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“Troublemaker.” “Separatist.” “Dangerous.” “Pro-Independence.” These are labels Beijing has wielded against Taiwan’s recently inaugurated president, Lai Ching-te, since the election campaign in 2023. Characterizing Lai as some sort of recalcitrant deserving of punishment seems to draw from an old People’s Republic of China (PRC) playbook: frustrate the administration in Taipei so as to push it into making increasingly risky moves, raising the likelihood of serious missteps. Measures to force Lai’s hand include raising pressure externally while at the same time leveraging domestic cleavages in Taiwan. Beijing can then exploit mistakes to drive wedges between the Lai administration, Taiwan’s population, and foreign governments, thus isolating Lai and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) domestically and Taiwan internationally.
This can already be seen with the lambasting of Lai by PRC officials, state-controlled media, and other sympathetic voices; enhanced diplomatic pressure; and the ramping up of military and paramilitary activity near Taiwan. Beijing convinced the Pacific island microstate of Nauru to break official relations with Taipei while trying to get states and international organizations to conflate their “one China” policies with Beijing’s “one China principle.” These actions leverage efforts by Taiwan opposition parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), which hold a legislative majority, to railroad through a highly expansive and controversial contempt of legislature law tied to massive infrastructure spending. The move led to scuffles inside the Legislative Yuan and major protests outside it. Just a week into office, Lai is already being painted as incapable of controlling the situation.
Current developments echo Taiwan’s recent history. Before Lai Ching-te, there was Chen Shui-bian—also of the DPP. Chen narrowly won a three-sided presidential election in 2000 with 39.3 percent of the popular vote, just 2.5 percent above the second-place finisher, James Soong of the People’s First Party (PFP), with Lien Chan of the KMT trailing in a distant third. Yet Chen faced a legislature where the KMT and the PFP together enjoyed a significant majority. Beijing was suspicious of the DPP due to the pro-independence clause in the party’s charter, its inclusion of prominent pro-independence figures from Taiwan’s democratization movement, and its ambivalence toward China. Both Beijing and Chen’s domestic opponents were, therefore, eager to cast him as incompetent and dangerous.
Aware of the challenges, Chen went into office making overtures to both the opposition and the PRC in the hopes of reciprocation. He used his first inaugural address to declare that he would not move Taiwan toward de jure independence or suspend unification-oriented government bodies while appointing KMT members to key cabinet posts. Despite these moves, both Beijing and Taiwan’s opposition repeatedly rebuffed Chen, making him increasingly frustrated. They advanced a narrative that Chen and the DPP were reckless and out to wreck U.S.-PRC relations as well as regional stability. Allegations of corruption swirling around Chen and his family members during his time in office did not help Chen’s case.
In response, Chen sought to mobilize the public along populist lines, including attempts to hold a referendum to support Taiwan’s attempt to enter the United Nations. Those moves alarmed Beijing and annoyed Washington, which at the time was becoming embroiled in major military operations in Afghanistan and later in Iraq following the September 11 terrorist attacks. Chen’s efforts reinforced the impression that he was self-serving, irresponsible, and out to create problems. After two terms, he left office deeply unpopular domestically and isolated internationally, with the DPP suffering in the 2008 presidential and legislative elections. In the United States, even the George W. Bush administration’s initial pre-9/11 enthusiasm for Chen and Taiwan cooled considerably. Chen eventually served jail time for corruption after leaving office but was later acquitted following changes to the law. Many still view him with suspicion.
That said, Lai’s administration may have more space for maneuver than Chen had. With a desire to maintain the status quo while underlining Taiwan’s distinctiveness during his inaugural address, Lai is clearly in step with popular sentiment in Taiwan. Regular polling shows that more than 90 percent of people in Taiwan see themselves as Taiwanese with about two-thirds exclusively so, but more than 85 percent of those same respondents consistently wish to keep the status quo regardless of their identification. More than anything, this Taiwanese identification is strongly based on affinity for democracy, which is a key distinction from ethnic-based PRC claims about identification for people in Taiwan. Few politicians focused on elected office are going to risk going against what is probably as close to a consensus as possible in an active democratic system, Lai included.
Lai can further afford to ignore calls from Beijing and the KMT to stop the “de-Sinicization” of the education system or to remove the independence clause from the DPP charter. Beijing’s own view of Chinese history is historically fraught with contention and variability, as seen in recent efforts to remove writings about Ming history that seemed to invite comparisons with Chinese President Xi Jinping and water down Deng Xiaoping’s legacy. Taiwan’s public generally accepts the formulation that the Republic of China is already independent and not subordinate to the PRC by virtue of being vested in Taiwan’s democratic system, making moot any declaration of independence. This is a point that Lai as well as his predecessors Tsai Ing-wen and Ma Yin-jeou made, and any effort to change the DPP charter will potentially stir a contentious debate over what is currently a non-issue in Taiwan.
Externally, there is more general acceptance of the current status quo where Taiwan enjoys substantive autonomy even if it does not have significant formal diplomatic recognition. Accompanying this view is an understanding that Taiwan not only avoids creating instability but also plays an integral part of the global supply chain and is a contributor to global prosperity. Any unsettling of Taiwan could result in major disruption to transport, communications, trade, and finance, in Asia and beyond. Taiwan’s differences with the PRC ought to be something that the two sides sort out peacefully and consensually, without coercion, force, or violence. Lai merely has to reinforce these realities.
It remains to be seen how Lai ultimately navigates the situation given that Beijing and his domestic opponents seem resolved to push him regardless of how much he tries to reach out. Tsai Ing-wen previously said that being president is not something that can be taught. That said, Lai’s disposition appears much calmer than Chen’s although he does not quite have Tsai’s poise and unflappable image. His team will also need to hit the ground running given the absence of any honeymoon period for the new administration.
So far, other governments including in neighboring Southeast and Northeast Asia have not taken Beijing’s bait of casting Lai as a threat to regional security. This is partially a result of recent experience with a more forceful Beijing that is actively pressing its claims in disputed areas with shows of might centering on military aircraft and ships as well as paramilitary coast guard and maritime militia vessels. There is also the PRC’s pushiness in trying to shift perceptions surrounding everything from UNCLOS to UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong, and even the PRC-Ukraine Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Moreover, the Tsai administration’s record clearly demonstrates that Taiwan is an international player that supports the status quo. Nevertheless, few regional states—especially in Southeast Asia—dare to publicly contradict Beijing, something that may pave the way for future confusion as immediate memories fade.
In principle, Lai must now somehow win over at least part of the opposition in the legislature or else render them innocuous while demonstrating to Taiwanese the leadership he promised them during the election campaign. Concurrently, Lai has to convince external partners that he is the stabilizing presence he promoted himself to be during his campaign and promised to the world in his inaugural address. His advisers and allies should look to constantly provide reasonable alternatives to enable the president to maintain the initiative and avoid becoming cornered in an increasingly contentious or even acrimonious environment. Lai’s choices and non-choices may prove particularly consequential as Taiwan faces not only a more forceful PRC but also a need to further consolidate its democracy. Approaching these goals will be a true test of Lai’s political acumen and that of the DPP team around him.
