After a series of setbacks and doubts as to whether Senegal’s presidential election would actually take place before the end of President Macky Sall’s term on April 2, the election was held on March 24 without any major incidents and in a transparent manner.1 A few hours after the polls closed, partial results were already pointing to a first-round winner: Bassirou Diomaye Faye, the candidate of the most outspoken opposition to the incumbent government, and second in command of the African Patriots of Senegal for Work, Ethics and Fraternity party (PASTEF). Released from prison just ten days before the election after eleven months in pretrial detention, the forty-four-year-old former tax inspector will be the youngest and most unexpected president in the history of independent Senegal. He will be the continent’s youngest serving president when he takes office in April.2
Before his presidential candidacy, Faye was little known to the Senegalese public, working in the shadow of party leader Ousmane Sonko. Sonko, also a former tax official, emerged in recent years as the most outspoken political opponent of Sall’s government. Sonko gained popularity, especially among young people, for his highly critical discourse on the traditional political class and for his promises of a radical break from how the country has been governed for decades.
On the evening of April 2, Sall will step down after twelve years at the helm of the country. He will hand over power to a young president from a political party that his government officially dissolved in July 2023, whose “radical” style he found unsettling. To many, Sall’s final months in office have been a political failure, tarnishing a solid record of infrastructure development and diplomatic activity on the African and international stage. In his efforts to neutralize his main political opponents, Sall has instead facilitated their uncontested victory. However, by permitting the electoral administration to play its role without further political interference, Sall allowed Senegal to reach a peaceful and democratic conclusion to three years of political tension, violence, and uncertainty.
Threats to Senegal’s Democratic Credibility
On February 3, 2024, Sall launched the country into a political and constitutional crisis when he announced his decision to postpone the presidential election planned for February 25. Sall’s announcement preceded a bill in the Senegalese Parliament that moved to officially change the election date to December 15, 2024, effectively extending Sall’s term in office. Senegalese citizens responded with mass demonstrations, and the state cut mobile internet access and deployed large police forces to its major cities, resulting in the loss of four lives.3
On February 15, Senegal’s Constitutional Council—the country’s highest constitutional court, whose members are appointed by the president—ruled that Sall’s decree to move the election date and Parliament’s subsequent bill were unconstitutional. The council urged Sall to set the earliest possible date for the election and confirmed that Sall’s five-year presidential term would end on April 2. In place of the scheduled February 25 election, the government held a two-day “National Dialogue” on February 26 and 27 that brought together a wide range of representatives of political parties, civil society organizations, and religious groups. However, opposition candidates voiced concerns that Sall’s National Dialogue was about “slowing down the election,” and demanded that Sall set a presidential election date as soon as possible.4 Following a Constitutional Council ruling that rejected the postponement of the election beyond the end of Sall’s electoral mandate, Sall announced on March 6 that the election would take place on March 24.
Thomas Carothers and Benjamin Press, in a paper on global democratic backsliding, argue that for a country to be considered a “democratic backslider,” it must have “achieved a significant level of democracy” and then “experienced significant erosion of democratic institutions,” often at the hand of “purposeful elite actors.”5 Senegal has long been heralded as one of the few stable democracies in West Africa, a region that has seen a trend of democratic backsliding since 2020, with coups d’état in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Niger. However, threats to the country’s democratic credibility had been simmering for quite some time, and until the March 24 election seemed to temporarily place Senegal in the category of a “democratic backslider.”
Senegal’s current constitution grants presidents a maximum of two consecutive terms of office. However, presidential term limits have been a consistent source of turmoil for Senegal. When Sall’s predecessor, Abdoulaye Wade, was elected to office in 2000, Senegal did not yet have term limits. After Wade changed the constitution to ensure a two-term limit, he positioned himself for a third term in 2012, arguing that constitutionally mandated term limits were not retroactive. Amid widespread protests, Sall emerged as the leading opposition figure, promising constitutional reform. In his first term, which ran from 2012 to 2019, Sall reduced the presidential term from seven to five years. However, two years into his second term, Sall seemed to be positioning himself for a third by refusing to publicly state his political intentions beyond his mandate.
More broadly, Sall’s two terms in office have marked trends in the restriction of political participation in Senegal, as shown in figure 1. Sall’s reelection in 2019 came after the Constitutional Council ruled that two of Sall’s major opposition candidates were ineligible to run for president because of their convictions in separate corruption cases. Those corruption cases were widely seen as “an effort [by the Sall administration] to neutralize” Sall’s most powerful political opponents.6
In addition, Sall’s administration moved to limit freedom of the press and freedom of speech. In 2021, Sall signed into law a press code that allowed for a two-year prison term for “defamation” and up to three years for publishing “fake news” that could “discredit public institutions” or “prejudice public decency.” The Senegalese government moved to ban numerous opposition rallies and protests and heavily strengthened its paramilitary force, the National Gendarmerie, with waves of recruits and equipment to respond to protesters.
The state has made the draconian move of shutting down internet and social media access on mobile phones several times. In March 2021, the Senegalese state suspended two television stations and restricted access to social media applications and phone data services.7 In June and July 2023, the Senegalese government again restricted access to internet services and social media, citing the “dissemination of hateful and subversive messages.”8 Most recently, on February 13, 2024, the state shut off mobile internet access following Sall’s announcement that the election date would be moved.9
One of the key players in Senegal’s political landscape over the past five years is Ousmane Sonko, who rose to fame for denouncing corruption and criticizing Sall’s administration while working as a government tax inspector. He emerged as a popular opposition leader with PASTEF during the 2019 presidential election. Although Sall was reelected, Sonko continued to rally youth in enormous numbers with his promises to fight government corruption. In 2021, Sonko was accused of “rape and death threats” by an employee of a Dakar beauty salon, inflaming his supporters, who took to the streets to protest what they perceived as an attempt by the Sall administration to undercut a rising opposition movement.10 Sonko did not attend his trial and was sentenced in absentia to two years in prison for “corrupting youth” on June 1, 2023, but acquitted of charges of rape and death threats.11
Following this sentence, and after months of tension, Sonko was arrested in late July 2023 for “calling for insurrection, criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist undertaking and undermining state security” and imprisoned.12 PASTEF was dissolved by the government on July 31 with an official statement by Senegal’s interior minister accusing the party of having encouraged “insurrectional movements [with] serious consequences,” including “loss of life” and “looting of public and private property.”13 In the end, it was the Supreme Court’s confirmation on January 4, 2024, of Sonko’s suspended six-month prison sentence for defamation of a minister that led to his removal from the electoral roll and his exclusion from the presidential election.
Breakdown of Political Norms
In addition to threats to Senegal’s democratic stability, the past years have seen a breakdown of political norms and an increase in violence in the political arena. In the view of Sall’s presidential camp, Sonko—along with PASTEF—represents a “threat” to Senegal, particularly because of his alleged proximity to Islamist circles and his populist views. Sonko, for his part, is not one to shy away from inflammatory language. He has called for France to stop “suck[ing] the blood of its ex-colonies,” supported the end of the French-inherited currency (CFA franc) and more generally campaigned for the end of economic and political influence from France and other external actors he believes to be detrimental to Senegal’s national interests.14 At a January 2023 rally of his supporters, Sonko invoked the Wolof phrase gatsa-gatsa, or “eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth,” urging the crowd to “fight” against Sall “whatever it costs”: “either [Sall] kills us or we kill him.”15 In response to Sonko’s June 2023 sentencing, PASTEF urged Senegalese citizens to “massively descend on the streets.”16
Demonstrations by Sonko’s supporters have led to unprecedented levels of violence and destruction, shocking in a country where political tensions rarely escalate to this level. Protests in both 2021 and 2023 saw security forces fire tear gas and live and rubber bullets against protesters. They also set storefronts and government-owned buses on fire, blocked roads, built barricades, and threw stones at police forces.17 In March 2021, after Sonko was arrested and charged with “disturbing public order,” massive protests led to the use of live bullets by police forces, leaving at least fourteen dead and hundreds injured.18 In June 2023, protests following Sonko’s sentencing led to sixteen deaths and 500 arrests, with various witnesses reporting armed civilians attacking protesters alongside security forces, as well as the use of live bullets.19
Following February’s protests against Sall’s election postponement attempt, Human Rights Watch called for an investigation into abuses by security forces toward Senegalese citizens, including the use of live and rubber bullets and tear gas at close range.20 Amnesty International similarly called for the Senegalese government to investigate the “escalating repression and brutality” of Senegalese police forces against protesters and members of the press.21
Sall’s Political Calculations
Most observers of the political scene in Senegal are convinced that Sall’s move to postpone the election was not due to technical unpreparedness or exceptional circumstances but was rather a strategic ploy to organize a later election in a more favorable political context and with a potentially changed list of candidates.22 If Sall had successfully delayed the election, he would not only have extended his presidential term but allowed his party to better position its preferred candidate for victory.23 Political scientist Moussa Diaw described the election postponement as a “political maneuver” born of a “fake [governmental] crisis.”24
For the 2024 election, Senegalese citizens had a choice between nineteen candidates, compared to five in the 2019 presidential election. The list included some of the country’s leading political figures, including former prime minister Amadou Ba, the candidate chosen by Sall’s coalition; former prime minister and runner-up in the 2019 presidential election Idrissa Seck; former Dakar mayor Khalifa Sall; and PASTEF’s Faye. Faye was kept in pretrial detention beginning in April 2023, after he was accused of “acts likely to compromise public peace,” contempt of court, and defamation, until his release from prison in March 2024.25 Following PASTEF’s dissolution and Sonko’s removal from the electoral roll, Sonko officially endorsed Faye as his replacement in the presidential election.26
Sall’s decision to choose Ba as his preferred candidate displeased many members of his presidential camp. Just days before Sall’s announcement that he would move the election date, lawmakers from Sall’s own ruling party accused two Constitutional Council judges of corruption, claiming that Ba had bribed them to remove one of his key opponents, Karim Wade, from the candidates list. Ba was not considered a popular figure, including within his own party, many of whom believed he had only a slim chance of winning. In addition, his candidacy emerged in an unfavorable political context for the ruling camp. The hardening of power over the past three years, marked by the systematic banning of public demonstrations, the arrest of numerous journalists and activists critical of the government, and the prosecution of his main political opponent, Sonko, made Sall increasingly unpopular.27
It is possible that Sall had clear insight into voter trends in the run-up to the election. One hypothesis is that Sall aimed to gain time to avoid the risk of seeing his camp lose the election, forcing him to hand over the presidency to opponents from the newly dissolved PASTEF.28 If Sall had been able to decide the timing and conditions of the election, he could have expected to significantly improve the chances of his chosen successor’s victory. When a president leaves office, he or she is likely to want to hand over power to someone from his or her own political camp or groom a successor. If an outgoing president fears that his political adversaries will settle the score with legal proceedings, the desire to choose a trusted successor may be even stronger.
The reasons behind Sall’s decision remain difficult to understand. In July 2023, after weeks of violent protests, he announced in a speech that he would not be a candidate in the February 2024 presidential election. Like his predecessor, Wade, he stressed that his candidacy would not have violated the constitution. However, a third term was not in line with his personal commitments. Most observers felt that Sall made this decision only after facing pressure from the opposition, civil society organizations, and Senegal’s major external partners, including the United States and France.29
Sall’s rationale has undermined his continental leadership and potential future as a statesman and former president who once presided over a democratic transition. He previously served as chairman of the Assembly of the African Union and was one of the most prominent and successful voices to advocate for an African Union seat in the G20. In a controversial move in November 2023, French President Emmanuel Macron appointed Sall as special envoy and chairman of the follow-up committee to the Paris Pact for People and the Planet. Some talked about the possibility of Sall taking on an international post as prestigious as that of the Secretary General of the United Nations. These prospects may have receded considerably after recent events, which have done serious damage to Sall’s international reputation.30
Unable to take part in the elections, unsure of the victory of his candidate or even of Ba’s absolute loyalty after the elections, and unable to rule out a PASTEF presidential victory, it would appear that Sall used the final tool available to him by announcing an amnesty law during his National Dialogue. This amnesty law would guarantee immunity for all perpetrators of violence during political demonstrations between 2021 and 2024.31 On March 6, it was passed by the Senegalese Parliament. Importantly for Sall, the law would protect not only protesters but also members of the security forces and those responsible at the highest levels of Senegal’s security apparatus and political circles. This maneuver allowed for the release of Sall’s political opponents, including Sonko and Faye, while offering Sall and those close to him guarantees of security for the period following his departure from power. After using the stick, the president’s camp seems to have opted for the carrot to limit the risk of a catastrophic end to Sall’s final term.
Senegal on the International Stage
Since its independence, Senegal has maintained strong relationships with the United States, France, and other Western powers. The United States was very clear in its condemnation of the attempt to postpone the presidential election. In a telephone call on February 13, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke to Sall and urged him “to restore Senegal’s electoral calendar and presidential transition timetable in accordance with Senegal’s constitution.”32 On March 27, in a White House statement, President Joe Biden also congratulated Faye on his election and sent “warm wishes” to Senegalese citizens, who demonstrated that “the right to vote—and have that vote counted—remains democracy’s threshold liberty.”33
At the same time, in recent years, Senegal has moved to deepen its relationships with China and Russia. Senegal has a strong trade relationship with China and has worked over the past decade to strengthen the diplomatic relationship between the two countries. In June 2023, Sall, along with other African leaders, traveled to Ukraine and Russia, where in conversations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, he urged the peaceful resolution of Russia’s conflict with Ukraine.34 Just a month later, Sall joined the Russia-Africa Summit to engage in discussion on developing bilateral relations and broader Russian-African cooperation.
Senegal has also expressed interest in joining the BRICS bloc of emerging economies, which positions itself as a champion of a more multilateral global order.35 BRICS has called for the reform of various Western-led organizations including the United Nations and the World Bank.36 In August 2023, BRICS admitted five new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. With this expansion, the group now contains some of the West’s strongest rivals. With a deepening divergence in global order between Western and non-Western powers, Senegal’s future approach to diplomacy could have significant political and economic implications.
In June 2023, Senegal followed in the steps of South Africa, Indonesia, and Vietnam to sign a $2.7 billion Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) with Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. Senegal’s JETP aims to increase the country’s renewable energy capacity to 40 percent of its electricity generation.37 Yet Senegal’s green energy transition will very likely take a backseat to oil and gas. More than 40 trillion cubic feet of natural gas was discovered during Sall’s first term in office, positioning Senegal for enormous potential economic growth.38 Sall, for his part, championed the use of fossil fuels to support Senegal’s industrialization and development, stating that natural gas would help the country transition away from oil. However, Senegal will need to strike a delicate balance between its domestic priorities and those of the international climate community. The prospect of significant financial gains from this sector vastly increased the stakes of the competition for political power and the overall significance of this year’s presidential election.
Sall’s time in office saw the implementation of ambitious infrastructure projects, including roads, railways, and urban transports. The country’s GDP grew 4.1 percent in 2023 with predicted growth at 8.8 percent and 10.2 percent for 2024 and 2025 respectively.39 However, the country has seen limited economic diversification, structural change, and job creation for young people. Despite a growing workforce, youth unemployment is at 20 percent and the informal economy dominates.40 Inflation-linked high cost of living, unemployment, poverty, and lack of social services have led to general discontent and sowed the seeds of political unrest.
Periods of political unrest in Senegal have had direct effects on the country’s economic status, both domestically and abroad. The protests of June 2023 led not only to the destruction of tens of millions of dollars’ worth of infrastructure and public transportation but a shutdown of normal economic activity.41 The Senegalese government has estimated that even a single day of protests can slow the country’s economic output by up to $33 million, with the heaviest burden felt by those in the informal sector.42 Beyond the country’s borders, a “positive perception” of Senegal is crucial to ensure continued foreign investment, as any changes to the country’s risk assessment would cause serious financial consequences.43
What’s Next for Senegal Under President Faye?
Following the passing of Sall’s amnesty law, on March 15, Sonko and Faye were released from prison.44 With the backing of more than a dozen of the nineteen presidential candidates on the electoral roll and the support of important political figures (including Aminata Touré, Sall’s former close ally and prime minister), Faye was in an unusually good position despite having only nine days to campaign before the election.45 Faye’s campaign slogan—“Diomaye mooy Sonko,” meaning “Diomaye is Sonko”—pledged his alliance to his fellow opposition figure; a vote for Faye was also a vote for Sonko.46 On March 24, more than 5 million of the 7.3 million Senegalese citizens registered to vote took to the polls to choose their preferred candidate.47 After Senegalese local media announced that Faye had won more than 50 percent of the votes, Ba officially conceded defeat.48 According to the official provisional results announced on March 27, Faye won 54.28 percent of the vote in the election, compared with 35.79 percent for Ba.49
This election was a victory for the citizens who mobilized and organized to demand that the election be held before the end of Sall’s presidential term and who undoubtedly influenced the decision of the Constitutional Council, which went against the wishes of Sall and his political allies. It was a victory for those who defend democracy and the rule of law over the interests of those in power. In a West African context, where military rulers have been installed by coups d’état and elected civilian rulers have tried to cling to power by manipulating constitutions, a transparent election in Senegal that resulted in an uncontested victory for the opposition is uplifting to the entire region.
The arrival of Faye and PASTEF to power is obviously no guarantee that the promises of changes to political practices and the management of public resources, or of addressing the pressing economic and social needs of young people, will be kept. The platform presented by PASTEF is ambitious, emphasizing the party’s desire for Senegal to make more sovereign economic decisions and its refusal to accept the dictates of international institutions.50 However, the next administration will have to ensure that the Senegalese government honors its previous commitments, properly manages the country’s foreign debt (which has increased significantly during the Sall years), and maintains good relations with international partners who have interests in Senegal’s burgeoning oil and gas resources.
Senegal’s currency was one of the most debated issues during the election season and will continue to be so following Faye’s victory. PASTEF’s manifesto calls for Senegal to leave the CFA franc, which is pegged to the euro under an agreement with France, in favor of a national Senegalese currency.51 However, PASTEF leaders are aware of the contradiction that could exist between their pan-Africanist ideals and the hard realities of the fiscal and monetary policy as well as regional implications of leaving the CFA franc. Senegal is the largest economy after Côte d’Ivoire in the subgroup of West African countries that share the CFA franc and a major diplomatic player within the wider bloc of the fifteen ECOWAS countries, three of which—the military coup–led Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—announced their withdrawal from the bloc in February 2024. In mid-March, Faye’s election campaign said it would be necessary to try a region-wide implementation of a single currency at the level of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) before opting for a nationwide change to Senegal’s currency.52
The new Senegalese president’s positions on the complex political and security issues in the Sahel, the management of military transitions in the region, and the development of relations between Senegal and France will also be closely scrutinized.53 In his first speech as president-elect, Faye sought to reassure his country’s external partners, declaring that Senegal “will remain a friendly country and a safe and reliable ally for any partner who engages with us in virtuous, respectful and mutually productive cooperation.”54 On March 25, Macron congratulated Faye on his election and said he looked forward to working together.55
This surprising political change in Senegal has raised immense hopes. The immediate impact on the country’s international image is undeniably positive. With Faye and a new generation of political leaders taking office, a new chapter in the country’s political history will begin, bringing real opportunities for positive change, but also its share of uncertainties. The continued commitment of a large section of Senegalese society to more virtuous governance, stronger democratic institutions, and effective, realistic public policies will be crucial if the political breakthrough sought by the electorate is to translate into real improvements in people’s lives.
Notes
1 Ruth Maclean, “Young Opposition Candidate Set to Become Senegal’s President,” New York Times, March 25, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/25/world/africa/senegal-presidential-election-results.html.
2 Maclean, “Young Opposition Candidate.”
3 “Senegal’s Macky Sall Leaves Date Open for Delayed Presidential Election,” France 24, February 22, 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240222-senegal-s-macky-sall-leaves-date-open-for-delayed-presidential-election.
4 France 24, “Senegal’s Sall Opens ‘National Dialogue’”; and “Senegal: Authorities Must Investigate Killings and Police Brutality Against Protesters,” Amnesty International, February 13, 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/02/senegal-investigate-killings-and-police-brutality-against-protesters/.
5 Thomas Carothers and Benjamin Press, “Understanding and Responding to Global Democratic Backsliding,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 20, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/20/understanding-and-responding-to-global-democratic-backsliding-pub-88173.
6 “Freedom in the World 2019: Senegal,” Freedom House, accessed March 22, 2024, https://freedomhouse.org/country/senegal/freedom-world/2019.
7 Leanne de Bassompierre, “Senegal Shuts Down TV Stations, Internet Disrupted Amid Protests,” Bloomberg, March 5, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-05/senegal-shuts-down-tv-stations-internet-disrupted-amid-protests?embedded-checkout=true.
8 “Senegal Restricts Internet as Opposition Leader Formally Charged,” Al Jazeera, July 31, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/31/senegal-restricts-internet-as-opposition-leader-formally-charged.
9 Ngouda Dione, “Senegal Cuts Internet Again Amid Widening Crackdown on Dissent,” February 13, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ahead-planned-march-over-vote-delay-senegal-suspends-internet-access-2024-02-13/.
10 Elian Peltier, “Protests Erupt in Senegal After Opposition Leader Is Sentenced to Prison,” New York Times, June 1, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/01/world/africa/senegal-ousmane-sonko.html.
11 Peltier, “Protests Erupt.”
12 “Senegal: Opposition Leader Sonko Ends Hunger Strike (Party),” Africanews, November 23, 2023, https://www.africanews.com/2023/11/23/senegal-opposition-leader-sonko-ends-hunger-strike-party/.
13 “Senegal Dissolves Party of Opposition Leader Sonko,” Al Jazeera, July 31, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/31/senegal-dissolves-party-of-opposition-leader-sonko; and “L’état annonce la dissolution de PASTEF [The State Announces the Dissolution of PASTEF],” Seneplus, July 31, 2023, https://www.seneplus.com/politique/letat-annonce-la-dissolution-de-pastef.
14 Djiby Mbaye, “Ousmane Sonko est catégorique: ‘La France doit lever son coude de notre cou’ [Ousmane Sonko Is Categorical: ‘France Must Lift Its Elbow From Our Neck’],” Sene.News, August 18, 2022, https://www.senenews.com/actualites/ousmane-sonko-est-categorique-la-france-doit-lever-son-coude-de-notre-cou_413701.html.
15 Bamba Ndiaye, “Gatsa-Gatsa: Ousmane Sonko and Senegal’s Politics of Retaliation,” African Arguments, May 15, 2023, https://africanarguments.org/2023/05/gatsa-gatsa-ousmane-sonko-and-senegals-politics-of-retaliation/; “Ousmane Sonko en meeting à Keur Massar : ‘J’ai déjà fait mon testament et je suis prêt à faire face à Macky sur tous les fronts. . .’ [Ousmane Sonko at a Meeting in Keur Massar: I Have Already Made My Will and I Am Ready to Face Macky on All Fronts. . .],” Sudquotidien, January 23, 2023, https://www.sudquotidien.sn/ousmane-sonko-en-meeting-a-keur-massar-jai-deja-fait-mon-testament-et-je-suis-pret-a-faire-face-a-macky-sur-tous-les-fronts/; and “Sénégal: entre Macky Sall et Ousmane Sonko, un duel mortifère [Senegal: Between Macky Sall and Ousmane Sonko, A Deadly Duel],” L’Express, June 10, 2023, https://www.lexpress.fr/monde/senegal-entre-macky-sall-et-ousmane-sonko-un-duel-mortifere-YBJ6S7WOLNFDXHFBJI4UO7NSSM/.
16 “Senegalese People Called to ‘Take to the Streets’ (M2D),” Africa News, July 3, 2021, https://www.africanews.com/2021/03/07/senegalese-people-called-to-take-to-the-streets-m2d//.
17 “Senegal: Violent Crackdown on Opposition, Dissent,” Human Rights Watch, June 5, 2023, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/05/senegal-violent-crackdown-opposition-dissent.
18 Kamissa Camara, “Senegal’s Violent Protests Reveal That Its Long-Stable Democracy Is Fragile, After All,” Washington Post, April 1, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/04/01/senegals-violent-protests-reveal-that-its-long-stable-democracy-is-fragile-after-all/; and “Senegal Will Never Forget March 2021,” Amnesty International, March 2, 2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2022/03/senegal-will-never-forget-march-2021/.
19 Human Rights Watch, “Senegal: Violent Crackdown.”
20 “Senegal: Delayed Elections Spark Violence, Repression,” Human Rights Watch, February 12, 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/12/senegal-delayed-elections-spark-violence-repression-0.
21 Amnesty International, “Senegal: Authorities Must Investigate.”
22 Katarina Hoije and Antony Sguazzin, “A Delayed Election and a Stained Legacy: Next Africa,” Bloomberg, February 6, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-02-06/senegal-leader-macky-sall-risks-legacy-by-delaying-election?embedded-checkout=true.
23 Alexandra Sharp, “Senegal Delays Election, Critics Announce ‘Constitutional Coup,’” Foreign Policy, February 6, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/06/senegal-presidential-election-postponed-macky-sall-constitutional-coup/.
24 Coumba Kane, “Senegal’s Postponed Election: How Macky Sall Plunged the Country Into Uncertainty,” Le Monde, February 6, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/02/06/senegal-s-postponed-election-how-macky-sall-plunged-the-country-into-uncertainty_6497598_124.html#.
25 “Senegal Presidential Candidate Remains in Jail,” Voice of America, February 2, 2024, https://www.voaafrica.com/a/senegal-presidential-candidate-remains-in-jail-/7467207.html.
26 “Ousmane Sonko Chooses Bassirou Diomaye Faye as Replacement in Senegal’s Presidential Race,” Africa News, January 30, 2024, https://www.africanews.com/2024/01/30/ousmane-sonko-chooses-bassirou-diomaye-faye-as-replacement-in-senegals-presidential-race//.
27 “Senegal: Prohibitions, Violence, Arbitrary Arrests: The Right to Protest Is Under Threat,” Amnesty International, June 29, 2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/06/senegal-interdictions-violences-arrestations-arbitraires-le-droit-de-manifester-est-menace/.
28 Aanu Adeoye and David Pilling, “Senegal Cast Into Turmoil by ‘Shockwave’ Constitutional Crisis,” Financial Times, February 9, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/a6ca92be-52a1-4f2e-aae3-a1f748ec5294.
29 “US Praises Senegal’s President for Bowing Out of 2024 Election,” Voice of America, July 4, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/us-praises-senegal-s-president-for-bowing-out-of-2024-election-/7166086.html.
30 Yinka Ibukun and Katarina Hoije, “Senegal’s Sall Tries to Salvage Legacy Amid Constitutional Crisis,” Bloomberg, February 23, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-23/senegal-elections-president-macky-sall-fights-to-save-reputation-amid-turmoil.
31 “Senegal: Amnesty Bill Opens Door to Impunity,” Human Rights Watch, March 5, 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/05/senegal-amnesty-bill-opens-door-impunity.
32 Matthew Miller, “Secretary Blinken’s Call With Senegalese President Sall,” U.S. Department of State, February 13, 2024, https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-senegalese-president-sall-2/.
33 “Statement from President Joe Biden Congratulating Bassirou Diomaye Faye as President-elect of Senegal,” White House, March 27, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/03/27/statement-from-president-joe-biden-congratulating-bassirou-diomaye-faye-as-president-elect-of-senegal/.
34 Jamey Keaten, “African Leaders Meet With Putin in Russia After Ukraine Trip, Urge End to War,” PBS, June 17, 2023, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/african-leaders-meet-with-putin-in-russia-after-ukraine-trip-urge-end-to-war.
35 Nosmot Gbadamosi, “Why the BRICS Aren’t Crumbling in Africa,” Foreign Policy, August 23, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/23/brics-ukraine-russia-africa-summit-ramaphosa/.
36 Carien du Plessis, Anait Miridzhanian, and Bharghav Acharya, “BRICS Welcomes New Members in Push to Reshuffle World Order,” Reuters, August 24, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/brics-poised-invite-new-members-join-bloc-sources-2023-08-24/.
37 Elizabeth Pineau and John Irish, “Senegal Seals $2.7 Billion Green Energy Deal With Richer Nations,” Reuters, June 22, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/senegal-seals-25-bln-euro-investment-deal-help-renewable-energy-push-2023-06-22/.
38 Alexander Onukwue, “Germany Is Looking to West Africa to Help Solve Its Gas Woes,” Quartz, May 23, 2022, https://qz.com/africa/2168594/germany-is-looking-to-west-africa-to-help-solve-its-gas-woes.
39 “Senegal,” International Monetary Fund, October 2023, https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/SEN.
40 “Senegal: March 24,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, January 17, 2024, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/2024-elections/senegal/.
41 Sofia Christensen, “From Restaurants to Water Towers, Unrest Dents Senegal’s Economy,” Reuters, June 9, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/restaurants-water-towers-unrest-dents-senegals-economy-2023-06-09/.
42 Christensen, “From Restaurants to Water Towers.”
43 “From Tourism to Energy, Senegal Economy Braces for Fallout,” France 24, February 13, 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240213-from-tourism-to-energy-senegal-economy-braces-for-fallout.
44 “Senegalese Opposition Leaders Sonko, Faye Released From Prison Ahead of Vote,” France 24, March 15, 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240315-senegal-s-top-opposition-leaders-sonko-faye-released-from-prison-says-lawyer.
45 Katarina Hoije, “Senegal Candidates Back Opposition’s Faye in Race for Presidency,” Bloomberg, March 24, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-24/senegal-counts-ballots-in-tightly-contested-presidential-vote?embedded-checkout=true.
46 Bate Felix and Portia Crowe, “From Prison to Palace: Faye’s Road to Senegal’s Presidency,” Reuters, March 25, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/prison-palace-fayes-road-senegals-presidency-2024-03-25/.
47 Diadie Ba and Bate Felix, “Opposition Candidate Faye Takes Early Lead in Senegal Presidential Polls,” Reuters, March 24, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/senegalese-voters-go-polls-delayed-presidential-election-2024-03-24/.
48 Maclean, “Young Opposition Candidate.”
49 “Senegal Results Show Large Win for Opponent Faye in Presidential Poll,” France 24, March 27, 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240327-senegal-results-show-large-win-for-opponent-faye-in-presidential-poll.
50 “Le Projet d’un Sénégal souverain, juste et prospère [The Project for a Sovereign, Just, and Prosperous Senegal],” Bassirou Diomaye Faye Président, February 25, 2024, https://www.ipar.sn/IMG/pdf/programme_bassirou_diomaye_faye_vf.pdf.
51 Bassirou Diomaye Faye Président, “Le Projet [The Project].”
52 “Senegal Opposition Leader Backs of Promise to Create National Currency,” Reuters, March 15, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/senegal-opposition-leader-backs-off-promise-create-national-currency-2024-03-15/.
53 Elise Vincent, “France Begins Drastic Downsizing of Its Military Bases in West Africa,” Le Monde, January 31, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/01/31/france-begins-drastic-downsizing-of-its-military-bases-in-west-africa_6480050_4.html.
54 “Gambia: Senegalese President-Elect Diomaye Speaks,” All Africa, March 27, 2024, https://allafrica.com/stories/202403270413.html.
55 “Macron Congratulates Senegal’s Bassirou Diomaye Faye on Election Win,” Barron’s, March 25, 2024, https://www.barrons.com/news/macron-congratulates-senegal-s-bassirou-diomaye-faye-on-election-win-a9973cf6.
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