offensive operations require significant advantages in manpower and materiel on the order of three-to-one or even higher, especially when the defender is prepared and dug in, as was the case in the summer of 2023. It is now abundantly clear that the size of Russia’s population, economy, stocks of military hardware, and defense-industrial base far exceeds those of Ukraine, even when it is supported by the United States, Europe, other allies, and partners.
Second, the Russian military has defied expectations by adopting new tactics and deploying new equipment. Written off as inept during the early stages of the war, when Russian President Vladimir Putin’s generals bet on Ukrainians greeting them as liberators from what Russian propaganda charged was an illegitimate Nazi regime in Kyiv, Russian forces have recovered. While the United States and its allies may be dismayed by traditional Russian disregard for battlefield losses, they need to acknowledge that Moscow is now using better tactics and fielding some of its hardware more effectively. Last summer, Russia pulled ahead of Ukraine in crucial areas such as drones and electronic warfare.
The Russian defense industry is also performing rather impressively, despite a reputation for technological obsolescence. It has far overtaken Western production of critical items such as ammunition for artillery, benefited from well-timed help from friends in Iran and North Korea, and found ways to modernize and repurpose old weapons to new uses. The most recent such weapon is the glide-bomb, a massive old “dumb” bomb fitted with a kit to give it enough range and accuracy for Russian air force pilots to stay beyond the reach of Ukrainian air defenses.
China too has offered Russia a helping hand. It has facilitated alternative supply chains and offered substitutes for Western machinery and other components Russian defense industries need to keep running round the clock.
Third, time and time again, the United States and its allies discovered that sanctions did not “[choke] off Russia’s access to key inputs for its military industrial complex and [undermine] the Kremlin’s ability to wage its unprovoked war,” in the words of Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen. Nor did they “cripple” the Russian economy. Thanks to a surge in defense orders, the economy is estimated to have grown by 3.6 percent in 2023 and is projected to grow by 2.8 percent in 2024. Despite U.S. and EU efforts to cut off Russia from Western technologies, Russian companies have found alternative supply routes and continue to import dual-use and even military technologies, including from many members of the U.S.-led coalition.
Faced with this grim reality, Ukraine has switched to a strategy of “active defense”—building fortifications and giving its troops a chance to reconstitute, recover, and retrain, while engaging in a series of high-profile strikes inside Russia and attacks on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. But this “active defense” strategy requires massive infusions of Western aid and support. Just as importantly, it requires an intake of new recruits following the adoption of a law that expands the pool of eligible conscripts. Occasional deep strikes at targets inside Russia generate publicity and boost morale, as do Ukrainian attacks against Russian ships in the Black Sea. But these successes have little effect on the situation on the battlefield, where Russian troops, despite heavy losses, are slowly gaining ground.
The rest of 2024, with new U.S. assistance flowing to Ukraine, is supposed to be the year of rebuilding to prepare for offensive operations in 2025, according to some observers. That plan appears highly optimistic. The task of rebuilding Ukrainian army units, many battered by years of uninterrupted combat and heavy losses, will take time—especially while waging a campaign against a ruthless enemy. So will recruiting, training, and integrating new conscripts in existing units or forming and training entirely new units. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his Western backers are, for the time being at least, loathe to admit publicly that the Ukrainian military is unlikely to be in a position to launch another large-scale counteroffensive in 2025. Ongoing delays in reinvigorating the Western defense industrial base mean that increased production of key weapons and systems that Ukraine needs to conduct such operations are unlikely to be available in sufficient quantity.
Ukraine has no good options, even with the latest aid package. Many military analysts have already come to that conclusion privately but are unwilling to voice that sentiment, reluctant to add to the widespread gloomy narrative and face accusations of defeatism.
The latest $61 billion U.S. aid package is almost certainly the last package of such magnitude, regardless of who gets elected as the next U.S. president. The EU has approved 50 billion euros in financial assistance until 2027, but Ukraine needs that money to keep its government running. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has proposed establishing a $100 billion fund for Ukraine’s defenses, but his proposal has been met with little support from NATO members.
Ukraine is waging a war against an enemy that shows no inclination to stop its aggression and negotiate in earnest. Having bet his entire presidency on this war, Putin is in no mood to give up. Ukraine’s need for help, even with the adoption of a defensive strategy for the long run, is open-ended. Are Washington and Brussels ready for it?
That is the key question for NATO’s upcoming summit in Washington. Instead of arguing about Ukraine’s path to NATO membership, the allies should put in place a series of concrete commitments, including more and better capabilities to defend and push back against the Russian onslaught and long-range precision strike weapons to continue and expand strikes deep inside Russia. Such offensive capabilities will position Ukraine to implement a long-term strategy that combines defense with offense and deterrence and inflicts increasingly costly consequences on the Kremlin. Support for Ukraine is the most important piece of the West’s containment strategy toward Russia in the new cold war. The Washington summit will answer whether the West is up to the challenge.
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