This article, which examines Brazil’s approach to Ukraine and China, is part of an ongoing series on U.S. statecraft and the Global South developed by the Carnegie Endowment’s American Statecraft Program. For other articles in the series, click here.
“Nobody can stop Brazil from continuing to develop its relationship with China,” Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva insisted during a 2023 visit to Beijing.1 Under Lula, Brazil will not pick a side in the growing standoff between Washington and Beijing, even as Brasília seeks to enrich its ties with both countries.2 Meanwhile, Brazil’s approach to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has chafed officials in Washington, as Lula has advocated for peace negotiations that Washington views as counterproductive and naïve. The war in Gaza also brought the United States and Brazil’s differences to the fore in October 2023, as Brazil led the charge for a ceasefire at the UN Security Council but was shut down by a U.S. veto.3
Brazil has a tradition of foreign policy independence and nonalignment that dates back many years, but its desire for autonomy has crystallized amid the broader U.S.-China standoff and as Brazil’s political and economic weight has grown. Brazil wants to avoid a world order structured only by great power competition and instead hopes for a multipolar order where states its size have more say in international institutions and greater influence overall. In Brazil’s view, the emergence of new powers, especially China, promises an era of “benign multipolarity” in which the power of the West is reduced and the influence of rising nations is enhanced.4
Brazil’s Approach to the War in Ukraine
Lula told reporters in Washington in February 2023 that Brazil would not be sending weapons or ammunition to Ukraine. “I don’t want to go join the war,” Lula said. “I want to end the war.”5 Brasília opposed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in four UN resolutions but has not joined the U.S.-led coalition against Russia. To the contrary, Lula sought to assemble a “peace club” of neutral nations to mediate negotiations between Russia and Ukraine to end the war.6 At the Munich Security Conference that same month, Brazilian diplomats presented their peace plan to more than twenty countries. Lula and his foreign policy adviser Celso Amorim have also pitched their peace plan directly to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin.7
U.S. officials see the initiative as misguided and counter to U.S. efforts to push Russia back to its February 2022 lines.8 Washington was especially peeved by Brazil’s welcome of Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov to Brasília in April 2023, and by Lula’s suggestion that Putin might attend the 2024 G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro without risk of arrest on the charges brought by the International Court of Justice—a statement he later backpedaled on.9
Other Brazilian statements on Ukraine have been frustrating to the Biden administration, such as when Lula told reporters during his Beijing trip that Washington should “stop encouraging war and start talking about peace.”10 But Brazil is not completely on Russia’s side. It condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the United Nations and clearly opposes Russia’s violation of international law and the principle of national sovereignty. It was also the only BRICS nation to support the UN resolution demanding a withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory. But Brazil abstained from a later resolution to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council, on the grounds that excluding Russia would damage the chances of reaching a diplomatic resolution to the war.11
Brazil’s economic relationship with Moscow looms large in shaping its approach to Ukraine. Brazil depends on Russia for a quarter of its fertilizer imports, which it needs for its massive agricultural industry.12 Agriculture is the mainstay of Brazil’s economy, accounting for nearly one-third of its gross domestic product. Brasília is also the world’s largest agricultural net exporter and relies on nitrogen fertilizer to maintain its output.13 Although this is not the only driver of Brazil’s policy, Brazilian officials will note that if Russia were to stop sending its fertilizer, there could be major economic impacts, not only in Brazil, but on global food security, as Brazil feeds some 10 percent of the global population.14
Beyond these economic interests, Brazil’s position on Ukraine tracks with its long-standing diplomatic tradition. Brazil has long criticized unilateral sanctions, such as the sanctions on Cuba, and does not consider any sanctions that the UN Security Council has not endorsed to be legal.15 Brazil also does not typically provide lethal assistance to conflicts. Lula’s initiative to find peace in Ukraine aligns with his self-identification as a peacemaker, a vocation that Lula once pursued while attempting to broker a nuclear fuel swap deal with Iran, much to Washington’s annoyance. As a man who prides himself on being able to speak to anyone and sees Brazil as a bridge between nations, Lula may see brokering peace in Ukraine as a big finish to his long career.16
Brazil's Approach to U.S.-China Competition
Brazil’s open embrace of Beijing has also irritated U.S. officials, especially because Lula criticized the U.S. dollar’s role as the global reserve currency during his trip to Beijing.17 Brasília has made it clear that it rejects the imposition of a binary choice between Beijing and Washington. “I am not going to get into a cold war with anyone,” Lula said in February 2023, insisting that Brazil wanted “splendid” relations with both superpowers.18
Ties between Brazil and China deepened in 2009 when they came together to form BRICS, which plays an important role in Brazil’s foreign policy, even as the group has grown more anti-Western in its rhetoric and approach to the world. Brazilian leaders see BRICS as a platform that can elevate the influence of the Global South and build out new alternatives to Western financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank. For instance, when Argentina’s economic crisis worsened in the spring of 2023, Lula suggested that the BRICS New Development Bank send loans to Buenos Aires, while saying that the IMF should “remove its knife from Argentina’s neck.”19
Brazil’s relationship with China is primarily economic. China buys roughly one-third of all Brazilian exports, including most of its soybeans and beef.20 This agricultural trade relationship has made China increasingly reliant on Brazilian commodities, but it has also created a powerful pro-China lobby in Brazil. The Brazilian agribusiness caucus in particular has an interest in ensuring that relations with its top customer remain friendly, as became clear when former president Jair Bolsonaro was forced to moderate his hardline stance against China in the face of their opposition.21 Even on the local level, Brazilian politics are linked to trade cycles with China.22 This complicates Brazilian leaders’ decision-making when it comes to China and limits the scope of actions they can take.
But the United States is also critically important to Brazil. At the 2023 UN General Assembly, Biden and Lula announced their Partnership for Workers’ Rights, a bilateral agenda for protecting workers that they hope to expand to other countries. The two countries collaborate on climate change, although Brazil has been disappointed with the level of funding that the United States has provided for the Amazon Fund to protect Brazil’s gigantic rainforest.23
Washington has also signaled, but not announced, that it would support Brazil’s membership in an enlarged UN Security Council, but Brazil would like to see a more enthusiastic endorsement.24
Although Brazil has a strong pro-China lobby, many Brazilians have reservations about China’s international behavior and trust the United States more than China when it comes to issues like peacemaking and security.25 Some also worry that their country will drift too far into China’s orbit.26 Therefore, just as Brazil’s domestic politics make it difficult for its leaders to distance themselves from Beijing, so too do they make it unlikely Brazil will get too close to China. Brazilian leaders will probably maintain a delicate balance between Washington and Beijing.
Moreover, both China and the United States are important sources of foreign investment for Brazil. Brazil has not officially joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative, but it still regularly receives more Chinese investment than any other country in Latin America.27 Chinese companies have invested about $71 billion in Brazil since 2007.28 Yet the United States remains Brazil's top source of foreign investment; in 2021 it held a stock of $191 billion.29 Brazil thus has every economic incentive not to attach itself to just one superpower, nor will it allow one power to determine its relationship with the other.
For example, Brazil’s pursuit of technology cooperation with China, despite U.S. attempts to dissuade such cooperation, shows Brasília’s unwillingness to moderate its relations with China at Washington’s bidding. U.S. officials have tried, unsuccessfully, to convince Brazil to exclude Huawei from its 5G networks.30 During his April 2023 visit to China, Lula made a point of touring a Huawei research facility and stating that Brazil has “no prejudice with the Chinese.”31 He also wants to build a Chinese semiconductor factory. When asked about U.S. attempts to discourage collaboration with China in this area, foreign policy adviser Celso Amorim asserted that Brazil is “not afraid of the big bad wolf.” 32
Despite skepticism about China in some areas, Brazilian leaders see China’s rise as a positive development insofar as it offers a means of soft balancing against the United States and tempering U.S. unilateralism. Lula has in fact stated his commitment to work with China to “balance world geopolitics.”33
Brazil is an active participant in the G20 and will host the 2024 summit meeting. Brazil is also active in the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, IMF, World Bank, and WTO, and it insists that it does not want BRICS to be seen as the counterweight to these institutions.34 Moreover, even as Brazil encourages other developing countries to build alternative global governance frameworks, it has reservations about BRICS expansion. Brazil supported Argentina’s membership, but worried that adding other new members would diminish its own influence in the group.35 This preference could eventually bring Brazil to loggerheads with China, which is much more enthusiastic about expansion.
Brazil is moving up the ranks of the global system with the objective of taking on a greater role in geopolitical agenda-setting. Overall, it has sought, like many emerging powers, to maintain its sovereign independence in international affairs, and it sees China’s rise as more helpful than harmful to this objective.
Notes
1 Meaghan Tobin and Lyric Li, “Lula Tells Xi 'Nobody Can Stop' Brazil-China Relationship,” Washington Post, April 14, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/04/14/brazil-china-lula-xi-jinping/.
2 Celso Amorim, “Brazil and the Global South,” in Latin American Foreign Policies in the New World Order: The Active Non-Alignment Option (Anthem Press, 2023), 251-262.
3 Rafael Kruchin, “Lula’s Quest for a Diplomatic Balance Amid Israel-Hamas War,” Americas Quarterly, October 18, 2023, https://americasquarterly.org/article/lulas-quest-for-a-diplomatic-balance-amid-israel-hamas-war/.
4 Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, “The Benign Multipolarity: Brazilian Foreign Policy Under Dilma Rousseff,” Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy 2, no. 1 (March 2014), http://jirfp.com/vol-2-no-1-march-2014-abstract-2-jirfp.
5 Tara John, “Lula Says Brazil is No More Divided Than the US as He Meets Biden,” CNN, February 10, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/10/americas/brazil-president-lula-interview-intl-latam/index.html.
6 Pedro Rafael Vilela, “Lula Suggests Group of Nations to Negotiate Peace for Ukraine, Russia,” Agencia Brasil, January 31, 2023, https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/internacional/noticia/2023-01/lula-suggests-group-nations-negotiate-peace-ukraine-russia.
7 Simone Iglesias, “Brazil's Lula Intensifies Diplomatic Push for Peace in Ukraine,” February 23,2023, TIME, https://time.com/6258071/brazil-lula-ukraine-war/ ; “Brazil’s Lula Discusses Peace Effort With Zelenskiy in Video Call,” Reuters, March 2, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/brazils-lula-discusses-peace-effort-with-zelenskiy-video-call-2023-03-02/ ; “Brazil Envoy Met Putin to Push Ukraine Peace Talks,” Reuters, April 3, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/brazil-envoy-met-putin-push-ukraine-peace-talks-cnn-brasil-2023-04-03/.
8 Peter Baker and Jack Nicas, “Biden and Lula Swap Insurrection Stories and Vow to Guard Democracy,” New York Times, February 10, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/10/world/americas/biden-lula-brazil-us.html.
9 Associated Press, “Brazil’s Welcome of Russian Minister Prompts U.S. Blowback,” Politico, April 18, 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/04/18/brazil-russia-ukraine-kirby-blowback-00092485.; Tom Phillips, “Lula Backpedals on Suggestion Putin Could Attend G20 Without Fear of Arrest,” Guardian, September 11, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/11/lula-putin-g20-brazil-arrest.
10 Duarte Mendonca, “US Should Stop 'Encouraging' Ukraine War, Brazilian President Says,” CNN, April 15, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/15/world/brazil-president-ukraine-war-intl/index.html.
11 “UN General Assembly Resolution on the Suspension of Russia’s Membership in the Human Rights Council,” Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations, April 7, 2022, https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/un-general-assembly-resolution-on-the-suspension-of-russia2019s-membership-in-the-human-rights-council.
12 Jack Nicas and Andre Spigariol, “Good News For Food, Bad News For War: Brazil Buys Russian Fertilizer,” New York Times, May 8, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/08/world/americas/brazil-russian-fertilizer-sanctions.html.
13 Constanza Valdes, “Brazil’s Momentum as a Global Agricultural Supplier Faces Headwinds,” U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, September 27, 2022, https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2022/september/brazil-s-momentum-as-a-global-agricultural-supplier-faces-headwinds/#:~:text=The%20University%20of%20S%C3%A3o%20Paulo's,at%20%241.8%20trillion%20in%202021.
14 Gabriel Araújo, “Brazil Feeds Some 10% of World's Population, Research Finds,” Reuters, March 4, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/article/brazil-grains/brazil-feeds-some-10-of-worlds-population-research-finds-idUSL2N2L23F6.
15 “Brazil’s President Calls U.S. Economic Embargo on Cuba ‘Illegal,’ Condemns Terrorist List Label,” Reuters, September 16, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazils-president-calls-us-economic-embargo-cuba-illegal-condemns-terrorist-list-2023-09-16/.
16 Brian Winter, “Q&A: Brazil’s Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira on the ‘Lula Doctrine,’” Americas Quarterly, March 23, 2023, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/qa-brazils-foreign-minister-mauro-vieira-on-the-lula-doctrine/.
17 Joe Leahy, “Brazil's Lula Calls For End to Dollar Trade Dominance,” Financial Times, April 13, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/669260a5-82a5-4e7a-9bbf-4f41c54a6143.
18 Tom Phillips, “’Brazil is Back’: Lula to Visit Xi as He Resets Diplomatic Relations With China,” Guardian, March 24, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/24/lula-xi-jinping-visit-china-brazil-diplomatic-relations-reset.
19 “Lula Says He’s Started Talks With BRICS Bank to Help Argentina,” Buenos Aires Times, May 3, 2023, https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/economy/lula-says-hes-started-talks-with-brics-bank-to-help-argentina.phtml
20 “Brazil,” Observatory of Economic Complexity, https://oec.world/en/profile/country/bra.
21 Oliver Stuenkel, “Brazil-China Ties to Face Test Under Bolsonaro,” Americas Quarterly, October 29, 2018, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/brazil-china-ties-to-face-test-under-bolsonaro/.
22 Daniella Compello and Francisco Urdinez, “Voter and Legislator Responses to Localized Trade Shocks From China in Brazil,” Comparative Political Studies 54, no. 7 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020970233.
23 Christopher S. Chivvis, “Why Brazil’s Relationship With the United States Isn’t Taking Off,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 24, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/08/24/why-brazil-s-relationship-with-united-states-isn-t-taking-off-pub-90432.
24 Cede Silva, “Biden Signals Support for Latin American Seats on the UN Security Council,” Brazilian Report, September 21, 2023, https://brazilian.report/liveblog/2022/09/21/security-council-biden-latin-america/.
25 Laura Silver, Christine Huang and Laura Clancy, “Views of China,” Pew Research Center, July 27, 2023, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/07/27/views-of-china/; Francisco Urdinez and Pietro Carlos de Souza Rodrigues, “Trapped in Proto-Bipolarism? Brazilian Perceptions of an Emerging Chinese-American Rivalry,” Rising Powers Quarterly, Vol. 2, no.,2 (2017): 105-123, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318865195_Trapped_in_Proto-Bipolarism_Brazilian_Perceptions_of_an_Emerging_Chinese-American_Rivalry.
26 Marcos Strecker, “The Risk of Lula’s Visit to China,” April 14, 2023, Istoé, https://istoe.com.br/o-risco-da-visita-de-lula-a-china/.
27 American Enterprise Institute, “China Global Investment Tracker,” https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/.
28 Chinese Investments in Brazil, 2022, China-Brazil Business Council, August 29, 2023, https://www.cebc.org.br/2023/08/29/numero-de-projetos-chineses-no-brasil-bateu-recorde-em-2022/.
29 U.S. Department of State, “US Relations With Brazil,” August 21, 2023, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-brazil/.
30 “Brazil May Face ‘Consequences’ If It Gives Huawei 5G Access, Says U.S. Ambassador,” Reuters, July 29, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-tech-brazil-5g/brazil-may-face-consequences-if-it-gives-huawei-5g-access-says-u-s-ambassador-idUSKCN24U20X.
31 “Lula Courts Chinese Tech For Brazil, Brushes Off ‘Prejudices,’” Reuters, April 14, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/technology/brazil-paves-way-semiconductor-cooperation-with-china-2023-04-14/.
32 Lisandra Paraguassu, “Lula to Seek Chinese Semiconductor Technology, Investment in Beijing,” Reuters, March 24, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/technology/lula-seek-chinese-semiconductor-technology-investment-beijing-2023-03-24/.
33 Bryan Harris, “Lula Vows Partnership with China to ‘Balance World Geopolitics,’” Financial Times, April 15, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/766ed3aa-3f51-4035-8573-43254c9756d5 ; Joe Leahy, “Brazil's Lula Calls For End to Dollar Trade Dominance,” Financial Times, April 13, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/669260a5-82a5-4e7a-9bbf-4f41c54a6143.
34 “Brazil’s Lula in Favor of Argentina Joining BRICS Bloc,” Reuters, August 22, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/brazils-lula-says-brics-not-meant-challenge-g7-us-2023-08-22/.
35 Lisandra Paraguassu, “Brazil Now Main Holdout Against BRICS Expansion,” Reuters, August 2, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/brazil-now-main-holdout-against-brics-expansion-sources-say-2023-08-02/.
