In this debate, Sada publishes two articles dealing with the escalation of tensions between the Palestinian and Israeli sides in light of internal crises in both Israel and the Palestinian territories. In the first article, Amr Salah focuses on the expansion of the scope of the conflict beyond settlements and direct issues of occupation. His article analyzes the factors that are feeding the identity dimension of the conflict, arguing that this dimension is playing a greater role than at any other time in the past. Salah explains that the impact of the rise of the Israeli extreme right is not limited to settlement expansion or discourse calling for the imposition of Israeli sovereignty over all Palestinian lands. Rather, the impact also extends to producing a more extreme Israeli national-religious narrative about the conflict.
The second article written by Azzam Shaath discusses the possibility of achieving calm between the Palestinians and the Israelis in light of the growing confrontations between them with the intensification of the political crisis in Israel, especially after the approval of the establishment of the “National Guard” through the Netanyahu-Ben Gvir deal. Shaath discusses the outcomes of the Aqaba and Sharm el-Sheikh summits and raises questions about opportunities to reduce security tensions, along with the possibility of achieving a broader de-escalation between the Palestinians and the Israelis.
The Worst is to Come in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Amr Salah
Multiple factors, including the Palestinian economic crisis, the rise of new actors, a distracted U.S. administration, and the lack of a political solution, could intersect to produce a broad escalation.
The UN described 2022 as “the deadliest year for the occupied West Bank.” Despite Western attempts of de-escalation, nearly 113 people, including 96 Palestinians, have been killed during the first four months of 2023. While holding tragic significance, the number is not the only reason for concern. As a result of ongoing political developments in Palestine and Israel, and internationally, violence between Israelis and Palestinians could take a dangerous turn that an American firefighting policy could not contain. That makes the ongoing violence in Jerusalem, the recent Israeli retaliatory strikes on Gaza and Lebanon, and the Israeli army’s call-up of reservists a prelude for the worst.
First, a major source of concern is how identity now plays an even greater role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict than in past years. The impact of the rise of Israel’s far-right is not limited to the expansion of settlements or calls for Israeli sovereignty over the Palestinian territories. The far-right’s rise has also enhanced the identity conflict by constructing an extreme Israeli religious-national narrative about the conflict. That narrative benefits from and fuels the narratives of Palestinian armed groups that will, in turn, strengthen the narrative of Israel’s far right. As such a cycle continues, it becomes harder to deconstruct narratives that justify the conflict, depict it as inevitable, mobilize for revenge with every violent incident, and create a conducive environment for recruitment.
Second, another source of concern is the possible convergence of an identity conflict with political frustration and the increasing improbability of reaching a political solution. This time, arguments highlighting the unfeasibility of the two-state solution do not come from hawks on either side or from Arab hardliners, but from moderate voices who used to support the two-state solution. Even some who were part of the peace process now believe that extensive Israeli settlements have made a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders virtually impossible. This is not just a sentiment felt at the elite level, as it also points to a growing hopelessness about the two-state solution among Palestinians without a feasible political alternative.
The resulting political frustration could also interact with economic and social crises exacerbated by global events. Poverty indicators in the Palestinian territories and horizontal equality between Arabs and Jews in Israel remain sources of tension. From a political economy perspective, poverty and inequality are critical preludes to violence. In the Palestinian territories, the UN estimates that 36 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. Those numbers support the World Bank’s assessment that COVID-19 and the Ukraine war “amplified” the risks of destabilization in the Palestinian territories where donor assistance could not fill the funding gap faced by the Palestinian Authority.
These factors also reinforce the “conflict trap” in the Palestinian territories. The conflict trap could lead the Palestinian territories into a cycle of poverty and violence. Likewise, in Israel, the economic and social gap between Arabs and Jews in income, jobs, and representation within institutions feeds identity conflict, making Israel vulnerable to renewed civil violence between Arabs and Jews, as was the case in 2021. Moreover, growing polarization in Israel stemming from the controversial policies of the Netanyahu government could increase the possibility of such civil violence.
In parallel, the emergence of new, unpredictable, and perhaps uncontrollable actors in the West Bank and Israel is another concern that increases the possibility of escalation and counter-escalation. In the Palestinian territories, the emergence of groups such as the Jenin and Jericho Brigades and the Lions’ Den deserves attention. These actors are less open to compromise due to their limited political experience and lack of affiliation with conventional groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which could be influenced by Egyptian mediation. In the Israeli case, the far-right led by Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich maintains its rebellion against mainstream politics in Israel, seeking to militarize Israeli settlers, launch collective punishment against Palestinians, eradicate Palestinian towns, reinstate the death penalty, and structure a judicial system with less control over policies and officials. Imposing such a plan would not only undermine democratic institutions in Israel but could also provoke a counter-escalation from the Palestinians and wide-scale violence. Moreover, the impasse between the far-right flank of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government and his opposition makes an escalation against the Palestinians an option he may use at some point. That option would allow him to satisfy the right wing and silence his opponents during a confrontation with the “enemy” that could enforce domestic solidarity.
While such developments continue, the United States is overwhelmed with managing major global crises, including the Ukraine War, inflation, global energy challenges, and the issue of strategic Arab allies approaching Russia and China. Furthermore, the U.S. administration is very close to becoming a lame duck. In the final year of his term, President Biden would be preoccupied with reelection calculations, which could constrain American leverage over Israel. That creates an opportunity for the Israeli government to act unilaterally without fear of a U.S. reaction (which would likely not exceed condemnation or the deployment of an envoy for temporary de-escalation).
On the other hand, Iran, which has not concluded a new nuclear deal with the U.S., seems resilient despite its domestic upheaval and U.S. sanctions. Moreover, if the Iranian drones used on Ukrainian battlefields by Russia indicated Iranian determination to influence global conflicts, Iran’s support for groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad continues to be a space of regional influence for Iran. In past years, that support allowed for the development of the range of Palestinian missiles in a short period to reach 250 km in 2021. That year, Palestinian rockets were fired toward Israeli cities, including Tel Aviv, and 300 were killed in a violent escalation between Israel, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad.
In summary, a broad escalation between Israelis and Palestinians seems more likely now than at any other point in the past few years. That probability considers a partial or full interplay of multiple factors, including the economic and social conditions of the Palestinians, the rise of new actors in the conflict, a distracted United States, and the lack of a political solution.
Amr Salah is a graduate lecturer and doctoral candidate at Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution at George Mason University.
Seeking De-escalation in the West Bank
Azzam Shaath
The Aqaba and Sharm el-Sheikh summits renewed uncertainty about the possibility of achieving calm between the Palestinians and Israelis in the West Bank.
The Aqaba and Sharm el-Sheikh summits, which were held in Jordan and Egypt twenty days apart, renewed uncertainty about the possibility of achieving calm between the Palestinians and Israelis in the West Bank. The growing confrontation between the two, and the escalated security tensions on the ground, as well as the intense political crisis in Israel—which culminated in the “Netanyahu-Ben Gvir deal” that approved the establishment of a “National Guard” to stall the Israeli government’s contested judicial reform plan—could all contribute to delaying the long hoped-for peace.
Motives and Context
Both the Palestinians and Israelis were willing to participate in the Aqaba and Sharm el-Sheikh summits to achieve their goals. The Palestinians were looking to de-escalate tensions on the ground in order to pave a way forward towards a political settlement. The Israelis, in turn, were seeking to restore security coordination with the Palestinian Authority (PA) to help them resume their responsibilities in the West Bank.
The Aqaba Summit was held despite escalated Israeli raids against Palestinians and nonstop Israeli settlement legitimization policies—a situation that forced the PA to retaliate with a cessation of security coordination with the Israelis, and culminated in a few isolated shootings at Israelis in the West Bank and Jerusalem.
Despite the fact that the Aqaba Summit failed to achieve its objectives, the Israeli and Palestinian Authority delegations reconvened in Sharm el-Sheikh under the same circumstances to achieve the same goals. Each of the two summits resulted in the release of statements that focused primarily on the necessity of calm and reduced security tensions in the West Bank.
Outcomes of the Two Summits
The final communiqués of the Aqaba and Sharm el-Sheikh summits agreed on six items, four of which were repeated in the two statements. The items were related to de-escalating, maintaining the status quo in the holy sites, abiding by previous agreements, stopping discussion of any new settlement units for four months, and halting the authorization of any outposts for six months.
Yet, while the Aqaba Summit’s theme was the de-escalation of tensions, it did not specify any mechanism to do so. The Sharm el-Sheikh summit tried to avoid this shortcoming by stipulating in its final communiqué that the parties “will report to the quintet leadership in April, in a resumed session of the meeting in Sharm El Sheikh.” However, the text still did not elaborate on what is meant by the “de-escalation mechanism,” which leaves the interpretation of the term up to the two parties. The Israelis could implement their version of a de-escalation mechanism by suppressing the Palestinians and using force to reach the aspired “calm,” a sure way to provoke a violent Palestinian reaction and to drive peace further away.
Moreover, if PA officials were to attempt to impose their own version, they would be unable to do so because they have no actual control over the West Bank and Jerusalem, or over the armed groups operating there. De-escalation has also been further complicated by the isolated shootings carried out by Palestinians who do not belong to any of the Palestinian factions.
Perhaps the most significant stipulation in the Sharm el-Sheikh communiqué was to improve “the economic conditions of the Palestinian people, per previous agreements, and to significantly enhance the fiscal situation of the Palestinian National Authority.” However, this may prove difficult to achieve given the policy of “economic facilitation” that successive Israeli governments have tested and adopted. This policy cannot guarantee a de-escalation of the security tensions, even if it has helped to strengthen the PA’s financial position and alleviate its crises.
Two Possible Scenarios
Given the fact that the two summits were marred by the usual Israeli-Palestinian crackdown-retaliation cycle, the two parties will have to decide whether they will forfeit the pledges they made in Aqaba and Sharm El Sheikh or commit to them.
If they choose to disregard the pledges they made in Egypt to lower tensions on the ground, Israel will continue to use force against the Palestinians (especially after the formation of the National Guard) and will go ahead with its settlement plan. In return, the Palestinians will retaliate with more violence, pushing Israel further over the edge in a never-ending vicious cycle. Unfortunately, this scenario seems to be the more likely of the two because the deep-rooted causes of tension were not properly eradicated.
However, the two parties may choose to succumb to the pressure of the mediators, lower tensions, and cooperate to restore calm and coordination. Such a choice will probably be based on the fear of a “total explosion” in the West Bank that could lead to the collapse of the PA, which would constitute a burden on both Israelis and Palestinians. The parties also understand that continued escalation will lead to the expansion of the circle of confrontation, which contradicts the policy of “neutralization and fragmentation” adopted by the Israelis, who always make sure that escalation happens in areas that are neither costly nor harmful to them.
Conclusion
It can be said that the Aqaba and Sharm el-Sheikh summits did not impose binding formulas on either party because they focused on security talks and avoided political concerns. This means that the solutions they suggested will remain temporary and will fall short of achieving the goal of a comprehensive and sustainable truce that opens the doors for a political settlement between Palestinians and Israelis.
Azzam Shaath, a writer and political researcher based in Gaza, holds a PhD in public law and political science from Mohammed V University in Rabat.
