In light of the ongoing conflict between the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, Sada publishes three articles that discuss the humanitarian and political situation, the impact of fighting on the future of the country, and the possibilities of external interference, namely from countries that have historically played prominent roles in Sudan, such as Egypt.
In the first article, Sudanese journalist Youseif Basher argues that the complete disappearance of the state since the first day of the fighting exacerbates the human cost of a conflict which is likely to be exhausting and long, due to the fact that the two fighting sides possess a huge amount of military equipment and seem unwilling to stop the fighting. Basher predicts that the war will lead to millions of people in urban areas losing their jobs, and he notes that tens of thousands have already fled to safe cities. Basher says that with the continuation of fighting, the number of internally displaced persons will increase to a point that is difficult to estimate.
The second article, presented by Sudanese writer Weam Al Sharif, recounts the causes of the current armed conflict, explaining that despite the involvement of the army and the RSF in the political process, their media statements indicated the existence of deep differences between them, especially regarding the framework agreement. Al Sharif highlights that the civilian forces involved in the political process believe that supporters of the former regime played a role in fueling these disputes, as handing over power to civilians constitutes a threat to their activities. She also stresses that now, after the outbreak of fighting on April 15, it has become important to stop the conflict because of its high costs, and if this does not happen quickly, then further regional and international intervention is likely to complicate the situation.
In the third article, Giorgio Cafiero argues that despite Egyptian concerns about the conflict in Sudan, this crisis presents a potential opportunity for Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to position himself as an important leader on the international stage, as Sisi expressed his desire to play a mediator role after the outbreak of the crisis. Cafiero says that even though Cairo had given the Sudanese army unwavering support and viewed the RSF as an imminent threat, Egyptian officials reached out to RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” through a meeting with Sisi held in Cairo. Accordingly, it is likely that Washington, Moscow, and Arab capitals could see Sisi as a leader capable of playing a constructive role in de-escalating the conflict between the two sides in Sudan.
How Could the War Between the RSF and the Army Impact Sudan?
The current conflict will have wide-spread effects on politics, the economy, and security, with drastic consequences for civilians.
Youseif Basher
The dangerous effects of the clashes between the Sudanese Army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) emerged quickly in the state of West Darfur, as the fighting between the two sides morphed into an ethnic conflict between Arab and African tribes.
The clashes erupted on April 15, against the backdrop of disagreements between military leaders over issues of command and control and timelines for integrating the RSF into the army. These issues were discussed in the context of an internationally supported political process that aimed to hand over power to civilians, and to implement military reforms that would end with the formation of a professional, regular national army. Yet, these steps towards a political solution were thwarted upon the emergence of deep differences between the two sides of the current fighting.
The political forces involved in the political process worked to prevent the outbreak of war, but the lack of trust between the two forces regarding how to manage the process of handing over power, the active opposition of the forces that helped the army carry out the October 2021 coup, and the rejection of the process by entities close to the former regime caused the clashes.
After the outbreak of the war, the commander of the RSF, Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti,” claimed that his current fight was launched on behalf of the country’s transition to democracy, a position that contradicts his participation in the 2021 coup (He later regretted his participation, saying that elements of the former regime who wanted to seize power again were behind him.) The army, for its part, says it is currently suppressing a rebellion against the state, while at the same time showing its commitment to the political process.
Both Hemedti’s claim to protect the democratic transition and the army’s stated commitment to the democratic process are false, as the democratic transition needs dialogue, and closing the door to dialogue using military force confirms their desire to rule alone. Given that wars usually end with negotiation, it is likely that the two powers will negotiate, but the focus of the negotiations will be the cessation of hostilities, the exchange of prisoners, security arrangements, the repositioning of forces, and the sharing of power and influence. In this context, the subject of negotiations will not be the transfer of power to civilian forces. This means that the political forces and the peaceful protest movement will remain spectators rather than actors, as they will gradually lose their strong influence after the militarization of public life.
In this context, the pro-democracy forces have begun to form a new coalition, whose first declaration says that it is working to stop the war, meet the basic needs of the population, restore mobility, and remove the military from political and economic life. Yet, this coalition has not explained how to achieve these goals in light of an increasingly fragile situation that deteriorates by the day, as there is no security at all in Khartoum, looting has prevailed, and the clashes in the state of West Darfur between the two forces turned into a bloody ethnic conflict. It is expected that this conflict will move to other areas, especially after the armed movements that signed the peace agreement deployed fighters to secure the city of El Fasher in the state of North Darfur. In the event of any friction between rival forces in local communities, the situation will likely get out of control as hate speech spreads, possibly extending beyond the Darfur region to eastern Sudan and the Blue Nile.
During this time of crisis, the United Nations has suspended its humanitarian activities, which provide aid to 12.5 million people out of a total population of 15.5 million in need, including 8.5 million children. These children are among the most affected by the war; about 50,000 children suffer from acute malnutrition and are at risk of death due to interruption of medical treatments. Moreover, frequent cuts to electricity and fuel scarcity can obstruct vaccination processes, exposing children to fatal diseases.
It is also likely that the war will lead to millions of people in urban areas losing their jobs, which will increase the number of people in need of aid. Already, tens of thousands have fled to safe cities, and the number of internally displaced persons will only increase as fighting rages on. The exact number of IDPs is difficult to estimate now, but before the war, it was 3.7 million people.
Moreover, due to the concentration of pharmaceutical and food factories and major importing companies in Khartoum, and their exposure to looting and bombing, the supply of daily necessities has come to a complete halt, which has raised the prices of food commodities many times over. This will lead to a high rate of inflation and place millions at the risk of starvation.
Even before the recent conflict, the economy in Sudan was suffering from stagnation and slow growth. After the war, it will enter a long-term recession given massive disruptions to industry, which contributes to 21 percent of GDP. Yet, in light of fuel scarcity and the lack of fertilizer, the greatest impact will fall on agriculture, a sector which a large number of Sudanese depend on, as this sector contributes to 32.7 percent of GDP.
All these effects are exacerbated by the complete absence of the state since the first day of the war—a conflict which is likely to become a long-term battle of attrition, due to the two sides’ possession of a huge amount of military equipment and their unwillingness to stop the conflict before it inflicts unbearable losses on one of them.
Youseif Basher is a Sudanese journalist. You can follow him on Twitter: @YouBasher.
Struggle for Influence in Sudan Turns Lethal
Disagreements regarding command and control and the integration of the RSF into the army awakened deep conflicts that military leaders had long sought to suppress.
Weam Al Sharif
The first signs of disagreement between the Sudanese Army and leaders of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) appeared when the latter’s commander, Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti,” left the capital, Khartoum, for Darfur in June 2022, under the pretext of concluding reconciliations with the warring tribes. Yet, he returned from this journey after the army commander, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, announced the approval of the draft transitional constitution that was to be the basis for the transfer of power to civilians.
The leaders of the army and the RSF engaged in a political process facilitated regionally and internationally, which resulted in the signing of a framework agreement. This agreement talked about handing over power to the civilian forces after agreeing on thorny issues, including security and military reform. The parties succeeded in agreeing on all of these issues in workshops, with the exception of three items related to security and military reform. Such a success made them optimistic about signing a final agreement and forming a civilian government by the April 11 deadline.
Before disagreements erupted in the security and military reform workshop, the commanders of the army and RSF signed a vision to reform this sector, which included setting gradual mechanisms for command and control to eventually achieve a unified and professional military. This process was to begin with the unification of leadership, followed by the unification of the staff ranks, then the command of regions and divisions, over a period not exceeding ten years.
Yet, army leaders were absent from the closing session of the reform workshop, in protest of what they perceived to be a choice to ignore the proposals they had advanced. These proposals included stopping recruitment operations and amending the legal status of the RSF by reinstating the article confirming its affiliation with the army, an article that General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan removed shortly after he took control of the country. This made the paramilitary force largely independent of the military.
This independent position strengthened Hemedti’s ambition to monopolize power without announcing it. However, this goal was clear in his closeness to the influential forces in Sudanese society, whether they were civil society groups or political forces calling for democracy. This type of ambition, shared by some army leaders, led to the attempted coup against the transitional government on September 21, 2019, and despite the thwarting of their military move, coup leaders defended their plans desperately in court sessions.
Despite the involvement of the army and the RSF in the political process, their media statements indicated the existence of deep differences between them, especially regarding their respective positions on the framework agreement, which was highlighted in the reinforcement of their forces in Khartoum recently.
While the army leaders were hinting at retreating from the framework agreement, Hemedti remained a strong advocate of it, expressing in his speech that his disagreement was not with the army, but rather with those clinging to power. Despite this defense, anyone who follows Hemedti's military and political career points to his willingness to ally with anyone in order to lock in his ambitions and make them reality. Thus, although he had continued to defend the isolated President Omar Al-Bashir, he quickly changed his allegiance to cautiously welcome the protest movement, eventually joining the generals who overthrew Al-Bashir. These generals then formed a military council led by Al-Burhan, who made Hemedti his deputy, and the two continued in the same positions as president and deputy of the Transitional Sovereignty Council after agreeing to share power with civilians (before overthrowing them in the October 25, 2021, coup to reach the framework agreement stage).
The differences between the army and the RSF cannot be reduced to their positions on the framework agreement, issues of command and control, and the time period for the merger of forces. Rather, differences extend to the general influence of the leaders of the two forces, in addition to the expansion of the RSF in terms of recruitment and arms, its rapidly developing commercial activity, and its establishment of separate foreign relations.
All this has made Hemedti the biggest threat to not only the army, but also to the state itself. In addition, the civil forces involved in the political process believe that supporters of the former regime played a role in fueling these disputes, as handing over power to civilians constitutes a threat to their activities, which resumed after the October coup.
In light of all this, it was expected that the two sides would enter into a fight due to the escalating conflict of interests. After the outbreak of this conflict on April 15, it became important to stop the fighting due to the high cost of the war. Continued fighting could prompt further regional and international intervention, which could complicate the conflict and may prolong it.
Weam Al Sharif is a Sudanese doctor and writer interested in issues related to conflict.
Egypt’s High Stakes in Sudan’s Crisis
Officials in Cairo are gravely concerned about the implications of instability in Sudan from the standpoint of Egypt’s geopolitical, economic, and security interests.
Giorgio Cafiero
As Egypt grapples with high inflation, rising food prices, a debt crisis, currency devaluation, and other major challenges, the country of 109 million is now vulnerable to the threat of Sudan’s turmoil spilling into Egypt.
Amid Sudan’s ongoing crisis, no country has taken in as many Sudanese refugees as Egypt. Of the roughly 150,000 Sudanese who have been displaced to neighboring countries since last month, roughly 50,000 have come to Egypt. Continuation of Sudan’s conflict could easily add new layers of severity to Egypt’s already dire domestic problems.
Historically, Sudan has been a country under much Egyptian influence with Cairo viewing it as Egypt’s “backyard.” The two Arab states’ armies have maintained close relations. Just as Egypt’s leadership sees its national army as the guarantor of stability at home, Cairo’s perception is that the Sudanese national army is the country’s main institution similarly capable of ensuring security and order in Egypt’s neighbor.
In 2019, President Omar al-Bashir, whom Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi saw as too tolerant of political Islam and too close to Turkey and Qatar, lost power amid a popular revolt against his 30-year dictatorship. Bashir’s ouster gave Egypt, as well as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, an opportunity to gain greater clout in Khartoum at Ankara and Doha’s expense.
In March 2021, Egypt and Sudan’s armies bolstered their cooperation through a training and border security agreement. Subsequently, the two militaries have carried out joint exercises. Seven months later, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan led the coup against the civilian wing of Sudan’s transitional government. Consequently, Cairo-Khartoum relations further deepened.
Since the ongoing Sudanese conflict erupted last month, Egypt has established itself as the dominant outside actor supporting Burhan in his struggle against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (a.k.a. Hemedti). In conflicts across Arab countries, Egypt believes national armies—not mercenary groups, militias, or other non-state actors—should receive backing from other Arab states. This thinking largely explains Sisi’s support for the Ba’athist regime in Damascus and the Syrian Arab Army throughout the Syrian crisis. In Sudan, Egypt’s stance is that Burhan, unlike Hemedti, has legitimacy. Cairo will probably continue to see Hemedti as a threat and remain committed to backing the Sudanese national army.
The unpredictable nature of Sudan’s internal conflict raises important questions about the future of Egypt’s water and food security. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) issue is of immense importance to Cairo with Egypt’s government considering access to waters from the Nile River a lifeline for its citizens. Against the backdrop of Russia’s overt invasion of Ukraine last year, the Egyptians have been needing more water while attempting to grow their agricultural sector as part of an effort to compensate for their lost wheat imports from Ukraine.
Over the years, Egypt and Sudan have sided with each other against Ethiopia in the GERD dispute. Khartoum’s alignment with Cairo on this issue has been extremely important to Egypt. Yet, the Sudanese crisis stands to weaken Egypt’s position. In Cairo there are fears that Egypt may lose Sudan as a partner vis-à-vis the GERD, which would decrease Cairo’s leverage.
For all Cairo’s concerns about the conflict in Sudan, this crisis also provides a potential opportunity for Sisi to position himself as an important leader on the international stage. Egypt’s head of state has expressed his desire to play this mediation role shortly after the crisis erupted. Although Cairo has firmly supported Burhan and seen the RSF as a threat, Egyptian officials have engaged Hemedti with Sisi himself meeting the paramilitary leader in Cairo. Most likely, Washington, Moscow, and various Arab capitals will look to Sisi as a leader who can play a constructive role in terms of deescalating this conflict between Sudan’s two warlords, ultimately bolstering Cairo’s leverage internationally. On May 10, Egypt’s Deputy Foreign Minister for African Affairs, Hamdi Sanad Loza, met with the British special envoy to Sudan, Robert Fairweather, and London’s ambassador to Cairo, Gareth Bayley, to discuss the Sudanese crisis. Their discussions focused on efforts to swiftly implement an effective and lasting ceasefire in order to protect civilians.
However, there are potential scenarios in which Egypt’s diplomatic energy fails to produce positive results and Cairo concludes that direct military intervention is Egypt’s only viable option for safeguarding its interests. If this conflict rages on and Hemedti proves increasingly triumphant over Burhan, Egypt might come under pressure to wage unilateral military action to shore up the Sudanese national army. Naturally, any such intervention would come with enormous risk that Egyptian policymakers must seriously consider before making any such bold moves.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO and founder of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct fellow at the American Security Project. Follow him on Twitter: @GiorgioCafiero.
