Moldova’s eastern breakaway region of Transnistria is not the country’s only region under Russian influence. Another is Gagauzia, which also declared its independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but then returned to Moldova as an autonomous unit—albeit not without lingering disagreements. Those tensions have been exacerbated by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine: Chisinau has condemned Russian aggression, while the authorities in Gagauzia’s main city Comrat defend the “Russian world” in Moldova. Gagauzia now threatens to become Moldova’s second separatist pro-Russian region.
Despite having rejoined Moldova in 1994, the autonomous southern region constantly accuses Chisinau of failing to respect its autonomous rights and freedoms and of infringing upon the rights of Russian-speaking residents of Gagauzia through measures such as prohibiting Russian television channels and forcing a transition from Russian to Romanian for conducting business. Russian is the primary language in the autonomy, including in the school system, and 68.2 percent of the Gagauz—a largely Orthodox Christian Turkic ethnic group—do not speak Romanian, the state language.
Gagauzia also clashes with Moldova on foreign policy. Chisinau used to skillfully balance between Moscow and the West, even under a pro-Russian government. Comrat, meanwhile, has always held clearly pro-Russian positions. In 2014, when Moldova signed an association agreement with the EU, Gagauzia held a referendum on joining the Russia-led Customs Union. Voters also overwhelmingly approved a law “on deferred sovereignty” that would allow Gagauzia to secede once again if Moldova were to lose “the status of an independent state.” Chisinau did not recognize the legitimacy of the referendum, but Moscow expressed support for it: the Kremlin has always capitalized on pro-Russian sentiment in Gagauzia and Transnistria to keep Moldova in its sphere of interests.
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it seemed that the pro-Russian breakaway region of Transnistria would be neighboring Moldova’s most vulnerable spot. However, Tiraspol has demonstrated awareness of its dependence on Chisinau and Kyiv, and has sought to distance itself from the war as much as possible. Comrat, by contrast, has criticized Chisinau’s turn toward Europe, called for renewed cooperation with Russia, and threatened to secede if Moldova decides to pursue unification with Romania or “join some organization with supranational structures” (i.e., the EU), thereby “losing some of its sovereignty.”
Tensions between Comrat and Chisinau were further inflamed by the election of Evghenia Gutsul as the başkan (governor) of Gagauzia in the spring of 2023. A newcomer to politics, Gutsul was nominated by the party of the fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, who has been sentenced in Moldova in absentia to fifteen years in prison for the theft of $1 billion from the national budget.
Shortly after this election, Chisinau declared the Shor party to be anti-constitutional. Moldovan President Maia Sandu referred to Gutsul as belonging to a “criminal organization” and refused to sign a decree recognizing her as a member of the Moldovan government, which had been the practice for previous governors of the autonomy, in line with the law on the special legal status of Gagauzia.
Gutsul—whose victory Shor orchestrated by buying votes, promising major infrastructure wins, and campaigning for friendship with Russia and against Moldova’s accession to the EU—has been toeing her sponsor’s political line. She has visited Russia, where she has been met with honors and touted as a prominent Moldovan opposition figure; had a photo op with Vladimir Putin; and reached an agreement with Promsvyazbank, the main bank of the Russian defense sector, on extra payments of around $100 to employees of local government structures and retirees in Gagauzia via Mir payment cards.
Nevertheless, even after all the recent tensions, Comrat is not ready to follow in Transnistria’s footsteps by really escalating relations with Chisinau. While their relationship might be complicated, Gagauzia is deeply integrated into Moldova’s political and economic life.
Gagauzia, which has a steppe climate plagued by water shortages, is the country’s most heavily subsidized region, with 70 percent of its budget financed by the national budget and only 30 percent coming from local taxes and duties. Gagauzia also benefits from free trade with the EU, trade turnover with which has been growing. In 2022, EU countries accounted for over 42 percent of Gagauz exports (primarily alcohol and agricultural products), compared with Russia’s 8 percent.
Labor migration in Gagauzia is primarily EU-bound as well: residents of the autonomy, like those of other Moldovan regions, frequently obtain Romanian citizenship in order to be able to work in the EU. Meanwhile, the number of Moldovans (including the Gagauz) working in Russia is steadily decreasing.
Just a couple of years ago, it seemed that Comrat and Chisinau had moved on from their quarreling and begun constructive dialogue. However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine brought foreign policy front and center once again. Ilan Shor wants to use Gagauzia to destabilize the situation in Moldova. So does Russia, which lost the support of much of the population in Moldova due to its aggression against Ukraine.
The Kremlin is willing to align with anyone in order to regain its influence and undermine President Sandu—even with Shor, who was until recently banned from entering Russia due to accusations of financial machinations.
The fall 2024 presidential elections in Moldova present new opportunities for escalation. Shor, expected to be the Kremlin’s main proxy in Moldova, won’t be able to run, but promises to put forward a united opposition candidate. The electoral prospects of a pro-Russian candidate are dim, but Moscow’s main objectives are simply to disrupt Moldova’s pro-European consensus and undercut Sandu’s popularity in order to improve the chances of bringing Moldova back into Russia’s fold after the end of its war against Ukraine.
Yet even these limited goals will be difficult for Russia to achieve. The majority of Moldovans support European integration, and Sandu is expected to win the election. While pro-Russian sentiment in Gagauzia may be strong, the autonomy has a population of only 150,000—less than 5 percent of the national population—so its votes won’t have a major impact on the election results. Furthermore, despite their political views, the Gagauz see themselves as Moldovans above all, and aren’t interested in a serious confrontation with Chisinau. They can’t survive on their own, and they don’t expect practical assistance from Russia, particularly in the absence of a shared border.
Chisinau is also working to outmaneuver the Kremlin and Ilan Shor by engaging in direct dialogue with mayors in Gagauzia, bypassing the başkan, and even sending state funds to the municipalities rather than to the regional government. That leaves Gutsul and her team with nothing to show the local population besides her photo with Putin. Comrat has failed to prevent local officials from interacting with Chisinau, and Shor is unlikely to invest his own money in Gagauzia. Thus, if Gutsul is unable to regain control over the flow of funds from the Moldovan budget, she is unlikely to preserve her popularity.
At the same time, the Gagauz distrust of Chisinau goes deeper than the Kremlin’s and Shor’s scheming. Sooner or later, the Moldovan government will need to develop a clear program for building relations with the headstrong autonomy, and right now there is no sign of any such plan.
