In the latest from the Pivotal States series, which examines alternative U.S. foreign policy approaches to the world’s key nations, American Statecraft Program Director Christopher S. Chivvis discussed the future of the U.S.-Saudi Arabia relationship with Kim Ghattas, a contributing editor at Financial Times; Aaron David Miller, American Statecraft senior fellow; and Ambassador Dennis Ross, distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
This Q & A was adapted from a transcript of the event and has been edited and condensed for clarity.
Christopher S. Chivvis: What are America’s main interests when it comes to Saudi Arabia?
Aaron David Miller: I think U.S. interests [regarding Saudi Arabia] in some respects follow the outlines of U.S interests in the Middle East. First is counterterrorism—protecting the homeland and our interests abroad. Saudis have had a very complicated, problematic history in that regard, but they can be a useful partner.
Christopher S. Chivvis: Complicated, because Al-Qaeda was born in Saudi Arabia . . .
Aaron David Miller: Right. Second is maintaining access to Arab hydrocarbons, not because we need them, but because the rest of the world does, and oil trades in a single market.
Third is preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon with a nuclear weapon. I would put those in the category of must haves—they all pertain to American security and prosperity.
I would like to add a fourth when it comes to Saudi Arabia, which is the pursuit of human rights, but in some respects, I know better. No administration I ever worked for made human rights the organizing principle of American foreign policy.
The administration [of President Joe Biden] has moved the Saudis from pariah to more-than-partner. Saudi Arabia is a very problematic partner for the United States, and I think we need to acknowledge that and be very honest about the nature and the extent of our relationship.
Christopher S. Chivvis: What about you, Kim? How do you see U.S. interests?
Kim Ghattas: Very simply, it’s much better to have Saudi Arabia on your side as an ally that you can work with rather than having an antagonistic relationship.
The other angle to this is China and whether Saudi Arabia is a partner with the U.S. to try to limit the influence Beijing can have in the Middle East. And of course, the regional architecture that you want to put in place that can allow for some long-term stability.
I want to go back to human rights—something that in this region we are very concerned about when we see how much the United States invests in relationships with problematic governments. And that balance has never worked out somehow. Values and interests don’t always align, and they certainly don’t align here, but it’s worth continuing to make that effort. However, I’m also pragmatic—the U.S. constantly thinks that it can leave the Middle East and pivot to Asia, and every time the Middle East proves that you simply cannot walk away from this region. Who would’ve expected that, because of the war in Ukraine, you had to cozy up to Saudi Arabia again? And because of an unexpected event like October 7, you need the Saudis on board?
I think it’s always about finding the balance and not getting too close. We’ve seen in the past how getting too cozy is detrimental to American interests, as it upsets the balance of the region as well. American administrations often go from one to the other.
Christopher S. Chivvis: So how should the United States think about balancing the investments that it makes in this relationship with what it’s getting out of it?
Dennis Ross: I think the term balance that Kim uses is a good one. I think most administrations strive to produce it, but they don’t always succeed.
This needs to be a two-way street. It is important for us [the United States] to have a good, strong relationship with Saudi Arabia right now for a lot of reasons. If we’re going to do something like provide a defense treaty to them—I don’t think we’ve had a bilateral defense treaty that we’ve concluded for sixty years—it is legitimate to ask what is it that we’re going to get out of it. I think the administration is looking at it from several standpoints.
One is the possibility of [a Saudi] normalization with Israel, which has implications for the region because it means the Palestinian issue is actually going to be addressed. Two is the larger context of a broader regional competition. The notion of détente between the Saudis and the Iranians, it’s a purely tactical one. Having spent a lot of time in Saudi Arabia, I’m always struck by how low their expectations are that this détente can be translated into something more meaningful.
The reality is that the Saudis are looking to the U.S. for a defense treaty because their preoccupation is Vision 2030. If you ask [Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS] what his priorities are, he’ll say Vision 2030—first priority, second priority, third priority. He wants the defense treaty with the United States to ensure that there’s deterrence against Iran [to make Vision 2030 possible].
Christopher S. Chivvis: The proposed defense treaty is a really important issue, one that requires serious discussion here in Washington. What we’re talking about is basically turning the U.S.-Saudi relationship into something like the relationship the United States has with Japan. Obviously, Japan and Saudi Arabia are different countries with different economies, but the model for the treaty, as I understand it, is the U.S.-Japan Alliance—a very, very deep commitment that the United States has made to Japan decades ago. What we are discussing is making a similar kind of a commitment to Saudi Arabia for an indefinite period. What kinds of things would make it worthwhile for the United States to make that deep of a commitment, and how much confidence can we have that Saudi Arabia can deliver?
Aaron David Miller: There’s another element here that I think we need to focus on, and that is Saudi Arabia’s own agency. This is not the Saudi Arabia of its former kings. It is a Saudi Arabia that is pursuing what I would call a 360-degree foreign policy. [Also] MBS is thirty-eight years old. By my reckoning, if there’s a succession of one-term presidents, he could see eight or nine U.S. presidents come and go during his tenure.
In addition, Saudi Arabia has no intention of becoming the tip of the American spear in the face of an aggressive Iran. As long as Iran continues to be a bad actor in terms of wanting to spread its influence, MBS has to make a calculation. He’s vulnerable, and there’s a certain amount of dependency, but he also has to be extremely careful. We need to take a sober look at Saudi Arabia’s own motivations here.
If the U.S. is going to sign a mutual defense pact, which will be subject to Senate ratification and will attain the force of law, we have to be pretty sure about what we’re getting into. I would argue that with Saudi Arabia, there is very little coincidence of values. There is almost no constituency in this country for an exclusive relationship with Saudi Arabia. And as far as interests are concerned, it’s episodic. Oil pricing, not necessarily. Relations with Russia and China, not necessarily. Human rights, not necessarily.
What should the United States pay for Israeli-Saudi normalization? If you didn’t have Israeli-Saudi normalization, there would be zero chance of getting anything like what we are considering through Congress—which I know for some administrations becomes a sort of impediment, but in a democracy, it is a part of the foreign policy process. That’s the question to me.
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Christopher S. Chivvis: If we were going to boil it down to the key things that the United States is looking to get out of this proposed defense treaty, they would be Israeli-Saudi normalization, pushback against China, and some kind of help with Iran. Am I leaving any out?
Dennis Ross: No. I think I would put the last one in the context of the idea of developing a regional coalition where you have integrated air defense, missile defense, and integrated early warning. We saw that on the night of April 13, so it’s not just an abstraction.
The idea that the Saudis will make peace with Israel and we won’t be providing fundamental assurances is a kind of contradiction in terms. Of course we will, and it will be to Israel, and it’ll be to the Saudis. If the price of a peace treaty between the two of them is a defense treaty, if it’s the difference between having this deal and not having it, I say go ahead with it.
Christopher S. Chivvis: How much can the United States expect to get in terms of Saudi Arabia’s policy toward China if it signs this defense treaty? Will it really make a big difference in how Saudi Arabia approaches China?
Kim Ghattas: I think that it could, but I’m not a hundred percent sure. The Saudis have been looking at multiple alliances and making sure they hedge their bets. Their interests don’t all align with having an exclusive relationship with the United States. But I don’t think that necessarily stands in the way of a closer defense partnership with Saudi Arabia.
My concerns are that it feels like too much too soon. It’s maybe a question of timing, and if there wasn’t the issue of normalization with Israel, probably very few people would be bringing up a defense pact with Saudi Arabia. It would weigh on the United States in ways that it does not for a country like Japan.
This region is not one where we’re having traditional warfare. We’re dealing with a lot of nonstate actors. And I would like to know how the defense pact, if it goes forward, would address the issue of nonstate actors, which is really how Iran operates in the region.
Christopher S. Chivvis: If [the United States] signs a defense treaty with Saudi Arabia, are we going to have more influence over human rights?
Kim Ghattas: I think it’s almost irrelevant in the global geopolitical scheme of things, unfortunately, and I say this with much regret.
Saudi Arabia has changed tremendously over the past few years under MBS. I think we need to recognize that it is great for a young generation of Saudis. Approximately 70 percent of Saudis are under thirty-five. They’re living the kind of life that they could only dream about ten years ago, even five years ago. And I think that in every discussion about human rights and about Jamal Khashoggi, it’s hard to balance the grayness of it because what happened was outrageous—outrageous is even an understatement. Yet I don’t want to deny millions of young Saudis the possibilities that are within their reach at the moment.
The change is also coming at a price, and that is increased authoritarianism. [Recently] a young filmmaker was arrested and put on trial for a Netflix series that was judged a little bit too far out for the taste of the authorities—at a time when Saudi [leaders] are promoting film production and having a red carpet with stars from all around the world coming to Saudi Arabia. So it’s this battle between values and interests, and [values] unfortunately always takes a back seat to geopolitical interests.
But that does not mean that we should not continue to push for these things. Perhaps the U.S. should make this a part of the discussion about a defense pact and what it expects from its ally that is getting this huge gift, if you will, as an authoritarian country versus a democratic country. But I suspect that that will not be put on the table. American administrations don’t like to mix these things.
Christopher S. Chivvis: What about climate policy and the extent to which it could affect U.S.-Saudi relations?
Dennis Ross: One of the interesting things is both the Saudis and the Emiratis want to see themselves in the forefront of renewable energy. The Saudis are making huge investments in green hydrogen, not blue hydrogen. Blue hydrogen depends upon natural gas, and green hydrogen does not. They see themselves being leaders in delivery of non-fossil fuels over time.
Part of the problem is the transition period between now and the point at which you get to [renewable energy]. That’s why oil in Saudi Arabia remains important to the world for the next twenty years. But MBS sees Saudi Arabia being not only on the cutting edge but also a leader—not just regionally but also internationally—on this. We are doing more with the Saudis to collaborate in this area. So this is actually an area where you’re going to see more convergence than divergence.
Christopher S. Chivvis: As renewables come to play a larger role, [it’s a] question of making a permanent commitment to Saudi Arabia in exchange for something that’s pressing now, but ten or twenty years from now may not be as much of a concern.
Dennis Ross: But I don’t think that’s the driver of this. If the normalization deal wasn’t on the table, we would not be talking about a defense treaty with Saudi Arabia. That’s the only reason we’re talking about it.
Christopher S. Chivvis: Do you think it’s enough to get normalization?
Dennis Ross: No, it’s not enough to get normalization. The Saudis right now require something on the Palestinians that allows MBS to say, “It doesn’t look like Oslo. It’s not open-ended. It’s actually going to produce an outcome.” There has to be a time horizon here that allows them to say, “This is different than anything we’ve seen before.”
The Palestinians have a right to self-determination, and we should recognize that, but rights come with responsibilities. So you build benchmarks in to see that Palestinians have created for themselves a set of conditions that they want to meet before they have a state. And I’m not just talking about reform. I’m talking about: is there a Palestinian identity now that reflects a commitment to coexistence and not resistance? If there’s a continuing commitment to resistance, how is that consistent with a Palestinian state?
Christopher S. Chivvis: How much influence do you think Riyadh has in bringing that sort of change about among Palestinians?
Dennis Ross: I think they have very limited influence on that, but they don’t want a Palestinian state to be led by Hamas. They don’t want a Palestinian state to be part of the axis of resistance—what I call the axis of misery. They don’t want a Palestinian state to be a source of instability. So even if they’re not the ones creating these benchmarks or conditions, that should be what the American approach is all about.
Christopher S. Chivvis: Another part of this package is that the United States would offer Saudi Arabia a civil nuclear program. What do you see as the pros and cons of that offer, especially in light of potential nuclear capability of other actors in the region?
Aaron David Miller: The Atomic Energy Act basically prohibits the export of American nuclear technology to states that don’t sign up to certain protocols, assurances, and guarantees that they’re not allowed to control their own fuel cycle. They can’t enrich uranium, and they can’t extract plutonium from spent fuel rods. The Saudis want to be able to enrich uranium on their own soil. And from what I understand, the latest proposal was to have the United States construct such a facility—had MBS not made itunmistakablyclear several times that if Iran weaponizes, then the Saudis are going to weaponize.
Maybe it would’ve been possible to work out some arrangement, but that raises fundamental suspicions about what the Saudis intend by controlling their own enrichment. The South Koreans want to enrich too. If we do this for the Saudis, what are they going to say? I think we have to be extremely careful about this particular piece of the package.
Dennis Ross: One of the risks is that the Chinese will do it if we don’t do it. And then that has all sorts of implications for what the relationship between China and Saudi Arabia will be.
Our choices [in foreign policy are usually] bad or terrible, so we’ll take the least bad. I want to know what the assurances are that we will get from the Saudis as part of the process. We bring this back to where we started. Any defense treaty that is going to require a set of obligations and commitments by the United States should also require a set of commitments and obligations from the Saudis.
Christopher S. Chivvis: Final question: two years from now, will the United States have signed a defense treaty with Saudi Arabia?
Dennis Ross: You know what Yogi Berra has said about these kinds of predictions? The problem with them is they’re always about the future.
I hope it’ll be done [by that time] because there would’ve been a normalization deal done. There will not be a defense treaty without a normalization deal, and I think that is so potentially transformative for the Middle East that I hope it happens. But that’s not answering your question: no, I don’t think it’ll have happened by that time.
Kim Ghattas: I agree with Dennis. I think we might [get] something [with a] “less for less” [approach]. It won’t be passed in the Senate.
Aaron David Miller: I’d only say Middle East negotiations have two speeds: slow and slower.
Dennis Ross: I thought you were going to say slow and paralysis.
View the whole event in the player below, or watch it on YouTube.
Previously in Pivotal States:
- U.S. policy toward Venezuela: hope and realism
- The consequences of Türkiye’s election
- What Biden wants from Modi
- Why Brazil’s relationship with the United States isn’t taking off
- Unpacking U.S. interests in Indonesia
- The U.S.-Mexico relationship isn’t just about migration
- Washington has struggled to find the right Iran policy formula
