Lebanese religious leaders are often treated as authentic representatives of their sects and are given broad powers over religious affairs. However, their leadership is not organic, nor are they necessarily popular, as these individuals are trained and selected by elite institutions.

While Iran’s foreign policy writ large exists mostly beyond the confines of confessionalism, this much is clear: as Iran’s neighborhood has become more sectarian, so has its behavior.

Unless there are fundamental changes in Syria’s social and security structures, any political solution to the conflict is likely to fail.

Hizb al-Nour is not an Islamist party, at least in its current form; for Salafis, politics is just a means to an end—a way to protect and reinforce their religious movement.

The states of the Arab Gulf have been defined by their unique combination of economic generosity and political parsimony—a system preserved by vast resource wealth and traditional institutions of governance that have managed to retain a preponderance of legitimacy.

The Islamic State’s ideology is multifaceted and cannot be traced to one individual, movement, or period. Understanding it is crucial to defeating the group.

While Lebanon’s sectarian power-sharing system is flawed and unraveling in many ways, it has helped keep the country at peace and provides valuable lessons for the region.

The struggle between Saudi Arabia and the self-proclaimed Islamic State is also a contest for the soul of Wahhabism.

The clash of visions over the Iraqi state’s identity, legitimacy, and ownership, long predating the U.S.-led invasion of the country in 2003, has been the root cause of political violence in postwar Arab Iraq.

Violent events and social network structures play key roles in the transmission of both sectarian and countersectarian rhetoric on Twitter.