The parliamentary elections that took place in Georgia on Sunday were billed as the most important in the country’s history: a bold statement that neither the ruling party nor the opposition contested. They did, however, differ on just what exactly was at stake.
The opposition presented the vote as a referendum on the country’s future: whether Georgia would be an EU democracy or an authoritarian country under Russia’s sway. The ruling Georgian Dream party, on the other hand, portrayed it as a fateful choice between war and peace. Following the election, both sides claimed victory, but there is much to indicate that in this clash of narratives, it was that of the ruling party that proved more convincing to Georgian society.
Despite Georgian Dream’s recent squabbles with the West and promises to ban the opposition altogether, not to mention the accusations of rapprochement with Russia, the ruling party does appear to have won the election. The party, which has been in power since 2012, received about 54 percent of the vote according to official data, giving it eighty-nine out of 150 seats in parliament. According to the same official data, the four opposition parties that passed the 5 percent of the vote threshold required to enter parliament received a total of about 37 percent of the vote.
There are, however, major doubts over the reliability of official data, with allegations being made of mass falsifications. Election observers reported voters being given multiple ballots, including ones already filled in with votes for Georgian Dream; people voting using other people’s identity documents; and the intimidation of observers, which made it impossible for them to do their job.
Exit poll data also point to inconsistencies in the final election results. Those commissioned by the largest opposition TV channels gave Georgian Dream about 41–42 percent of the vote, and the opposition a combined result of more than 50 percent. Opinion polls conducted on the eve of the elections showed even lower support for Georgian Dream (34–36 percent), while the combined opposition was predicted to win a majority.
Still, though Washington and Brussels noted the reported violations and called for a full investigation into them, there is no talk yet of the West not recognizing the voting results. The OSCE reported violations, but recognized the results, while noting an overall “rollback of democracy” in Georgia: findings supported by the German Foreign Office.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, on the other hand, was quick to congratulate Georgian Dream on its victory, and promptly flew to Georgia the day after the vote for a two-day visit. While most EU leaders may not share Orban’s unconditional support for Georgian Dream, the Hungarian veto protects Georgia’s ruling party from possible punitive measures from the EU.
The accusations of mass falsifications are not unfounded, but nor can it be said that they alone account for Georgian Dream’s victory. The ruling party’s rhetoric of a choice between war and peace clearly proved more convincing than the opposition’s narrative of a choice between Russia and the EU.
Regardless of whether Georgian Dream actually won 42 percent or 54 percent of the vote, it still overlaps with the proportion of Georgians who support EU integration, which, according to all the polls, is close to 90 percent. That means that among those who voted for the ruling party, there are many who are very keen to see their country join the EU.
Indeed, despite its recent differences with Washington and Brussels, Georgian Dream itself has never officially renounced its support for EU integration. “Europe was always a kind of natural choice for Georgia and for Georgians,” Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze said in an interview with Euronews on the eve of the vote.
According to the party’s founder, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, Georgia must simply defend its interests and avoid a confrontation with Moscow—even if that means relations with the EU suffer—until the war in Ukraine ends (which in his view could happen very soon), when relations with the West will improve again.
The opposition’s narrative about a choice between Russia and the EU was also undermined by its own fragmentation. Several coalitions and more than ten parties ran against Georgian Dream. The inability of the opposition to agree among themselves was at odds with their official position that the election was a momentous choice between freedom and selling out to the enemy.
It was only at the very end of the campaign that the opposition finally managed to demonstrate any kind of unity, when the various factions agreed to sign a “Georgian Charter” proposed by President Salome Zourabichvili. The charter’s essence was that in the event of a defeat for Georgian Dream, the opposition would repeal all laws hindering the country’s path to EU integration, and hold early elections in 2025. But that plan was apparently too vague to convince a critical mass of the electorate.
The lack of coordinated tactics among the opposition parties was also evident after the vote, when it took them more than twenty-four hours to announce a plan of action. In the end, that plan consisted of all the opposition parties that cleared the threshold to enter parliament refusing to recognize the election results. After lengthy meetings with opposition leaders, President Zourabichvili followed suit, and called on people to come out in protest.
The president’s support adds institutional weight to the opposition’s rejection of the election results—but not for long. Zourabichvili’s term ends this year, and following constitutional reform in 2017, the next president will no longer be elected by popular vote, but by an electoral college consisting of parliamentary deputies and delegates from the regions. Georgian Dream, which supported Zourabichvili in the last presidential election, will be able to throw its support behind another candidate this time around.
The rest of the opposition’s plan consists of street protests, but the prospect of regime change through revolution seems unlikely, given that the election result is not contested by the international community and that Georgian Dream remains the most popular party.
That’s not to say that Georgia won’t face mass protests for a long time to come. In the last few years, accumulating frustration with Georgian Dream has repeatedly spilled out onto the streets of Tbilisi in the form of large-scale and violent rallies. Just a few months ago, thousands of people protested for weeks against the adoption of the law on “foreign agents.”
The current situation is far more serious. Accusations that Georgian Dream is in the Kremlin’s pocket resonate with a significant part of Georgian society, and the party itself raised the stakes ahead of the election when it promised to ban opposition parties—though it did stipulate that it would need a constitutional majority to do that, which it did not get.
For now, it appears that despite all the criticism, Georgian Dream has been reelected for a fourth term. But the unpredictability of the inevitable street protests could provoke the ruling party into making fatal mistakes.
