Finland became the first of Russia’s neighbors to close its border with Russia entirely on November 30, following a spike in the number of asylum seekers from other parts of the world entering the country from its giant neighbor. Even the Baltic countries, traditionally very wary of Russia, are not planning to follow Finland’s example, which raises questions over the move.
Why, for example, was it possible to solve a similar refugee crisis in 2015 via dialogue with Moscow, while this time retaliatory measures were immediately deemed necessary? How could a border be closed that, in the record year of 2013, was crossed 12 million times? Even in the first seven months of this year, despite all the restrictions currently in place, it was crossed almost a million times. Why does Finland, a country that has done so much to attract Russian tourists, and which a decade ago was issuing over a million Schengen visas per year to Russians, now want to fence itself off from Russia?
The data provided by the Finnish authorities is revealing. In September, thirteen people sought asylum in Finland after crossing the Russian border. In October, that number rose to thirty-two, and in the first two weeks of November, it was 500. No unique insight is required to realize that something has changed on the Russian side. This sort of rapid rise would only have been possible if Russian border guards had stopped checking whether those crossing had documents allowing them to enter Finland. And, in Russia, such a policy change could only have been authorized at the highest political level.
Moscow and Helsinki failed to find a solution through diplomatic channels, so the Finnish government, citing national security concerns, closed the border in stages, with the final border crossing shut on November 30. Now it is only possible to apply for asylum at Helsinki airport or at the country’s ports.
There are several reasons why Finland opted to close the border so swiftly. Above all, there is a consensus in Finnish society that the situation required a quick and decisive response. Unlike during the 2015 migrant crisis, when there was a public debate between those opposed to accepting them and those in favor, this time, the opponents were in a clear majority.
As of November 27, not a single asylum seeker entering Finland from Russia had had their application approved. As a result, online myths about how easy it is to enter Finland via Russia should begin to dissipate. The closure of the border was, in this respect, an essential step. Furthermore, migrants have reportedly left the border zone, allowing the Finnish authorities to consider reopening the border soon.
More importantly, the swift closure of the border by Helsinki was made easier because most Finns viewed what was unfolding as Russian hybrid warfare. And there’s plenty of evidence that that is, indeed, the case.
Since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Finns have seen everything to do with Russia through the prism of security. This is the same reflex among the population that led to Helsinki’s decision to join NATO in 2022. Finland now perceives its neighbor as a threat, and there is public support for any measures that strengthen national security in the face of the Russian menace.
The Kremlin’s assurances that it had nothing to do with the unexpected rise in asylum seekers crossing the Finnish border are unconvincing. After all its past lies—from pretending it had no role in the annexation of Crimea in 2014 to its denials of an imminent assault on Ukraine in 2022—few take Moscow’s statements at face value.
Finally, the bigger migrant crisis that took place on Belarus’s western borders in 2021 provided definitive evidence that closing the border and preventing refugees from trying to break through was an effective strategy. Sooner or later, the flow of people will lessen, and the organizers of the artificial pressure will be obliged to house the migrants—or even pay for them to be returned to their home countries.
Still, to fully understand the Finnish response, it must be seen in the broader context of Russia-Finland relations, which have recently seen the rapid collapse of the entire structure of bilateral cooperation that had been built over decades.
A year ago, masked men threw sledgehammers onto the grounds of the Finnish Embassy in Moscow in an apparent reference to a chilling execution by the Wagner mercenary group. This fall, Russia closed the Finnish consulate in St. Petersburg, which had once issued the most Schengen visas to Russians. In response, the Finns shut down the Russian consulate in Turku.
As for the business ties between the two countries, it’s doubtful that the state-owned Finnish energy giant Fortum will risk investing in Russia again anytime soon after it lost billions of dollars when its assets were seized in April by the Russian authorities. Indeed, will Finnish businesses ever think of returning to Russia?
It’s unclear what exactly Russia wanted to achieve by nudging asylum seekers toward the border with Finland. Perhaps it was some sort of trial balloon. Had Finland not closed the border, the crisis would have become permanent, draining resources from the country and its European partners and distracting attention from Ukraine.
Sensing the weakness and indecisiveness of its neighbor, Russia could then have, for example, “tested” the borders of a NATO country with a “lost” armored vehicle in order, again, to see Helsinki’s reaction. Or, if incidents started to occur on the closed border—like asylum seekers freezing to death in the sub-zero temperatures—Moscow could have played the human rights card, accusing Helsinki of reneging on its international obligations. But none of this happened. It seems likely that whoever was in charge of this operation on the Russian side has had few successes to report to the Kremlin.
Finland, for its part, only benefits from the status quo, which has given it an opportunity not only to test the diplomatic solidarity of its EU partners, but also to obtain practical assistance from the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex).
The main losers are Russian nationals living in Finland, of whom there were 66,000 in 2021, including those with dual citizenship. Finns with friends and family in Russia will also be affected. Both groups need an open border, and that is no longer a given.
Worse still, the idea is once again under discussion in Finland of outlawing dual citizenship for nationals of countries that do not recognize it—first and foremost, Russia. In a worst-case scenario, that could see people having to choose between the unappealing prospect of giving up their Finnish passport, or surrendering their Russian passport, which in practice is virtually impossible.
A long period of pragmatic cooperation between Russia and Finland in which Helsinki tried to avoid conflicts and be an intermediary between Russia and the West has come to an end. We’re now entering an era in which Finland—a member of both the European Union and NATO—will act as a responsible member of the “Western coalition”; Russia will see Finland as a hostile state; and the latter will respond accordingly.
