This article, which examines Saudi Arabia’s approach to Ukraine and China, is part of an ongoing series on U.S. statecraft and the Global South developed by the Carnegie Endowment’s American Statecraft Program. For other articles in the series, click here.
Rarely has the seven-decade relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia been more fraught, with the possible exception of the 1973–1974 oil embargo and the September 11, 2001, terror attacks. The oil-for-security trade-off that sustained the relationship has broken down as Washington has weaned itself off its dependence on Saudi hydrocarbons and Riyadh has come to doubt America’s commitment to Saudi security. Under Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia continues to pursue a range of assistance from and cooperation with the United States, but sees these as compatible with enhanced diplomatic, economic, and security ties with China, Russia, and a range of other powers. Riyadh paid no heed to the United States’ repeated calls to boost oil production after Russia’s invasion, instead coordinating production cuts through OPEC+, which raised global fuel prices and undermined Western sanctions.
Observers in Washington note that the United States’ supposed top partner in the Middle East has not acted like a partner at all. But the current Israel-Hamas war adds a new dynamic. Saudi Arabia is very interested — as is the Biden administration — in a normalization process with Israel. The war has slowed this down, but by no means derailed it. Indeed, Washington could look to Riyadh to play a key role in the post conflict environment.
Saudi Arabia’s Approach to the War in Ukraine
Saudi Arabia sees itself as a top-tier power well-positioned to broker dialogue aimed at ending the war in Ukraine. Riyadh hosted a two-day peace summit on Ukraine in August 2023 with representatives from more than forty countries. Russia did not attend and charged that the meeting was one of the West's “futile, doomed efforts” to drum up support for Ukraine in the Global South.1 But for Saudi Arabia, the summit was a successful show of its diplomatic ambitions beyond its traditional sphere of influence.2 It has also offered to mediate negotiations, and in September 2022, it helped Türkiye facilitate a major prisoner swap between Russia and Ukraine that involved almost 300 people.3
These attempts to end the war have been met with a more benign attitude in Washington than Riyadh’s decision to cut oil production, a move that U.S. President Joe Biden warned would result in real “consequences” for the Kingdom.4 Although the United States has reduced its dependence on Saudi oil, Washington still understood these cuts as a slap in the face, not least because they provided Russia with revenue despite Western sanctions. However, Saudi Arabia repeatedly denied that the cuts were politically driven.5
Saudi leaders have described their approach to the war in Ukraine as “active neutrality.”6 While Riyadh has taken a principled position against Russia’s use of force and voted in favor of UN resolutions to condemn the invasion, it refuses to turn wholeheartedly against Russia by joining Western-led sanctions. And despite being heavily armed, it has withheld any military assistance to Ukraine, confining its support to humanitarian and energy assistance.7
Riyadh has been unwilling to sacrifice its energy partnership with Moscow, even as it has remained critical of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war. The war has provided Saudi Arabia with an opportunity to strengthen its influence over the global oil market and bring in extra revenue in the process. In short, its economic self-interest has outweighed concern for Kyiv or upholding what the United States claims are universal, inviolable principles of nonaggression and sovereignty, but which Arab states see as selectively applied, often hypocritical norms, especially given U.S. support for Israel and the U.S. invasion of Iraq.8 But Riyadh has tried to combat these poor optics with grand gestures, such as hosting President Zelenskyy as a guest of honor at the 2023 Arab League Summit and holding the peace summit in Jeddah.
Saudi Arabia’s Approach to China
When he visited Riyadh in July 2022, Biden told Arab leaders that the United States is not leaving the Middle East. “We will not walk away and leave a vacuum, to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran . . . The U.S. is not going anywhere.”9 The possibility of a deeper relationship with Saudi Arabia that would include a U.S. security guarantee has been hotly debated in Washington. Regardless, Washington has sought to de-prioritize the region overall, focusing its attention instead on the war in Ukraine and competition with China in the Pacific.10 Meanwhile, China has stepped up its engagement in the Middle East, most visibly by brokering a detente between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023. While China has become increasingly intertwined with the economic and diplomatic issues in Saudi Arabia’s backyard, its overall political influence in the region remains minor relative to the historical position the United States has held in the Middle East.
As Saudi Arabia asserts its active neutrality regarding Ukraine, so too does it pursue close ties to China. “I don’t see our relationship with the U.S. [and] with China as being mutually exclusive. I think, in fact, they complement each other,” Saudi Minister of Investment Khalid Al-Falih told reporters in June 2023.11
Since 2011, China has been the Kingdom’s top trading partner and a top importer of crude oil. Recently, the two rising powers are expanding their ties beyond trade. In 2022, Riyadh and Beijing elevated their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership during a visit that China celebrated as “an epoch-making milestone in the history of the development of China-Arab relations.”12 The Saudi-China relationship has transformed from a rigid, oil-based structure to a more comprehensive partnership involving infrastructure projects and advanced technology transfers. Saudi leaders believe Chinese investment and expertise can help them diversify their economy away from hydrocarbons. When asked about Western criticism of the growing Saudi-China ties, Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman said he “ignores it” because “as a businessperson . . . you will go where opportunity comes your way.”13
Chinese companies help build infrastructure in the Kingdom, including high-speed railways, renewable energy, and telecommunications.14 Under their new strategic partnership, China and Saudi Arabia agreed on an “alignment plan” between China's Belt and Road Initiative and Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 domestic agenda and signed dozens of agreements involving hydrogen energy, electric vehicle manufacturing, and 5G information technology.15 In another sign of their close partnership, China’s President Xi Jinping announced at a Gulf summit in 2022 that China aims to begin purchasing oil in yuan instead of dollars.16
Aside from a stark advancement in economic integration, the security relationship between Saudi Arabia and China has also progressed, much to Washington’s chagrin.17 Seeking to diversify its weapons supply, Saudi Arabia has begun buying more arms from China, albeit slowly.18 To this end, the Saudis have reportedly cooperated with China to manufacture drones and ballistic missiles.19 In October 2023, the two countries held their second-ever joint naval drill.20 Meanwhile, the two countries are expanding their dialogue in international forums, with Saudi Arabia becoming a partial “dialogue member” of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a membership that may facilitate more defense collaboration, and getting invited to join BRICS at the August 2023 summit.21
Saudi leaders still rely on the United States as their most critical security benefactor, and know that neither China, their top trading partner, nor Russia, their key OPEC+ partner, can fill that role. However, Washington’s refusal to respond to the Houthi attacks on Saudi Aramco’s facilities in 2019 deepened Riyadh’s concern that the United States is not a dependable partner in regional security matters.22 Additionally, U.S. human rights criticisms, coupled with a Saudi view that the world is becoming increasingly multipolar, have compelled Riyadh to branch out beyond the U.S. security umbrella.23 It has not only deepened ties with Russia and China, but also with other powers, including Australia, India, Japan, and Germany.
Riyadh wants U.S. support in developing a strong local defense industry and a civilian nuclear program. Some analysts see Riyadh’s deepening ties with U.S. competitors as a leverage ploy, designed to get deeper security guarantees from Washington.24 Before war between Israel and Hamas broke out in October 2023, American and Saudi officials were negotiating a Saudi-Israel deal that would reportedly entail significant U.S. strategic commitments, including a binding defense treaty and civilian nuclear support. The current war in Gaza has thrown this into question, though U.S. and Saudi officials have indicated that they still intend to resume negotiations.25 By definition the deal would involve reciprocal Saudi commitments that would seem to impose limits on Riyadh’s strategic cooperation with China, although experts say this agreement is unlikely to nullify China’s influence entirely.26
Like many emerging powers, Riyadh is hoping it can have the best of both worlds: the benefits of a U.S. security partnership while advancing ties with U.S. adversaries. Perhaps Mohammed bin Salman seeks a division of labor, where the United States serves as Saudi Arabia’s primary strategic security partner and China remains a critically important partner for trade, technological cooperation, and managing relations with Iran. Given Saudi reservations about embracing America’s confrontational stance toward China and the constraints the U.S. Congress will demand on any security commitments the United States makes, it remains to be seen whether this new framework for a limited partnership is possible.
Whether the U.S.-Saudi relationship will undergo a significant course correction and be able to find the right balance that serves both their interests is now being put to the test. Much of the U.S. interest in repairing relations with Riyadh appears focused on moving the Kingdom away from its increasingly close ties with Beijing, but this is a tall order. Washington may decide the reputational costs and additional burden of providing security for such a problematic partner isn’t worth the marginal and still uncertain benefits of lessening Beijing’s influence.
Notes
1 "Ukraine Calls Jeddah Talks Productive, Russia Calls Them Doomed," Reuters, August 6, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-calls-jeddah-talks-productive-russia-calls-them-doomed-2023-08-06/.
2 ”Saudi Arabia Reportedly Will Host a Ukrainian-organized Peace Summit in August,” Politico, July 30, 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/07/30/saudi-arabia-ukrainian-organized-peace-summit-in-august-00108886
3 Valentyn Ogirenko and Aziz El Yaakoubi, “Russia, Ukraine Announce Major Surprise Prisoner Swap,” Reuters, September 22, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-releases-10-foreigners-captured-ukraine-after-saudi-mediation-riyadh-2022-09-21/ ; “Saudi Arabia Ready to Mediate Between All Parties Related to Ukraine Crisis – State Media,” Reuters, March 3, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-ready-mediate-between-all-parties-related-ukraine-crisis-state-2022-03-03/.
4 Zoe Richards, “Biden Warns There Will Be ‘Consequences’ For Saudi Arabia After Oil Production Cut,” NBC News, October 11, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/joe-biden/biden-warns-will-consequences-saudi-arabia-oil-production-cut-rcna51804.
5 Derek Brower, “Saudi Arabia Defends Oil Production Cuts After US Backlash," Financial Times, October 12, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/5eaea58f-d04f-40d6-aae5-f0b39ab324c0.
6 “Saudi Arabia Declares Neutrality After Zelenskiy Visit to Jeddah,” Guardian, May 19, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/may/19/russia-ukraine-war-live-zelenskiy-to-attend-g7-in-person-reports-say-as-leaders-prepare-new-sanctions#top-of-blog.
7 Alvaro Escalonilla, “Saudi Arabia Balances Its Stance on Ukraine with $400 Million in Humanitarian Aid,” Atalayar, February 27, 2023, https://www.atalayar.com/en/articulo/politics/saudi-arabia-balances-its-stance-ukraine-400-million-humanitarian-aid/20230227133359181946.html
8 Walid al-Sheikh, “The Arab World Tilts Eastward,” Sada, June 27, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/90045
9 Shannon Pettypiece, “Biden Tells Middle East Leaders the U.S. ‘is Not Going Anywhere,’” NBC News, July 16, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-meet-middle-east-leaders-focus-iran-israel-rcna38168.
10 Natan Sachs, “Can Biden Pivot to Normalcy in the Middle East?,” Brookings Institution, Jul 12, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/can-biden-pivot-to-normalcy-in-the-middle-east/.
11 Natasha Turak, "Saudi Arabia and China Are Part of a Multipolar World Order, and Their Mutual Interests are 'Strong and Rising,' Minister Says," CNBC, June 13, 2023, https://www.cnbc.com/2023/06/14/china-and-saudi-arabia-are-part-of-a-multipolar-world-order-minister.html.
12 Aziz El Yaakoubi and Eduardo Baptisa, "China's Xi on 'Epoch-Making' Visit to Saudi as Riyadh Chafes at US Censure," Reuters, December 7, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-xi-starts-epoch-making-saudi-visit-deepen-economic-strategic-ties-2022-12-07/.
13 “Saudi Arabia Seeks Cooperation with China, ‘Ignores’ Western Worries,” Voice of America, June 11, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/saudi-arabia-seeks-cooperation-with-china-ignores-western-worries/7132507.html.
14 Mohammed Al-Saudairi, Steven Jiawei Hai, Kameal Alahmad, “How Saudi Arabia Bent China to Its Technoscientific Ambitions,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 1, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/08/01/how-saudi-arabia-bent-china-to-its-technoscientific-ambitions-pub-90301.
15 Vivian Nereim, "China and Saudi Arabia Sign Strategic Partnership as Xi Visits Kingdom," New York Times, December 8 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/08/world/middleeast/china-saudi-arabia-agreement.html#:~:text=RIYADH%2C%20Saudi%20Arabia%20%E2%80%94%20Saudi%20Arabia,is%20seeking%20greater%20self%2Dreliance.
16 Maha El Dahan and Zazi El Yaakoubi, "China's Xi Calls for Oil Trade in Yuan at Gulf Summit in Riyadh," Reuters, December 10, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/saudi-arabia-gathers-chinas-xi-with-arab-leaders-new-era-ties-2022-12-09/; Summer Said and Stephen Kalin, "Saudi Arabia Considers Accepting Yuan Instead of Dollars for Chinese Oil Sales," Wall Street Journal, March 15, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-considers-accepting-yuan-instead-of-dollars-for-chinese-oil-sales-11647351541.
17 Dion Nissenbaum, "Saudis Agree with U.S. on Path to Normalize Kingdom's Ties with Israel," Wall Street Journal, August 9, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-saudi-arabia-agree-to-broad-terms-for-israel-normalization-ac6d549c.
18 Jane Cai, “China Said to Be Negotiating Arms Deals With Saudi Arabia and Egypt,” South China Morning Post, May 24, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3221715/china-said-be-negotiating-arms-deals-saudi-arabia-and-egypt ; Stephen Kalin, “Arms Megadeal Collapsed When China, Russia Links Emerged,” Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/a-saudi-defense-contractor-courted-russia-and-china-then-its-u-s-business-partners-fled-962527ad.
19 Agnes Helou, “Chinese and Saudi Firms Create Joint Venture to Make Military Drones in the Kingdom,” Defense News, March 9, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2022/03/09/chinese-and-saudi-firms-create-joint-venture-to-make-military-drones-in-the-kingdom/ ; Courtney Kube and Saphora Smith, “Saudi Arabia Appears to Be Building Its Own Ballistic Missiles With China’s Help,” NBC News, December 24, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/saudi-arabia-building-ballistic-missiles-china-iran-rcna9893.
20Seong Hyeon Choi, “Chinese and Saudi Navies Launch Joint Counterterrorism Exercise Against Backdrop of Israel-Hamas War,” South China Morning Post, October 10, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3237401/chinese-and-saudi-navies-launch-joint-counterterrorism-exercise-against-backdrop-israel-hamas-war
21 “Riyadh Joins Shanghai Cooperation Organization As Ties With Beijing Grow,” Reuters, March 29, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/riyadh-joins-shanghai-cooperation-organization-ties-with-beijing-grow-2023-03-29/.
22 F. Gregory Gause III, "The Kingdom and the Power," Foreign Affairs, December 20, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/gregory-gause-kingdom-and-power-us-saudi-relationship.
23 Karen E. Young, “How Saudi Arabia Sees the World,” Foreign Affairs, November 1, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/saudi-arabia/how-saudi-arabia-sees-world.
24 Stephen Kalin and Summer Said, "Saudi Crown Prince Test Drives Nonaligned Foreign Policy," Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-crown-prince-test-drives-nonaligned-foreign-policy-450ddefb.
25 Tovah Lazaroff,"Saudi Arabia Still Open to Israeli Normalization Deal, White House Says," Jerusalem Post, November 1, 2023, https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-771098.
26 Dion Nissenbaum, "Saudis Agree with U.S. on Path to Normalize Kingdom's Ties with Israel," Wall Street Journal, August 9, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-saudi-arabia-agree-to-broad-terms-for-israel-normalization-ac6d549c.
