Heightened tensions across the Taiwan Strait in the past several years have alarmed many countries within the region and beyond. Even South Korea, traditionally very careful about expressing views on the Taiwan issue, has recently voiced unease and concern regarding the possibility of a militarized crisis around Taiwan. Among the neighbors of both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan, Southeast Asia has the most at stake in peace across the Taiwan Strait. Hundreds of thousands of Southeast Asian citizens live in Taiwan. These nations’ economies are deeply integrated in regional supply chains, which depend heavily on stable trade flows through the Taiwan Strait. A Taiwan military conflict could threaten to escalate tensions in the South China Sea and undermine regional peace and stability in Southeast Asia. Given the differences between Southeast Asian countries’ positions on the Taiwan question, a crisis in the Taiwan Strait could potentially undermine Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) unity or even result in the breakup of ASEAN. For these reasons, a Taiwan conflict would be catastrophic for Southeast Asia.
It is difficult to predict how most Southeast Asian governments would react to a potential Taiwan crisis. Much would depend on how the crisis began and how it unfolded. An unprovoked, all-out PRC assault on Taiwan would certainly create a much stronger sense of threat among Southeast Asian governments, and they would likely align more closely with the United States and its allies in response. Conversely, there would be more sympathy in Southeast Asia with Beijing if the crisis were perceived to have been initiated by Taiwan or the United States, and if Beijing were perceived as being cornered or forced to react to provocative actions undertaken by its adversaries.
To gauge potential Southeast Asian actions, this article necessarily proceeds with several assumptions. This specific set of circumstances and assumptions might not hold true during an actual Taiwan contingency, but is plausible and worth examining. It assumes that Beijing cares about perceptions in Southeast Asia because of the region’s geographical proximity to Taiwan, and because Beijing will want to ensure Southeast Asia’s support, or at least neutrality, to secure a favorable diplomatic environment and strategic outcome. This assumption rules out a scenario in which Beijing initiates an all-out and sudden invasion with a maximum use of force. Instead, this article assumes that Beijing will try to avoid being accused of launching an “unprovoked” attack. As the wars in Ukraine and Gaza demonstrate, there is significant divergence between Southeast Asia and the West in assessing the root causes of the conflicts. This could also be the case in a conflict over Taiwan. Beijing will seek to formulate a favorable narrative on the origin of the crisis to find some degree of acceptance among political leaders in Southeast Asia.
Ultimately, Beijing has clear incentives to ensure that most, if not all, ASEAN members remain neutral. Threats, pressure, and inducement could be leveraged toward this outcome. In particular, Beijing could seek to limit the spillover from a Taiwan conflict into the South China Sea and offer to assist in evacuation operations for Southeast Asian citizens. Reactions from Southeast Asian countries will differ significantly, which could further weaken the cohesion of ASEAN.
Will the Taiwan Scenario Intersect With the South China Sea Dispute?
Analysts and commentators often argue that the eruption of a Taiwan conflict could intersect with the South China Sea disputes, implicating the maritime interests and security of Southeast Asian countries. Some suggest that should such a spillover take place, maritime Southeast Asian countries, especially those that have ongoing disputes with China, could support the United States against China to protect their sovereignty and national interests.
The likelihood of the South China Sea becoming a theater of operations in a Taiwan conflict is high. Military actions could well take place in the South China Sea if China were to stage its operations from its bases in the Paracel Islands or Spratly Islands, or if it attempted to seize Pratas Island or Itu Aba (Taiping Island), currently occupied by Taiwan’s forces. The United States and its allies also might not confine their actions to Taiwan and the surrounding area.
Nonetheless, if Beijing’s most important objective vis-à-vis Southeast Asia during a Taiwan conflict scenario were to ensure that Southeast Asian countries stay out of hostilities, then it would be in Beijing’s interest not to conflate its military actions on Taiwan with disputes in the South China Sea. Simply put, it would not be rational for Beijing to use force to press its claims in the South China Sea during a Taiwan crisis, which would only multiply the number of belligerents. Instead, China would focus on defeating its main adversaries: the military forces of Taiwan, the United States, and their allies.
Southeast Asian claimant states, for their part, will likely prefer to stay out of the conflict. Public opinion surveys show that most Southeast Asians would not support cutting economic ties with China if it invaded Taiwan. Moreover, there would be little incentive for Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, or Vietnam to take escalatory action against China unilaterally in the South China Sea unless China took aggressive actions targeting them. The Philippines is likely the one major exception.
Taiwan’s military installations in the South China Sea, Pratas Island and Itu Aba, could complicate the picture and draw China to open a front in the South China Sea. China likely would be able to attack Pratas Island without embroiling Southeast Asian claimant states. Pratas Island is located near to China and far away from any of the features occupied by Southeast Asian claimant states. It is also not a disputed feature between China and Southeast Asian claimant states. Itu Aba, however, is surrounded by features occupied by Southeast Asian claimant states, especially Vietnam and the Philippines. Chinese military actions against Itu Aba could inadvertently pull these states into the conflict, especially if China were to evict their forces and take control of these features in the process of attacking Itu Aba. China would then find itself creating new enemies in the course of action. The cost would be high for China and could outweigh the military value of occupying Itu Aba. Hence, it is more likely that China will be very careful in any operation against Itu Aba and seek not to provoke these states in hopes that they stay out of the fight.
These Southeast Asian claimant states may also fear that if they do not join the fight against China, and China later prevails over the United States and Taiwan, they would be the next victims of Chinese hegemony. As Asian security expert Drew Thompson argues, “it would be disingenuous and delusional for those states to ignore the precedent set by a cross-Strait conflict initiated by Beijing since they would eventually also be subject to Chinese military coercion over their own disputes.” Based on this logic, it could be better for claimant states to seize the opportunity afforded by a Taiwan conflict to push back against China in the South China Sea once and for all, and seek to ensure that the U.S.-led coalition prevailed over China. This argument might be met with a warm reception in the Philippines, but would be considered a risky strategy in the rest of Southeast Asia.
Instead, claimant states probably would find the contrarian argument equally persuasive. Taking advantage of the Taiwan crisis to attempt to expel China from the South China Sea could create long-term animosity with China. Whether China eventually emerged victorious or defeated in Taiwan, they would have to deal with the possible repercussions of a vengeful Beijing. The option to play it safe and not interject their own disputes into a Taiwan conflict, on the other hand, would find appeal to the generally risk-adverse strategic cultures of Southeast Asian states. Beijing could even encourage such an outcome by making tactical adjustments and softening its own posture in the South China Sea. As South China Sea expert Andrew Chubb notes, paradoxically, “greatly increased tensions in the Taiwan Strait could also ease tensions in the South China Sea.” Beijing could quietly signal to claimant states that it would be willing to offer tacit concessions should they stay out of the Taiwan situation. Conversely, states that take advantage of the Taiwan situation against Beijing would face repercussions. Signals like this would likely be enough to convince these states to think twice about taking advantage of a Taiwan crisis to push China back in the South China Sea.
As mentioned earlier, among the South China Sea claimant states, the Philippines is probably the exception to the above discussion because of its alliance relationship with the United States, its geographical location, its strained relations with China, and most importantly the presence of military bases from which U.S. forces could intervene in a Taiwan conflict. Under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed in 2014, the Philippines authorized U.S. access to selected “Agreed Locations” (military bases) on a rotational basis. The United States can use those bases for the purposes of training, refueling, deployment, and other activities agreed on by both sides. In February 2023, four new bases were opened to U.S. access under EDCA—including three that are located on Luzon, a Philippine island geographically close to Taiwan. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippines has stated that U.S. access to Philippine military bases would be “useful” if China attacked Taiwan. He also acknowledged that should a Taiwan conflict develop, it would be unlikely that the Philippines could maintain neutrality. China would inevitably be concerned about U.S. forces using the Philippine bases and would likely take military measures in response, effectively involving the Philippines in direct armed conflict with China. If a direct clash were to break out, China-Philippines disputes could directly intersect with a Taiwan crisis.
China’s Potential Role in Southeast Asian Evacuation Operations
Statistics provided by Taiwan’s government show that as of 2023 more than 780,000 nationals of Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia live and work in Taiwan, accounting for more than 90 percent of the roughly 850,000 foreign citizens on the island. There are 278,000 Indonesians living on Taiwan, followed by Vietnam with 255,000, while Filipinos accounted for 153,000. By contrast, there were only about 14,000 Japanese, 10,000 Americans, and less than 5,000 nationals from Korea, India, or Europe. For Southeast Asian governments, among the first priorities in a Taiwan crisis would be to secure the safe and timely repatriation of their own nationals. Indonesia and the Philippines have already started drawing up plans for such a contingency.
For Southeast Asian governments, conducting non-combat evacuation operations involving hundreds of thousands of their nationals leaving Taiwan would be difficult and arduous. Do Southeast Asian governments have sufficient naval and air assets to conduct such operations? Do these assets have the capabilities to endure the distances necessary to traverse maritime Southeast Asia? Where will evacuees be sheltered? Will there be secure routes to and from Taiwan? These questions do not yet have good answers.
Most discussions on evacuation operations have not taken into consideration how China would respond to such noncombatant evacuation operations. If Beijing cares how it is perceived in Southeast Asia during a Taiwan crisis, it follows that Beijing would view the evacuation of Southeast Asian citizens as crucial for its own diplomatic posture. In such a conflict, both Beijing and its adversaries would seek as much support from other countries as possible. By supporting Southeast Asian evacuation operations, Beijing could claim sensitivity to Southeast Asia’s interests.
How a potential Taiwan crisis unfolded would affect the feasibility of evacuations. A sudden, high-casualty, all-out attack on Taiwan that indiscriminately killed civilians would close off all options. However, if the scenario were to unfold in a way that allowed time and space for evacuations, it is not inconceivable that under the right conditions Beijing would announce the opening of a safe channel or corridor in the Taiwan Strait for the purpose of humanitarian evacuation. It could also designate one or multiple areas along China’s east coast as demilitarized humanitarian zones.
For Southeast Asia, few good options exist. Apart from the Philippines, the geographical distance to Taiwan would be a challenge for most Southeast Asian states. While they could ask for help during American or Japanese evacuation operations, the number of evacuees could be too high. Should Beijing offer to help the evacuation, giving a safe route for vessels or planes carrying evacuees between Taiwan, its own designated humanitarian zones, and these Southeast Asian countries, it could be tempting for some of these countries to accept this offer.
A direct role for China in facilitating Southeast Asian civilian evacuations would be highly unusual, as evacuation operations generally transport foreign nationals to their own countries, neutral countries, or allied countries. Nevertheless, evacuation to a combatant country would not be without precedent. After Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the sizable Vietnamese community (numbering around 5,000) in Ukraine sought to flee the country. While most found their way to neighboring countries to the west (especially Poland), a small number fled to Russia under the assistance of the Vietnamese embassy in Russia and Russian government entities.
A similar offer by Beijing could significantly reduce the operational difficulties faced by Southeast Asian governments in their evacuation operations. From a purely logistical point of view, a PRC-facilitated evacuation operation, especially one nominally led by ASEAN or Southeast Asian militaries, might be appealing to Southeast Asian governments. Regional governments would likely face anxious domestic publics pushing for authorities to accept any measures that could help secure their own people from immediate danger, whether the help comes from China, Japan, or the United States.
Of course, a China-initiated humanitarian corridor could also complicate and entangle the air or sea routes that the Chinese military would be using to launch attacks and resupply forces. And in the messiness of armed conflicts, things often do not go as planned. Beijing could end up being unable to effectively protect civilian lives during humanitarian evacuations, and hence its potential efforts to minimize reputational damage could be fruitless. If Beijing were able to facilitate humanitarian evacuations, however, it would afford China a great deal of leverage on the diplomatic front.
Not all Southeast Asian governments would respond favorably to Beijing’s offer. The Philippines again could be an exception. Its geographical proximity to Taiwan means that it needs far less assistance from China. It is also more likely to be directly embroiled in a possible conflict, as discussed earlier. The Philippines could also offer assistance to fellow ASEAN countries under ASEAN’s “Guidelines for the Provision of Emergency Assistance by ASEAN Missions in Third Countries to Nationals of ASEAN Member Countries in Crisis Situations,” which urges ASEAN countries assist one another in times of crisis. Evacuation operations from Taiwan would be such a huge and complex action that the logical choice for the majority of Southeast Asian governments would be to accept all feasible evacuation arrangements, whether from Beijing, Manila, or for that matter from Washington or Tokyo.
Would ASEAN Break Up?
The 2024 State of Southeast Asia Survey report, published by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, shows that during a conflict situation in Taiwan, Southeast Asian elites would prefer the use of diplomatic measures to oppose the use of force, followed by the adoption of a neutral position.
The collective weight of ASEAN suggests that it might be able to play some role in negotiating a way out of a Taiwan crisis situation before it escalates into an irreversible armed conflict. However, if military actions commence, there is a real danger that ASEAN will start to crack. Diverging interests, priorities, and perceptions within the region would be so exposed that a potential breakup of ASEAN is not unimaginable.
The key variable would be Beijing’s level of ability to extract neutrality from Southeast Asia. If Beijing manages to convince Southeast Asia that it was forced to undertake military actions, had no intention of extending the fight to Southeast Asian claimant states in the South China Sea, and offered to help in evacuation operations, China would almost certainly secure Southeast Asian neutrality with the likely exception of the Philippines. Beijing could then publish a statement indicating that it would respect the neutrality of ASEAN and that, in return, it would expect the same respect from ASEAN for China’s position on Taiwan.
In the event of a crisis around Taiwan, there would be agonizing choices to be made among allies and close partners of the United States in the region. The likelihood of the Philippines being directly involved in hostilities is much higher than that of other neighboring countries for reasons already stated. As noted by William Choong and Hoang Thi Ha, “the Philippines’ charging ahead into a tighter alliance with the U.S. would make it difficult for ASEAN to reach any consensus on how to respond collectively in a Taiwan contingency. This issue is going to be deeply divisive within ASEAN.” If the Philippines were to experience direct Chinese military attacks as a result of its bases being employed by U.S. forces in defense of Taiwan, would its fellow ASEAN countries rally in solidarity?
Judging from the prevailing state of affairs, the opposite development seems more likely. The rest of the ASEAN states would be keen to preserve neutrality. Though they might make diplomatic statements aimed at assuaging the Philippines, they probably would not do much to help. Some even might privately blame the Philippines for potentially dragging the whole of ASEAN into an untenable situation. Filipinos would likely feel justifiably disillusioned by the lack of support coming from fellow ASEAN member states at a time when they were under attack, which would further entrench the Philippines’ relationship with the United States, Japan, and other allies. ASEAN would likely not be able to speak with a unified voice.
Beyond the Philippines, Thailand is also a U.S. ally, but the likelihood that Thailand would invoke its alliance commitment with the United States in a Taiwan contingency is not high, given the low threat perception toward China in Thailand. Singapore is another country that would have to make excruciating decisions as a result of its strong security partnership with the United States. U.S. forces, for instance, could potentially use Singapore’s naval base in a Taiwan conflict. If China refrains from attacking Singapore, the likelihood that Singapore remains neutral will be high. After all, if a U.S. ally as established as South Korea, under a strongly pro–United States conservative government, stated publicly that it would not get involved in a potential Taiwan conflict, others are likely to act similarly unless they are directly targeted by China.
On the other hand, the traditionally pro-China states within ASEAN, such as Cambodia, Myanmar, and possibly Laos, could come out strongly in support of China (either at Beijing’s urging or independently) while still professing neutrality. However, the pro-China position of these states is not necessarily shared by the rest of ASEAN, which would still prefer to maintain the space and credibility to accommodate different sides. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and probably Singapore could eventually become the core of a new ASEAN—a significantly shrunken, weakened, and diminished ASEAN.
Conclusion
This article attempts to analyze the potential courses of action and reaction in Southeast Asia should hostilities erupt between China and Taiwan. All the scenarios discussed here (regarding countries’ perceptions of the origins of the conflict, the situation in the South China Sea, and China’s role in evacuation operations) lean toward the likelihood that China would be able to keep Southeast Asia neutral with the exception of the Philippines, which also could lead to the possible breakup of ASEAN unity. However, there are many unknown contextual and interactive factors that would shape and influence the actions and responses of Southeast Asian countries in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. The actions undertaken by Australia, Japan, and the United States would be crucial in addition to those of China and Taiwan. The fog of war would be confusing and disinformation prevalent. Nevertheless, this article attempts to provide and outline some possible paths.
Regardless, a hot conflict over Taiwan would be disastrous for Southeast Asia. The Philippines could well be a direct party to the hostilities, while other nations’ resources would be stressed to the limit in coping with the resulting humanitarian crisis. The lives of many Southeast Asian nationals would be at stake. Economically, a Taiwan war would ruin all Southeast Asian economies, most of which are still not rich and resilient enough to survive a drastic economic downturn that could further trigger political crises or instabilities. The social fabric of some countries could be torn apart. The end of the peace dividends would have ramifications in the years to come, as regional countries would likely begin to spend more on defense and less on welfare and economic development. The cherished ideas and aspirations of ASEAN centrality would be relegated to the margins of geopolitics. ASEAN itself probably would not survive intact.
Frustratingly, Southeast Asia’s ability to influence developments across the Taiwan Strait is limited. But it is time for Southeast Asia to initiate more discussions on the prevention of war over the Taiwan. ASEAN states should leverage their friendly and long-standing ties to Beijing, Taipei, and Washington to encourage all three to moderate their behavior and avoid an irreversible catastrophe for all.