In October 2023, Bhutan’s foreign minister Tandi Dorji travelled to Beijing to meet his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi. For countries that do not share formal diplomatic ties, the visit was significant for several reasons. This was Dorji’s first official visit to China and marked the twenty-fifth round of boundary talks between the two countries. This in itself was a milestone, considering the previous round was held eight years earlier in 2016. A statement by the Chinese foreign ministry following the visit expressed hope that both sides would soon establish diplomatic relations and conclude their boundary negotiations.
The new momentum towards an early settlement of a dispute that has been ongoing for the last seven decades has strategic implications for Bhutan, China, and India. Bhutan and India have a friendship dating back to 1949 which affords New Delhi guidance over Bhutan’s foreign and defense policy. While for China, the willingness to conclude boundary talks with Bhutan is linked to the India-China border dispute, and particularly to the status of Arunachal Pradesh which it claims as an extension of South Tibet.
As a result, Bhutan faces a substantial diplomatic challenge as it aims to strike a delicate balance that resolves the border issue without incurring large-scale territorial concessions that alienate India or further encourage Chinese advances. This piece examines the strategic implications of Bhutan’s diplomatic efforts amid its border dispute with China, highlighting the thin ice it walks on to achieve a resolution without compromising its vital relationships. It also raises the question—Wedged between two Asian powers, how much agency does Thimphu truly have to steer these negotiations?
Explaining the Dispute
Bhutan and China share a 477-kilometer-long border. In 1951, the annexation of Tibet shifted Chinese borders farther south. This not only threatened the territorial integrity of Bhutan but fuelled the assumption that attempts at infiltration by Chinese troops would be hostile.
Ever since the change in frontier lines, Beijing has laid claim to two regions in Bhutan— Pasamlung and Jakarlung in the north (near Tibet), and Doklam, including Sinchulung, Dramana and Shakhatoe in the west (bordering India). China published maps in the 1950s that identified Bhutanese territories as Chinese to support these claims. On occasion, China used incursions into Bhutan as a tactic to initiate direct border negotiations. A study reveals that Chinese incursions into Bhutan in 1979 were “found to be on a larger scale than in former years,” underscoring the need for negotiations. However, it was only five years later in 1984 that both sides came to the negotiation table for back-channel talks facilitated by the embassy of Bhutan in India.
Two agreements serve as the foundation for current negotiations. One, established in 1988, outlines guiding principles for resolving boundary issues, while the other, reached in 1998, focuses on upholding peace and stability along the Bhutan-China border.
The closest the negotiations came to a breakthrough was in 1996, when Beijing offered to concede 495 square kilometers that it claimed towards Pasamlung and Jakarlung. In return, Bhutan would yield 269 square kilometers of land at Doklam and the nearby areas of Sinchulung, Dramana and Shakhatoe. After four years of negotiations, China and Bhutan, in 2001, reached the brink of this exchange. The deal, however, fell through after India convinced Bhutan about its security concerns. Presence in the Doklam plateau would grant China a strategic position to potentially target the Siliguri Corridor, a crucial sliver of land linking India’s north-eastern states with the rest of the country. As a result, any territorial concession between Bhutan and China is seen as a Chinese strategy to gain a crucial advantage over India.
The next notable development in the negotiation process occurred in 2021, when Bhutan and China agreed on a three-step roadmap for boundary negotiations aimed at a “successful conclusion that is acceptable to both sides.” The Cooperation Agreement, a key outcome of the twenty-fifth round of talks, stipulates the guidelines for a joint technical team to work on border delimitation. These recent developments are indicative of Bhutan’s efforts in the past three years towards an early settlement of its dispute with China. Commentators trace this urgency to June 2020, when China upped the ante by vetoing development assistance for Bhutan’s Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary. The 740-square-kilometer area had never before found mention in the twenty four previous rounds of boundary talks. This move was widely perceived as a deliberate attempt by China to irritate Bhutan to initiate direct border negotiations and was interpreted as a strategic manoeuvre aimed at India, considering Thimphu’s symbiotic relationship with New Delhi.
Doklam Tri-Junction
In 2017, Bhutan accused China of unilaterally attempting to alter the status quo after it was found that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had begun constructing a motorable road toward the Bhutan army camp at Zompelri. Chinese infrastructure in the region previously only consisted of rudimentary dirt track roads. Bhutan cited the 1988 and 1998 agreements and emphasizing their commitment to maintaining peace in border areas until boundary disputes were resolved. China insisted that the construction of the road in Doklam was an act of sovereignty on its territory as “Doklam has been a part of China since ancient times” and “is an indisputable fact supported by historical and jurisprudential evidence, and the ground situation.” Despite Bhutan’s condemnation, China proceeded with its construction activities near the India-Bhutan-China trijunction in Doklam, sparking tensions between the countries. This escalation culminated in a seventy-three-day military standoff between the PLA and the Indian Army. It came to an end in August 2017 after both sides mutually agreed to disengage.
If Thimphu harboured any desire to remain insulated from the larger India-China rivalry, the 2017 standoff placed it right in the centre. In an interview last year, Bhutan’s former prime minister noted that the dispute at the tri-junction was not a bilateral matter. “It is not up to Bhutan alone to fix the problem. There are three of us. There is no big or small country; all are three equal countries, each counting for one-third.”1 Chinese state media used the article to assert that New Delhi was the main obstacle standing in the way of settling the dispute.
Implications
Following the 2017 Doklam standoff, it was widely held among Bhutanese academics, senior civil servants, and parliamentarians that it was not Doklam, but an overall border settlement with China that stood as Thimphu’s foremost priority. However, the prospect of Bhutan reaching a bilateral resolution with China appears bleak, given the historical involvement of Doklam in the longstanding boundary dispute. Any potential agreement between Thimphu and Beijing involving a territorial exchange between areas in the north (Pasamlung and Jamparlung valleys) and Doklam in the west would be of concern to India. The plateau is located on the southeast side of the tri-junction area. According to experts, Doklam under Bhutanese control provides India with a significant advantage over China. This position enables India to conduct strategic offensive and counteroffensive maneuvers against China from Sikkim. Therefore, a resolution at the tri-junction would significantly impact the larger India-China Line of Actual Control dispute. After the 2020 Galwan Valley incident, India and China already find themselves locked in a standoff in eastern Ladakh, exacerbating tensions and further entangling boundary issues with broader bilateral relations.
Bhutan is aware that it is navigating a terrain of competing interests. Immediately after the twenty-fifth round of talks, Bhutan’s King, Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, embarked on an eight-day visit to India, where he met with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Minister of External Affairs S Jaishankar. In March 2024, Bhutan’s newly elected prime minister, Tshering Tobgay, chose New Delhi for his first foreign visit after assuming office. These visits can be seen as Bhutan’s attempt to reassure India that it recognises the relationship between border disputes with broader bilateral relations, is conscious of the red lines, and is eager to have both India and China involved in the resolution process.
However, involving New Delhi in the negotiation process leaves Thimphu with little space to maneuver its foreign policy within the broader constraints of the India-China relationship. As Bhutanese diplomats strive to resolve this dispute, it is crucial that they protect the status quo and prevent additional encroachments by formulating a deal that Bhutan, China, and India can agree on.
Notes
1 During the 2017 standoff, India’s Ministry of External Affairs stated that the two special representatives from India and China had reached an understanding in 2012 that “the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalized in consultation with the concerned countries”. China denied that there was a 2012 “understanding” over future trilateral talks on tri-junction. “What was agreed in the 2012 understanding was that in the future, the parties will conduct demarcation on the side of the tri-junction area. This serves to prove that the Indian side had agreed to the fact that the tri-junction area has been established at least on paper,” China’s deputy chief of mission Liu Jinsong told reporters in August 2017.
%20with%20the%20United%20States%20What%20Can%20We%20Expect.png)