Source: Getty

Podcast: Navalny's Legacy for the Russian Opposition

Carnegie Politika podcast host Alex Gabuev is joined by David Herszenhorn, an editor at The Washington Post and author of the biography "The Dissident: Alexey Navalny," to discuss the death of Navalny and its consequences for the Russian opposition and society.

by Alexander Gabuev and David Herszenhorn
Published on February 20, 2024

The sudden death of the jailed Russian opposition leader was a shock, though it was not unexpected. For the last decade, Navalny had been the most vocal critic and opponent of Putin's regime, while his Anti-Corruption Foundation had supporters in almost all Russian regions and cities. Only Navalny was able to consolidate people across Russia in waves of protests against corruption and the authoritarian regime. What impact has Navalny's death had on Russian society and the opposition movement? What is Navalny's legacy? Is there any other person inside or outside Russia who can lead the opposition to Putin's regime now? 

Listen or download: Simplecast | Subscribe: YouTubeApple, Google Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, RSS

Alexander Gabuev. Welcome to Carnegie Politika Podcast, my name is Alexander Gabuev. I'm the director of Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin and the host. 

Today we are going to talk about tragic death of Alexei Navalny, one of the most prominent Russian opposition leaders. He was killed in a jail in Russia. We’re going to discuss it with David Herszenhorn, who is editor of the Washington Post covering Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe, and is the author of the recent biography of Alexei Navalny, ‘The Dissident,’ one of the most comprehensive accounts of Alexei Navalny's life and work that was published right before his assassination. 

We welcome you, we're very happy to have you, David, although this is not the best of occasions.

David Herszenhorn. I agree. It's good to be with you not under these circumstances.

Gabuev. Where did you hear about Navalny's death?

Herszenhorn. Well, sitting at my desk, where I'm sitting, speaking to you right now. On Friday, working reporters, of course, that are covering Russia and Ukraine, immediately saw it on Russian telegram channels. And of course, the first reaction is no, but then of course, it could be. And this is the situation where for I think many of us, including Navalny himself, who had predicted this possibility. We're shocked, utterly shocked, but not at all surprised, the Kremlin wanted him dead. Federal security service agents had tried to assassinate him several times before with a banned nerve agent. The German government confirmed that. Bellingcat and Navalny teamed up for an investigation that proved that, even named the members of the assassination team. So, we understood all along that Navalny's choice in January 21, to go back to Russia was potentially risking a death sentence.

Gabuev. That pretty much sums up my reaction. I was at the Munich security conference when I've heard the news. I've heard Yulia Navalnaya, wife and partner, supporter one of them back quote of Alexei Navalny's political career to living her very moving and emotional remarks, just a couple of hours after hearing the tragic news about her husband and that definitely shaped the mood in Munich. Which is the most important gathering of European politicians, defense intelligence, diplomat officials who are in charge of Western transatlantic foreign policy, everybody was saying, well, president Joe Biden has threatened grave consequences to Vladimir Putin's regime back in 2021. But Alex Navalny was arrested and put in prison. If Navalny is killed while in captivity. And then after that Russia's aggression against Ukraine happened, all possible sanctions have been applied and then everybody in Munich was asking, "Okay, but where are the bullets, where are the sticks that we can apply to punish Vladimir Putin?" Which seems to be run out of sticks for a much graver, a much more tragic crime which is invasion of Ukraine and everybody was puzzled and asking. How should the West react? But definitely, that had an effect on mood in Munich and across the world, because I know a lot of Russian friends and colleagues, I was there with my colleague Ekaterina Schulmann, everybody was expecting this at some point, but everybody was very shocked and like many of my friends told me it's like a small version of February 24th, 2022, like the day of the war start.

Herszenhorn. People will remember where they were for sure, I mean, let's pause for a moment, Alexander, and let's dwell a bit on the strength of Yulia Navalnaya. I mean this was remarkable, to stand up in this room full of world leaders of top defense, officials, surrounded by journalists, by cameras, and she's not always been the most comfortable in front of the cameras, and to be able to speak out at that moment, not knowing whether to believe the reports of her husband's death. I mean, she was honest about this. How could she know for sure? Because there was no proof at that point and to be able to have that poise and that strength and deliver that message demanding accountability was quite remarkable. And yet, as you say, for those of us who have followed Navalny's career, people very close to him told me, when I was working on the book, Navalny is not one person. Navalny is two people - Alexei and Yulia. And she has been by his side. She had been part of his journey. Every step and a much more powerful force than many people realized, because she didn't seek the attention or the limelight, but she was there, always there. So really, really dramatic.

Now moving to your other point about the leaders in the room, tell me if you disagree, but my sense is that Alexei Navalny would be livid, absolutely furious, at the hypocrisy of Western leaders, now demanding accountability for his death. Because, he warned them how many times for how many years who Vladimir Putin was, what Putin was about, what he was capable of. And he asked over, and over, and over again for them to do more to prevent this very kind of thing from happening. And they did nothing. So, amazing to hear it yet again and of course it's the right thing to say.

But I think about Darya Navalnaya, their daughter, Dasha, appearing in front of the European parliament to accept the Sakharov prize on her father's behalf. And her speech to the members of the European parliament was blistering, accusing them in this sweet voice, I mean she's a lovely young woman, accusing them of utter hypocrisy and of constantly choosing pragmatism. And asking, why couldn't they open a history book and realize that compromising and negotiating with a dictator does not work. 

It was really quite a dramatic statement by a very poised young woman obviously taking on, in the tradition of her parents. We know where she gets it from. But I think Navalny would be furious at the fact that it has come to this. Of course, he himself could not have imagined even with all of the commitment he had to his cause, and putting aside he would talk about this not wanting to think about the risks. He was asked so many times “Why are you still alive?" and he got sick of the question but also said that he didn't want to think about the risks because it would be paralyzing.

So, we know that he would put this out of his mind. The possibility that this could happen. But the fact that it indeed did come to this after all of these warnings and after, you know, these officials doing nothing. And yet, he didn't know, right, even in January 21 it was so impossible to imagine that Putin was prepared to invade a country of 40 million people to begin bombing entire cities. And if you're willing to cause that number of deaths, that amount of destruction in a place that you've called a brother nation, that you're willing to send so many of your own soldiers to their deaths thousands and thousands of them. For, what all of us know, is… really absurdities. I mean no basis, in fact, so many of these argents that are made, then what is the fate of one man? Then what is the value of that one life of Navalny in that context? Obviously, nothing. And so indeed, as Putin himself said - “If they wanted to do it, they would have finished it.” It looks like, in this case, they finished it.

Gabuev. I agree that definitely would be Navalny's view. I think that it's subject for a separate and long discussion whether that path was predetermined. Whether Vladimir Putin on the day he put his hand on the Russian constitution in May 2000 was the person who kills his opponent, political opponents in prison. And Navalny’s just the most famous one of there are many other political killings happening in Russia, who invades a neighboring country and kills people, who are very close to Russia, although definitely a separate nation that deserves freedom its own state can choose its alliances, and so on. And whether that was predetermined or whether that was a journey and where has been Russian mistakes on Putin's side and frankly on the Russian society’s side? Because, I remember that my political kind of consciousness was connected a little bit with the Bolotnaya Square protest before that with the first rigged election and with everything what Alexei Navalny invited. I was a 26-year-old when Bolotnaya happened.  So, to me, when I hear sometimes my Ukrainian friends saying that “what your country is destroying, is not only Ukraine or cities, but this is part of us, of our youth and adulthood, like memories, people we know, who’ve get killed”.

So, in a way, it’s just incomparable and I don't want to equalize that. But, killing of Navalny really closes the chapter of youth and I think that so many people, my generation, particularly in Moscow, particularly people who support a different vision for a different Russia, is like, the feeling is similar. 

But can we sit back for a second? There are many prominent political opposition leaders in Russia. Boris Nemtsov has been killed, but there are many others. What is your explanation why it was Alexei Navalny who emerged as the undisputed leader of the Russian opposition? Not necessarily acknowledged by other… leaders, but definitely if you would ask Russians or foreigners like who is the leader of the Russian opposition, everybody would say: "Alexei Navalny". And I would agree. Why- How did that happen?

Herszenhorn. Well, it goes back to those years, that you're talking about, which was also my introduction to Russia. I moved to live in Russia as a correspondent for the New York Times in 2011, right as Navalny was experiencing this meteoric rise in his career. And a rather dramatic transformation from an anti-corruption crusader and online blogger on Livejournal, that’s where he was mostly known, to the Russian public. Even though his political career had begun much earlier than that and so people who know him very well will tell you that he is absolutely a political animal. He was a born politician and this will help to… the explanation, for why it was Navalny who emerged as the leader, the recognized singular leader of the Russian opposition. Navalny had a… an almost innate instinct for communication. His communication skills were extraordinary in writing and spoken. Just had away with words and sometimes it wasn't even conscious, we could see that it was actually unconscious. He went on a radio show in early 2011 and he gets asked a question of what he thinks of United Russia, of Putin's party. And as, almost by accident, he calls them the party of crooks and thieves right, "julikov i vorov".

He didn't mean to do it. He didn't plan it. He hadn't written this out and suddenly this phrase becomes a meme even before we understood what memes were and it went viral, you know, in this way from Vladivostok, in the far East, to Petersburg, in the Northwest. Everybody who was frustrated with corruption and sick and tired of so much that had been happening in Russia for so long this phrase just captured their imaginations. And he had this way, of course, we yuthen saw it later with the YouTube videos, and his hor. That, you know, how funny he is, the ability to relate to people. And this does all go to his desire to be a politician. And so, we have to step back further not to 2011 and 2012, but to 2007 and even earlier, when Navalny was… joined "Yabloko", he became involved in liberal progressive politics in Moscow, what he thought might be the alternative party to Putin. It never materialized. Together with Masha Gaidar and others, they were part of a youth political movement called "da!" ("yes!") and they created this series of debates in Moscow, political debates, in person. It seems almost a quaint thing, but you think that this is actually, you know, happening in the 21th century already but it- but it was, and they caused a sensation and they had a great time. You know, matching up… people from different political views. Usually the Putin view versus others. But Navalny was the moderator of this and was even- almost had a television show where he was going to be moderating a TV version of these debates until the Kremlin quickly shut it down, said this guy is not allowed to be on state TV. But he had this communication instinct because he wanted to be a politician. And he was looking, always, even since he had falling out in "Yabloko", with the leadership there, and they accused him of being a nationalist or having nationalist views. And part of that was because he was searching for what were the ways to bring together all the different opposition forces in Russia. Progressives and liberals with nationalists and others. And it didn't work. And he admitted later, that it only caused him grief but he was practiced at it. So, when in fact, in 2011 we have this signature moment. Putin and Medvedev have switched jobs, Putin is then the prime minister. And then, in that September, they announced they're switching back, the tandem switch. And Russians were just absolutely offended, that they were being told what was going to happen. That clearly, their vote didn't matter. That this was, you know, managed democracy was actually sham democracy. And that anger built from that point on and from there then there were parliamentary elections… Da elections where the flaw- the fraud was blatant and was probably not any more or less fraudulent than elections had been in the past except now we had cell phone cameras.

We had video immediately. Where it was absolutely the evidence there of, just how egregious this fraud was. And so, this anger now… spills out into the street. The white ribbon protests begin. This is the path that leads to Bolotnaya, as you said. And there is Navalny, having for the better part of the past year, being the guy that suddenly everybody is speculating about. Really, because of that interview talking about crooks and thieves that suddenly it was like Navalny was the guy who maybe could be the alternative to Putin. I mean it's almost ridiculous for someone who had never been elected to anything previously. But in a system like Russia's where the only job that clearly mattered was the presidency suddenly when there was a look for an alternative. It was Navalny for president and he believed a little bit in this, of course it fit with his aspiration to be a politician and suddenly now he's on stage for these white ribbon protests. And he was an electric speaker, and he knew how to capture the crowd and he could feed off the crowd and for any of us who have covered politicians, I mean you know it when you see it.

Gabuev. I was there in this crowd during his first speech and that was really like everybody paled in comparison to how energetic he was, and how that really captured everybody's mood.

Herszenhorn. The anger, right? Do you remember…?

Gabuev. I remember well, well I was not part of the crowd who was… dissatisfied with the job swap between Putin and Medvedev because I was back then working in Kommersant in Medvedev’s Press Corp. I was Kommersant Kremlin Reporter so I sort of suspected it was coming. I harbored no illusions against Dmitry- around Dmitry Medvedev. So, the current version of Dmitry Medvedev didn't surprise me at all so I was not that angry about that. But I remember that a lot of people really thinned their hope for some… transition to a more liberal system even within Vladimir Putin framework associated with Dmitry Medvedev. When that didn't materialize, people were really angry and Navalny was really able to channel that anchor into political actions on the street.

Herszenhorn. It's funny it's a total aside but I actually had a conversation with Leonid Volkov who's Navalny's chief of staff and longtime top political advisor about this because he was with a bunch of Medvedev confidants when this announcement happened and, you know, could see how disappointed they were. How shocked and surprised many of them were because in fact, and this is a different conversation, the Putin camp and the Medvedev camp were not the same back in those days at all and there were many working for Medvedev, you covered them obviously, who really thought that he was the path forward to a more pluralistic democratic future for Russia and at that point everybody understood no matter whether you were in or out whether you were a Medvedev fan or a skeptic that no that was not going to happen but you were there you saw it and Navalny had that ability to electrify the crowd. Also, to get himself arrested and he began to do that I mean one of the funny things to me and it just tells you about who Navalny was in a certain generation of Russians, the Sovoxin described the post-Soviet. I mean they bridged the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, right? So born between 1976 and 1982 and even right then as there are all these amazing protests going on and he's having this incredible role on the streets and he's been arrested and he's come out of jail after two weeks. Right then during the December holidays he takes off with Yulia to Mexico and he's taking calls from reporters in Chichen Itza. He's touring the Aztec ruins, and he's obviously brought his computer along and he's live blogging and doing everything else, but it was a generation that, was embracing the new freedom of the post-Soviet Union that he met Yulia in a Turkish resort. People love to travel, love to embrace the rest of the world and so now, for Russia to be closed off to so many places because of this unnecessary war, it is just tragedy upon tragedy, right? It layers it on but… from there we see, you know, that Navalny built on that communication skills and built the operation and this is where, it really does show that this is not luck, this is hard work. We talked a little bit about- I mentioned Volkov, you know, Volkov was a politician in his own right? He had won election as one of the first online campaigners. And into his own local Da and he made a decision that he was better off not as a politician but as a tactician as a strategist as the advisor not as the principal. And the other fact that made Navalny so powerful, is that he looks the part. Let's be honest, you know, we know the studies that show that tall good-looking politicians are more successful. I mean that is just a fact of human life and Navalny looks like a classic Russian guy, I mean it's the Slavic blond blue eye, you know, good looks. 

Gabuev. Young version of Boris Yeltsin like you see similarity in their picture of young Yeltsin and Navalny he definitely fits the stereotype. Absolutely.

Herszenhorn. You know with the tall wife and the beautiful children and, you know there were many reasons why Navalny didn't want to be known as a dissident and I write about this a lot in in the book. Even though it's called the dissident because in the end, you know last summer, he did embrace this term and he did recognize that he was… a political prisoner but the other and compared himself to Natan Sharonsky and speaking of Sharonsky, one of Navalny's close supporters. You know the reaction was that they, you know, here in the opposition among the dissident voices that they would even acknowledge even though he doesn't like that title. It's like he's not a Jew. He's orthodox, you know, and this is no but you cannot paint him as an outsider and this was maybe the most outrageous thing that Putin and Putin's allies have tried to do which is paint Navalny as some kind of enemy of Russia. He loved Russia so much he wouldn't stay away from Russia when he went to the United States and did a fellowship at Yale University and said you know okay, it was interesting to live in the US but he missed black bread. He wanted to go home. You know now some of that like politics of course some of that is politics but the truth is he really really truly loved Russia and he was Russian not just Russian of course half Ukrainian on his father's side Ukrainian spent summers as a child in Ukraine with his grandparents until Chernobyl.

And some of the anger that he had in him against the system which he used to such great effect and this was also one of Navalny's powerful tools in becoming a leader of the opposition because obviously in the opposition you're an opponent of something you need to have that- that anger that fire. You know, he saw what happened to his relatives after Chernobyl. There's radiation in the ground and they're sent to just keep picking potatoes and people getting sick and then having to abandon their homes and- and you know realize that this was just, you know, absolutely criminal. What was done to people because of the silence because of the effort to cover up this terrible nuclear catastrophe and it were those were the kinds of things that drove Navalny's passion, often anger, at a system that he thought was just absurd and stupid and could give it to people so much more.

Gabuev. Can we spend a little bit of time on the very important point that you make that he didn't want to be a dissident outside of Russia and this is why he chose to return even after assassination, where, my instinct would tell me that death sentence or at least a prison sentence was then written on his forehead when he landed in Moscow.

So, if you think about alternative paths, he had so many Russian opposition figures in Putin time who have left the country Khodorkovsky, Garry Kasparov and many others and who became far less relevant, recognizable, and so on I think that he was talking about without naming names that he doesn't want to become irrelevant but then you think about other historic precedents. I mean it’s Ayatollah Khomeini whatever you think of the man was sitting in Paris doing this tape recordings that were brought into Iran and have helped to radicalize the youth and when the time came, and when the moment was right for the Shah regime to fall Ayatollah Khomeini came back and became the regime, I think that Navalny had really unique talent to make everything what he touches interesting because of this unique sense of humor because of his unique presentation. Jokes he cracked, the style, the narrative, the structure, everything what he does is really attractive and interesting. Even if you sometimes disagree with what he says. Everything but many other people are doing including in his team who has a lot of very interesting and charismatic individuals. Just doesn't have the same resonance because he is a political animal as you say, he is, others may not. So wouldn't it be smarter, wiser to stay. Of course, we didn't know that Putin is going to war… but why was that not part of the discussion in the inner circle.

Herszenhorn. This is the crux of it. You're touching on it and let's of course use the more controversial but maybe more relevant example of Lenin you know sometimes revolution has to come from outside, I think Navalny's mistake one of them was believing that he could be part of evolution in Russia and didn't need to be part of revolution. And maybe this is because Putin would constantly compare him to revolutionaries calling him a Saakashvili you know, calling him part of this color revolution, movement that the orange revolution in Ukraine or the rose revolution in Georgia. So maybe it's believing a little bit because he is so Russian right? He always was believing that. In fact, revolution is bad or at least is going to harm a lot of lives and cost a lot of lives. So perhaps it was this hope this optimism that he could be part of an evolutionary process not a revolutionary process that made him believe he had to stay and not be a Kasparov or a Hodorkovsky that doing that would make him irrelevant. Of course, there are other historic reasons, right? And this idea of the soviet dissident the ‘shestidesyatniki’ the “sixty years” that were very brave as Volkov told me, but never won anything never accomplished anything and in some cases, they lived more comfortable lives because they were allowed to leave the Soviet Union and then came back only after it fell but they did not achieve the collapse of the Soviet Union they did not achieve the goal that they sought and so Navalny did not want to be seen.

As somebody engaged in some feudal struggle and certainly did not want to be seen as someone who was a dissident and a dissident in exile he wanted to be seen as a politician. But in fact, there was a grave miscalculation there. Putin was prepared to go to war and in fact, now we see that if there will be any change in Russia almost certainly it will have to come from outside. It almost certainly and this is the challenge that Navalny would have faced had he lived which is that his outspokenness against the war which became very clear from prison. An anti-war position. Not only was the war wrong and that Russia must withdraw its troops from Ukraine immediately. But that in fact, it should pay reparations that the borders of 91 need to be respected but from oil and gas revenue Russia would have to pay reparations. Let's think about this this is a guy who wants to be, hopes to be the president of Russia taking this position that is absolutely anti-Russian or at least anti-Russian against the current government against a war that Putin and everybody on Russian state media is telling the entire country is worth the sacrifice in which regular Russian mothers and fathers are sending their sons to die in which wives, girlfriends are losing their partners in this war and here's Navalny saying none of this is worth it. This was all a lie. This was all a fraud.

What was the chance of him ever being able to rebuild his political career from that position? It's a situation where I think we would say you could only imagine it if there was the kind of defeat of Russia that there was of Germany in World War II and the kind of self-examination and reconciliation that followed that and there's no sign of that happening. First of all, no sign of Russia losing but also no sign of introspection and a recognition that this invasion was wrong. You know we always know that the poll numbers Putin’s poll numbers are inflated but his popularity was genuine. His popularity tracked. You know the increase in oil prices. Those of us who cover politics understand you know he did deserve credit for helping to stabilize and rescue Russia from the 1990s and in that sense for people who voters who can remember what the country was like in the 90s when there's default when savings are disappearing from bank, banking accounts or back to Soviet times when some people didn't have enough food and the country was literally starving now to have had this what this country became you know with the big box you know supermarkets like Ashan where you have every product that you can have in Western Europe and or the United States and more that come from Asia etc.

You know there were some remarkable things that happened and a reason for his popularity. At the same time this idea that you know there was a threat to Russia that Russian speakers were under threat in Ukraine I mean even with my terrible American accent you could speak Russian and from one side of Ukraine to the other and no one ever said anything to you I mean I was in Crimea when the little green men arrived and were there people in Crimea who wanted to live in Russia? Yes.

Was it an absolutely flagrant violation of international law was there an invasion and an annexation and this is what Navalny was trying to say when he got caught up in the what is it called? 

Gabuev. A sandwich. Sandwich quote that Crimea is not a sandwich and that’s why he’s not popular to say the least in Ukraine.

Herszenhorn. You know, but they misunderstood how much Navalny really you know the fact that Putin would say Russia and Ukraine are brother countries and Navalny would say it doesn't mean they agreed with each other. Navalny said it because he looked in the mirror and that's what he saw Ukrainian and Russian you know in his own face. And he did say that anybody who ordered Russians or Ukrainians to shoot at each other, the Russians and Ukrainians should stand back-to-back and fire their guns at whoever gave that order. I mean, this is not a guy who had any confusion about where he stood on the idea that Russia and Ukraine would be in any kind of war. This was absolutely unthinkable to Navalny, just inconceivable.

Gabuev. When we're talking about what's next, I think that it was predictable that we won’t see million people on the street and so on that as my colleague Alexander Bowne of his put in his FT column written right after Navalny was assassinated that he was poisoned in one country. He came back after recovering of his poison to a different country and was killed in yet a third different country after the war. So, the level of charges at repression the amount of fear that the regime uses and optimization was all the time. The problem of the Russian society that Navalny was trying to fight. He said that and I keep I remember very well his live journal blog where his political career started in a way and the caption, I think that was a feature in your book is that it's a fight between the good against the neutrality. It's not the evil but somebody who chooses to be neutral, but it's not surprising his wife just recorded a very moving statement that she will continue his work and basically, it's a claim that she will become a politician.

What would you expect given that Russian opposition has demonstrated the same historic malice of fighting each other and there are all of these petty rivalries that don't help the opposition outside of Russia to unite? I personally don't think that opposition on the outside has that much impact on what's happening inside. Usually, the conditions are ripe for change in Russia because of domestic dynamics and there are so many unpredictable pieces that are moving at the same time. But even that having a united voice with a strong voice of Yulia Navalnaya, can that first materialize and then have an impact on Russia?

Herszenhorn. Let's see I mean it was a dramatic statement today and one has to believe that they had talked about this before that this had been a conversation previously and this was the plan that in fact, if something happened to Navalny if he was killed. That she was going to step up. I was looking yesterday at an interview. She'd done a long time ago when she was asked if she could imagine him as president and she said absolutely I can imagine him as president because he wants it and he's worked for it and what he believes you know his views I can see him as president and but myself I don't imagine as first lady I imagine you know myself as his wife. Whatever he is and it was the perfect answer that even her mother-in-law was applauding for it to say you know exactly the right answer but she's ready and she's angry and this is a dramatic moment. It's unclear how all of Russia will react but she does have the advantage of clarity about certain things that her husband did not have clarity on the fact that this fight does need to happen from the outside. The fact that, there are you know, the clear danger that she will face in this sort of role. But she's also free of so much of the baggage, right? I mean no matter what they tried to paint on her husband. It wasn't on her. She was focused on her family on protecting her two children.

And now her message is very clear starting from today about the free, democratic, happy Russia that she wants to create. And this is the tragedy of Navalny. Like all he wanted was to be able to have a chance to run in free and fair elections. All he wanted was a chance to have a country that didn't permit that just vast theft of public resources, whether that's oil and gas from the ground and the corruption in state companies or among officials with their vast real estate holdings. He never was asking for too much for himself. And this wasn't a guy who quickly was seen as living in all sorts of luxury. And someone who just wanted, as she said today, he wanted to live in a normal country. And I think in many ways, she could be a much more powerful opponent at this point to the Putin regime, especially as Putin is getting older, especially as the war, if it goes on, may weaken him, though it doesn't look like that now. We had a story in the Washington Post about he seems almost unstoppable at this point. But we know that the war is having an impact and the economy, while having proven more resilient than expected, has some core underlying weaknesses. It is a dangerous, vulnerable moment potentially for him, which of course is why Navalny was just killed. If there wasn't that vulnerability, why bother?

Gabuev. Yes, I think that she promised that we will know more about the circumstances and the reasons why he was killed. You have various speculations. I was just in Munich where people said, well, if Germany was ready to release Vadim Krasikov, the FSB agent who killed a former Chechen rebel field commander in Berlin, that was for Navalny. And that swap was being discussed. And this is one of the reasons why he was killed, because Putin, for all of that, couldn't tolerate Navalny being through this purge and purification of a prison turb and being outside as an absolutely recognized international and national hero, but also deploying his unique political talent for all of the tools to at least erode Putin's legitimacy at home.

Herszenhorn. It's an amazing thing. I mean, two points that you're making. First, and we've been hearing the same thing about this idea of a potential trade, would Navalny have agreed? At this point now, knowing what he knows, would he have agreed to be traded? And I think maybe he would have. 

But the other thing is, let's take a couple steps back. Even if there was only half truth to some of what these reports are that are coming out about the possibility of a negotiation, we know who Krasikov is, and we know what he did, convicted in a German court of murder for carrying out a murder on behalf of the Russian state in the Tiergarten of Berlin. And then let's look at who else was potentially in discussion of possible trade and exchange. And that's Evan Gershkovich, a Wall Street Journal reporter, a journalist like you or me, who is not a spy, not engaged in politics. He's a journalist, a reporter. I mean, there are the lists that have been created in the last days of the Putin critics and opponents who have died or been murdered. This doesn't exist in other countries. This doesn't exist with other leaders. Is there any question about what we're talking about when the goal for one country is to get back the assassin, Krasikov, and on the other side, the goal is to free a guy like Navalny who just wants his children to live in a free and democratic country? It’s quite a dramatic thing when you consider it.

Gabuev. I would agree. Although the Russian narrative would be like, what's the difference between Mossad agents killing Hamas operatives on foreign soil and Israel is the kind of most successful example of targeted killings. But definitely the people that you want to swap are political opponents or journalists doing their work that were arrested in Russia.

Herszenhorn. Absolutely. But you don't hear about Israel publicly demanding a Mossad killer to be to be returned, right? And this was also another mistake of Navalny's. And this is in the book that I wrote. He actually had this idea that there was some kind of code. You know it's funny. Navalny really saw himself and his team as some sort of superheroes, fighting good against evil, even though as you point out, the real enemy is neutrality. In the same way we say the opposite of love is not hate. The opposite of love is indifference, right? But Navalny had this idea that the ones who would get killed were the Chechen operative or the former you know FSB guy Litvinenko, who in turn is renegade. Like this is the killing for security services, not for the civilian opposition or politicians, and yet he was with Boris Nemtsov, just before Nemtsov was shot dead on the bridge in 2015. So, on the one hand, he thought, oh, there are rules and therefore it won't apply to him. And on the other hand, clearly, if there were those rules, those rules were changing, like you said, the country changed, the rules changed. And at some point, there were no rules anymore. It was done.

Gabuev. I think I share your grim assessment about the possibility of change in Russia. To me, the situation looks not perfect for Mr. Putin, but it looks quite stable. And we discussed the things that changed in Russia compared to 1990s. When Putin came to power, it's not only thanks to him, it's definitely higher oil prices. The very capable team that he brought on board, the governor of the Central Bank, the Minister of Finance and many other people, the entrepreneurship of the Russians, who learned how to do business in a capitalist environment throughout the 90s, and learned pretty quickly, and became very successful. So, all of these achievements of the nation as a whole were pocketed by Mr. Putin, and claimed to be his achievements. And there are millions of Russians who believe just that and don't want to compare even like Putin is in empowered nearly quarter century. If you can cherry pick and compare Putin, current Putin, who leads a genocidal war against Russia's closest neighbor in Ukraine to Putin number one, or Putin first term, I think that's remarkable differences. And yet this choice is not provided because Mr. Putin wants to stay in power, and he's going to re-election or re-establish of his mandate because that's not a real election, couple of weeks from now.

Herszenhorn. Regime preservation. And I just want to return Alexander to your point, because I'm actually very conscious having lived in Brussels and covered the EU for a while about the danger of American exceptionalism. You know, I admit I carry a US passport, and I'm always mindful. There is a lot of hypocrisy on the part of Washington, and we should not at any point, try to minimize that, you know, a lot of double talk, and no one is suggesting for anyone who's listening, that I'm not keenly aware, you know, of the kind of dualities that you describe. And yet, you know, if we look at the last prisoner exchange, Brittany Griner, a basketball player with a small amount of cannabis oil for Victor Boot, known to be an international arms dealer. I mean, we're just talking about two completely, completely different things. Does that mean that in the West, let alone in Israel, but then in Washington, that the decisions that have been made, you know, that some of them aren't highly hypocritical, of course, some of them have been highly hypocritical over the years. And at the same time, you know, as you say, this unfathomable war, I mean, no one imagined that we would be facing a land war in Europe in the 21st century. And it is interesting, the challenge this poses, because today, even as she made this amazing, strong, powerful statement about continuing her husband's work, Yulia Navalnaya, she didn't talk about the war. And I think that shows just how difficult an issue this is for even the most well-intentioned Russians. How do you reconcile this divide in society where some people are convinced, they've allowed themselves to be convinced that this war is necessary and just, and others who look at and say, this is genocide. This is trying to erase an entire country, a country that had its own seat in the United Nations, even during Soviet times. So, you know, if there's any question that it was, that there's a Ukrainian identity we know exist.

Gabuev. I agree. And bringing the Germany moment that you described, like I'm currently based in Germany, since I was forced to leave the country after the war had started. And like, being based in Berlin, on every corner, you bump into the work or the German society, German intellectuals on how much they experience has been reflected upon. And this is something that you are very unlikely to see in Russia, because it's very hard for me to imagine that Russia will be defeated as a nuclear superpower, the same way that Germany was. And that's why the genuine change needs to come from within. My colleague Ekaterina Shulman and Irina Scherbakowa from Memorial, we share the same office in Berlin here with Memorial. We talked a lot about how much the work that Memorial was doing to explain to the Russians, the crimes of the Soviet regime against the Russians themselves, like and Ukrainians and other nations of the Soviet Union, but how much that was detrimental crime against the people of their very country that Bolsheviks and Stalin have been ruling. It's very hard for me to imagine this kind of work happening from within, but for a genuine big change, it must. I think that even a change like compared to Stalin, and compared to Khrushchev, that would be a welcome development that's more likely than a revolution like a democratic revolution you described. But who knows, in April 1917, Vladimir Lenin wrote a very pessimistic essay on the revolution being absolutely impossible and then it just happened.

Herszenhorn. And look, I understand, you know, some of the frustration, you speak of Berlin, and it's going to sound funny, but not too long ago, I was there, passing by checkpoint Charlie. And there was a guy dressed in a Russian army uniform who wanted me to pay 10 euros to take a picture with him. And I tried to speak to him in Russian. He says, no, he wanted to speak to me in English and I say, well, come on. You know, like, Russia contributed to this. You know, so much sacrificed for the victory in World War II and so I understand why there can be frustration that, you know, as there is in France, sometimes that too many people speak English, you know, and America's sort of overbearing presence on the world stage and yet, at the same time, there are so many of us who have had the opportunity to live in Russia, who know how much beauty there is in Russia, that how much good Russian people are capable of, and sometimes this is the thing that for me is so depressing is knowing that. There is no reason at all that Russia can't be a vibrant, democratic, free country, just like Germany or France or the United States, there absolutely is no reason that history isn't possible and the pessimism the belief that I think exists in the Kremlin that this would open the door to some kind of chaos is just sad, because it's more pessimistic about Russia than those of us from the outside look and see no, why not? There’s absolutely no reason why that different path wasn't possible. And I think Navalny saw this. I think he’s lived in various places and understood that actually, there was no reason whatsoever that Russia could not be, as he said, free but also happy.

Gabuev. I think that is a very beautiful ending, this hope and the roots for this hope in the beauty and generosity coexist with the other dark sides of Russia that have been displayed in butcher and throughout this war, they coexist on one side. And I think that Navalny said it that the evil is triumphant when the forces of good are disunited. And let's hope that the forces of good can be united and there is this change that Navalny has inspired. I'm very grateful for your time, David.  I hope to have you back at some point.

Herszenhorn. Thank you for the discussion. It's good to be able to talk about all these things as we try to digest the incredible news of these days. Thank you.

This transcript was generated automatically.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.