Although the three nuclear powers in Southern Asia—China, India, and Pakistan—have had a complex history of disdain, reluctance, and even outright opposition to nuclear weapons at different times in the past, they remain today the only countries whose nuclear-weapons inventories are growing as nuclear stockpiles gradually shrink in the rest of the world. The fact that China, India, and Pakistan have been, comparatively speaking, late nuclearizers accounts for this anomalous trend. The large disparities in nuclear capability between the advanced nuclear powers and the Southern Asian trio exacerbates this trend further, as China, responding to U.S. and Russian nuclear capabilities, provokes Indian, and in turn Pakistani, nuclear modernization in response. Furthermore, the trio’s strong belief that they are still some ways from achieving the kind of nuclear capabilities required to protect their national interests ensures that China, India, and Pakistan will likely continue to expand their nuclear arsenals, albeit at different rates, for many years to come—even if the other established nuclear powers continue to pursue progressive reductions in stockpile size.

To better understand the implications of the continuing growth in size and complexity of the nuclear capabilities in Southern Asia, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with the generous support of the MacArthur Foundation, undertook this study of the prospects for nuclear deterrence stability among China, India, and Pakistan over the next decade. As part of this effort, twelve Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani experts present perspectives on key issues that bear on different dimensions of the challenge of managing the changing nuclear capabilities in the region. The views from China focus on how Beijing’s nuclear deterrent is shaped by developments both globally and in Asia, the current Chinese debates about its nuclear doctrine, the prospects for China’s sea-based nuclear deterrent, and how China perceives India as a nuclear threat. The views from India include studies of how India’s civil-military institutions affect the country’s nuclear command and control, the doctrinal debates surrounding the Indian nuclear deterrent, the Indian nuclear force structure in 2025, and how India’s contemplated ballistic missile defense system advances its deterrent objectives. The views from Pakistan explore the direct and indirect costs of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, the changes in Pakistan’s nuclear use doctrine, the character of Pakistan’s nuclear force in 2025, and the impact of Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons on regional stability.

These topics were explored because of their obvious import for strategic stability in Southern Asia. The project also sought regional voices and, wherever possible, contributions from younger scholars in order to nurture expertise on an issue that promises to remain a permanent fixture in Asian politics for a long time to come. Accordingly, these perspectives are offered in the expectation that they will be of interest to scholars, policymakers, and all those interested in Southern Asia or in matters of nuclear policy.

Ashley J. Tellis

Although the three nuclear powers in Southern Asia—China, India, and Pakistan—have had a complex history of disdain, reluctance, and even outright opposition to nuclear weapons at different times in the past, they remain today the only countries whose nuclear-weapons inventories are growing as nuclear stockpiles gradually shrink in the rest of the world. The fact that China, India, and Pakistan have been, comparatively speaking, late nuclearizers accounts for this anomalous trend. The large disparities in nuclear capability between the advanced nuclear powers and the Southern Asian trio exacerbates this trend further, as China, responding to U.S. and Russian nuclear capabilities, provokes Indian, and in turn Pakistani, nuclear modernization in response. Furthermore, the trio’s strong belief that they are still some ways from achieving the kind of nuclear capabilities required to protect their national interests ensures that China, India, and Pakistan will likely continue to expand their nuclear arsenals, albeit at different rates, for many years to come—even if the other established nuclear powers continue to pursue progressive reductions in stockpile size.

To better understand the implications of the continuing growth in size and complexity of the nuclear capabilities in Southern Asia, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with the generous support of the MacArthur Foundation, undertook this study of the prospects for nuclear deterrence stability among China, India, and Pakistan over the next decade. As part of this effort, twelve Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani experts present perspectives on key issues that bear on different dimensions of the challenge of managing the changing nuclear capabilities in the region. The views from China focus on how Beijing’s nuclear deterrent is shaped by developments both globally and in Asia, the current Chinese debates about its nuclear doctrine, the prospects for China’s sea-based nuclear deterrent, and how China perceives India as a nuclear threat. The views from India include studies of how India’s civil-military institutions affect the country’s nuclear command and control, the doctrinal debates surrounding the Indian nuclear deterrent, the Indian nuclear force structure in 2025, and how India’s contemplated ballistic missile defense system advances its deterrent objectives. The views from Pakistan explore the direct and indirect costs of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, the changes in Pakistan’s nuclear use doctrine, the character of Pakistan’s nuclear force in 2025, and the impact of Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons on regional stability.

These topics were explored because of their obvious import for strategic stability in Southern Asia. The project also sought regional voices and, wherever possible, contributions from younger scholars in order to nurture expertise on an issue that promises to remain a permanent fixture in Asian politics for a long time to come. Accordingly, these perspectives are offered in the expectation that they will be of interest to scholars, policymakers, and all those interested in Southern Asia or in matters of nuclear policy.

Ashley J. Tellis