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On January 13, 2024, Taiwanese voters went to the polls to elect their next president and a new set of legislators. I spent the month leading up to these elections on the ground in Taiwan. Despite the unusually muted campaigns and seemingly mundane results of the elections, I observed quiet but important shifts in Taiwan’s politics that will have critical implications for cross-strait ties and beyond.As the ballots were counted, it quickly became clear that Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) had won the presidency with 40 percent of the votes cast. But the DPP lost its legislative majority. No party secured a majority in Taiwan’s 113-seat Legislative Yuan, which consists of seventy-three geographic constituency seats, three lowland aboriginal seats, three highland aboriginal seats, and thirty-four party seats allocated by proportional representation among political parties that receive more than 5 percent of the popular vote. The Kuomintang (KMT) won the most seats by a slim margin (fifty-two), followed by the DPP (fifty-one). The relatively new, populist Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) came away with eight seats—arguably the most significant victory of the night—and independent legislators aligned with the KMT won the remaining two. The hung parliament will make governance more difficult for the DPP, and will seriously try the new president’s political skills.
The biggest story of the election for me is the normalization of a politics rooted in Taiwan. All three major parties—as well as some minor ones—competing in the elections emphasized the need to protect Taiwan’s distinctive embrace of democracy, pluralism, and autonomy. Campaigning by the DPP featured not just Mandarin and Taiwanese, but also Hakka and various aboriginal languages. Even the usually Beijing-friendly KMT ran advertisements in Taiwanese. All three parties raised the importance of developing Taiwan’s ability to deter the use of force by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). And all three parties rejected the PRC’s “one country, two systems” formula for extending control over Taiwan, distancing themselves from Beijing. The KMT’s presidential candidate, Hou You-ih, was quick to exclude former KMT president Ma Ying-jeou from campaign events after Ma urged Taiwanese voters to trust Chinese President Xi Jinping. TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je stepped away from a proposed joint ticket with the KMT when his alignment with the Beijing-friendly party—along with a disastrous negotiations—led to declining support.
This emphasis on Taiwan’s own political values, society, history, and culture does not imply a clamor for confrontation with the PRC. Polling indicates that although people on Taiwan increasingly identify as Taiwanese, over 80 percent wish to maintain the status quo of an autonomous Taiwan regardless of their views on Taiwan’s status and limited international recognition. This cautiousness—which is probably as close to a consensus as anyone can get in such a lively and competitive political system—will rein in politicians who veer too far from the mainstream. Voters punished Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT for being too pliant to Beijing in 2014 and 2016, just as they rejected the DPP in 2008 for Chen Shui-bian’s overtly pro-independence sentiments during his second presidential term. All major political parties in Taiwan today, including the DPP, say that there is no need to declare independence while seeking political distance from the PRC and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
The KMT’s electoral results are particularly relevant for the PRC’s influence in Taiwan. Although Beijing-friendly conservatives have a declining hold over the KMT, their highly mobilized base inside the party still helps them win internal contests for top posts within the party. But the KMT’s strongest performers in the district legislative races this year were candidates with deep local networks rather than those with close ties to the party center. Indeed, the performance of the KMT’s district candidates seems to have helped raise the profile of its party list candidates as well. After new laws forced the KMT to return assets obtained during the martial law period, the party center now also has fewer resources to distribute to loyal members across Taiwan. Such conditions may portend a reconfiguration or even new fissures within the KMT that deprive Beijing of a natural partner with a strong presence across Taiwan.
Several developments during the extended election period suggest that Beijing continues to seek various channels through which it can influence politics in Taiwan. The most prominent example was the failed presidential campaign of tycoon Terry Gou, the founder of Hon Hai/Foxconn, who intended to run as an independent. Gou withdrew from the race shortly after PRC authorities began investigating the taxes of Hon Hai/Foxconn operations in the country. If this did indeed compel Gou to end his campaign, it would be the first known instance of the PRC overtly vetoing a prospective presidential candidate in Taiwan’s elections. Separately, KMT Vice Chairman Andrew Hsia met with officials from the PRC State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office during an August visit to the PRC in the lead up to the proposed KMT-TPP joint ticket, driving speculation that Beijing was trying to consolidate anti-DPP efforts. PRC media and officials also echoed KMT campaign claims that voting for the DPP was tantamount to war and economic ruin. Such obvious involvement by the CCP in Taiwan’s electoral process apparently backfired, resulting in a notable backlash from Taiwanese voters.
Taiwan’s growing sense of self is in no small part due to persistent diplomatic, economic, and military pressure from the PRC that has hardened views on the island, even as its citizens grow more confident about their democracy. Beijing’s suppression of freedoms in Hong Kong only fuels such perspectives among Taiwanese voters while undermining the credibility of any PRC promises. Current efforts by the PRC to flip the few remaining small states that diplomatically recognize Taiwan have had limited effect, as Taipei has found other ways to foster robust quasi-official ties with states that share their democratic values. Short of clearly committing to restraint and offering some sort of arrangement that could make people on Taiwan better off overall, CCP leaders are left only with the option to escalate confrontation through harsher means. This would only further alienate Taiwanese people. Xi Jinping’s insistence on absorbing Taiwan under his “one country, two systems” formula almost certainly guarantees growing cross-strait tensions as Beijing seeks to test the incoming Lai administration leading up to and following its May inauguration.
Beijing’s official admonishments of the Philippines, Singapore, and others for extending congratulations to Lai Ching-te were illustrative of another set of complications for both the PRC and other states, especially those in Taiwan’s neighborhood. Beijing has been trying to establish its own “one China principle,” which insists on defining Taiwan as part of China under CCP rule, as a wider norm. Other states employ their own “one China policies” to guide their relations with Beijing and Taipei, which contain varying degrees of vagueness over how they see Taiwan’s status. The goal is to allow flexibility in handling substantive interactions with Taiwan given its importance to global supply chains, technology, transport, and internet traffic in Asia. Agreements to disagree with Beijing are increasingly subject to the PRC leadership’s more-pressing desire to extend its control over Taiwan, even as Taiwanese people become more comfortable in expressing their sense of self. Regional states especially, as well as other states more generally, must contend with the PRC’s frustration at its inability to exert its will over Taiwan, which the recent elections demonstrate.
The dust may have settled on Taiwan’s 2024 election season, but new challenges are only just getting started. Lai Ching-te’s incoming DPP administration needs to navigate a hung legislature and rival parties beset with their own internal struggles, who may be less willing or able to cooperate. Beijing must contend with the reality that the CCP’s brand and claims of Chinese nationalism hold diminishing appeal for Taiwanese people—in part due to the PRC’s own actions. Its partners in Taiwan are either aging out or often opportunistic, collaborating with Beijing so long as they can enjoy immediate benefits that outweigh available alternatives at a given moment. The lived experiences of people on Taiwan differ substantively from people in the PRC or even in Hong Kong, and finger pointing at “de-Sinicization” cannot change that.
Taiwanese voters’ growing sense of indigenous identity, attachment to their democracy, and sense of caution are the biggest sources of restraint on their politicians and guarantee against risky behavior. So long as Taiwan maintains its current trajectory, which is highly likely, it should prove to be the easier cross-Strait party to work with. For regional states and important actors such as the United States, the European Union, and India, the question is how to continue mutually beneficial ties with Taiwan while living with a PRC that is increasingly strident in its claims, whether over Taiwan or other disputes. Some of this will come down to effectively discouraging the use of force, but patience, persistence, and creativity will be key in seeking a peaceful, stable way forward that may not be apparent at this time.
