Edition

Proliferation News 10/1/24

IN THIS ISSUE: China’s Newest Nuclear Submarine Sank, Setting Back Its Military Modernization, Russia Says it Won't Discuss New Nuclear Treaty with US in Current Form’, The UN’s Nuclear Chief Says the World Needs to Pursue Dialogue with North Korea over Nuclear Weapons, ROK Shows off ‘Monster’ Missile at Parade in Warning to Nuclear North Korea, Nuclear Power for AI: What it Will Take to Reopen Three Mile Island Safely, Why Russia Is Changing Its Nuclear Doctrine Now

Published on October 1, 2024

Michael R. Gordon | The Wall Street Journal

China’s newest nuclear-powered attack submarine sank in the spring, a major setback for one of the country’s priority weapons programs, U.S. officials said. The episode, which Chinese authorities scrambled to cover up and hasn’t previously been disclosed, occurred at a shipyard near Wuhan in late May or early June. It comes as China has been pushing to expand its navy, including its fleet of nuclear-powered submarines.

Reuters

Russia will not discuss signing a new treaty with the United States to replace an agreement limiting each side's strategic nuclear weapons that expires in 2026 as it needs to be broadened and expanded to cover other states, the Kremlin said on Tuesday. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov made the comments when asked about the fate of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, which is due to run out on Feb. 5, 2026. 

EDITH M. LEDERER | Associated Press

The world must recognize that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons and pursue dialogue despite its violations of U.N. sanctions and international law, the United Nations’ nuclear chief said Thursday…He said North Korea’s nuclear program should be condemned for violating Security Council sanctions and international law. But there has been no international engagement since 2006 when the country became “a de facto nuclear weapon possessor state” and since then its nuclear program has expanded significantly.

Jeongmin Kim | NK News

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol announced the establishment of the new Strategic Command (STRATCOM) to oversee military responses to North Korean nuclear threats on Tuesday, as the country publicly debuted a new “monster” ballistic missile that will be central to plans to take out DPRK leadership in the event of war. A first-of-its-kind flyover by a U.S. B-1B strategic bomber near the end of the Armed Forces Day celebration at Seoul Airfield punctuated the show of force featuring hundreds of assets and thousands of soldiers. “If North Korea attempts to use nuclear weapons, it will face a resolute and overwhelming response from our military and the ROK-U.S. alliance,” Yoon said. “That day will be the day of the North Korean regime’s demise.”

Michael Greshko | Nature

As the plants near their restart dates, their operators will also have to contend with a challenge faced by even fully operational plants: the need to source fresh nuclear fuel. US nuclear utility companies have long counted on the international market to buy much of the necessary raw yellowcake uranium and the services that separate and enrich uranium-235, the isotope used in nuclear reactors’ fuel rods. Russia has been a major international supplier of these services, even after the country’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, because US and European sanctions have not targeted nuclear fuel. But to minimize its reliance on Russia, the United States is building up its own supply chain, with the DoE offering $3.4 billion to buy domestically enriched uranium.

Heather Williams | CSIS

On September 25, Russian president Vladimir Putin provided insights into changes to Russia’s long-anticipated new nuclear doctrine…It will be important to check Putin’s comments against the doctrine document, whenever it is released. But the timing of Putin’s remarks and the changes he announced indicate Russia is increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons in an attempt to deter Western assistance to Ukraine. The purpose of the new doctrine may be not only deterrence but also an attempt to divide European allies on the basis of how much risk they are willing to accept in supporting Ukraine.


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