The State Department's Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) represents a critical element in the Bush administration's policy of attempting to transform the Arab world into a zone of liberal democracies and free market economies. Launched last year, MEPI funds programs in Arab countries other than Iraq to promote economic, educational, and democratic reform, in partnership with governments and citizen groups. MEPI is a most welcome initiative, representing the first significant increase in assistance for most Arab countries in decades. Yet major questions remain about its funding, management, and strategy, bearing on whether MEPI will succeed in advancing the administration's very ambitious goals.
Funding
Created with a modest $29 million in start up funds, MEPI was initially dismissed by many in the Arab world as merely a symbolic gesture. Since then, however, Congress has substantially increased MEPI's funding. It received $90 million in March 2003 and a request for an additional $145 million for 2004 is pending. The State Department has announced that MEPI also encompasses the annual bilateral economic aid for Egypt, Jordan, West Bank/Gaza, Lebanon, Morocco and Yemen overseen by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and totaling more than $1 billion.
These new funds demonstrate that the Bush administration is indeed giving more attention to Middle East reform than did its predecessors. But MEPI's goal of transforming conditions inside some sixteen Arab countries is out of proportion to its means. In a region where the U.S. has devoted tens of billions of dollars to support the Arab-Israeli peace process, and tens of billions more in Iraq, a few hundred million additional dollars does not make much impression. Furthermore, of the $1 billion in bilateral economic aid, ninety-five percent goes to the so-called peace-process countries of Egypt, Jordan, and West Bank/Gaza. For 2003, this leaves just $50 million, plus $119 million in MEPI funds, for all the other countries. By contrast, the 1992 Freedom Support Act, established to support the transition away from Communism in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, received $400 million in its first year alone.
Management
The State Department's ability to manage MEPI constitutes another major question. Historically, USAID has administered Middle East aid, while the State Department played a mostly hands-off oversight role. But reflecting the high priority the White House gives to Middle East reform, the State Department's Near East Bureau is directing MEPI, and is reviewing all USAID projects in the Middle East to make sure they are consistent with MEPI's goals.
The new approach has several advantages. USAID has been criticized for its risk-averse style; the State Department could bring fresh thinking. The State Department has far more Arabic-speaking staff. Under the State Department's control, MEPI is more likely to receive White House support and diplomatic reinforcement of its goals.
But State Department stewardship also has significant downsides. The State Department's lack of experience administering large aid programs could lead to poorly conceived and managed projects. The State Department's vetting of USAID programs for conformity with MEPI could lead to the elimination of valuable but non-reform related projects in areas such as health and environment. MEPI could become a political tool to reward Arab governments for their cooperation with Washington on counter-terrorism or other policies.
Strategy
The most pressing questions concern MEPI's strategy. MEPI has adopted a "let a thousand flowers bloom" approach of funding dozens of short-term, pilot programs across the region. Individual projects may be worthwhile on some level, but short-term projects rarely have lasting impact. Given that the U.S. and Europe have tried hard to promote economic liberalization in the Middle East for over a decade, it is unlikely that a new sprinkling of small technical assistance projects will make much difference in opening up closed economies.
In addition, MEPI's goal of engaging in partnership with large numbers of Middle Easterners may be thwarted by popular objection to American policies in the region or by rejection of foreign involvement in what Arabs consider sensitive domestic issues. For instance, past experience in many Arab countries shows that Western efforts at education reform often provoke great resistance when they encroach on the highly contentious issues of religion and gender.
Finally, despite the Bush Administration's frequent talk of Middle East democracy, the MEPI programs lack a clear strategy to encourage the kind of systemic political change required for democratization. Most of MEPI's political reform projects closely resemble the well-meaning but ultimately ineffective programs carried out in the Arab world during the 1990s to professionalize NGOs, train candidates, and modernize legislatures and judicial systems. These earlier programs failed to make much of a dent in entrenched authoritarian systems largely because they avoided sensitive but core issues of political inclusion and institutional power and because they worked with a very narrow group of interlocutors. MEPI's strategy to date suggests that the U.S. remains torn between a desire to embrace the idea of promoting democracy and a deeper fear of genuine political change.
Amy Hawthorne is an associate in the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment and editor of the Arab Reform Bulletin. While the views in this piece are strictly her own, she would like to thank Jeremy Sharp of the Congressional Research Service for his help.
