Introduction
Maha Yahya, director of the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
In her evocative book, Drinking the Sea at Gaza, the Israeli journalist Amira Hass writes, “To me, Gaza embodies the entire saga of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; it represents the central contradiction of the state of Israel—democracy for some, dispossession for others; it is our exposed nerve.” The conflict in Gaza in the past month and a half, since the October 7 attacks by Hamas against southern Israeli towns and military bases, has further exposed this nerve. These attacks and Israel’s brutal retaliation have come to embody the worst of our nightmares. The human and material cost of the conflict, with thousands of children killed and widespread devastation in Gaza, has sent shockwaves across the world, provoking major global protests on a scale not witnessed for years.
The conflict has also triggered a war of narratives, which has exacerbated tensions within many societies, particularly in the West. It has further polarized relations between countries of the global North and South, embedded itself into domestic divides, and raised questions about international norms. It has accelerated trends such as the growth of far-right movements and anti-immigrant sentiment. To examine the contentious dynamics at play, the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center asked scholars from the Carnegie network to each respond to a specific question on Gaza related to his or her area of expertise. What emerges is a range of views and assessments that only reaffirm how what had once seemed to be a largely forgotten issue—the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—in fact retains a capacity to profoundly mobilize populations and communities worldwide.
What is driving this is a host of complex reasons, the most prominent of which is outrage over the mass killing of unarmed civilians. On Israel’s side it also propelled by a shattered sense of security. For those supporting the Palestinians, it is a story of a long occupation, one marked by decades of dispossession, living in what has been described as the world’s largest open-air prison in Gaza, a profound asymmetry of power, and no political horizon. The catastrophic price paid by Gazans, with over 15,000 people killed, almost half of them children, led a Palestinian child, when asked what he wanted to be when he grew up, to respond that Palestinian children did not grow up. The exposed nerve of Gaza will continue to be felt, and these short commentaries, we hope, will help us to see how.
How Does the EU View the Gaza War and How Can it Address the Conflict?
Rosa Balfour, director of Carnegie Europe
The conflict in Gaza has torn Europe apart in more ways than one, with emotions running high driven by historical guilt and a sense of injustice, reaching into the multiple identities of Europeans themselves. The first response of European Union (EU) institutions showed a divided leadership, with backlashes against the visits to Israel by the presidents of the European Commission and European Parliament, which were seen as one-sided and a break from the traditional diplomacy of the EU, which had always adopted balanced statements on Israel-Palestine questions.
The votes at the United Nations General Assembly then saw the EU member states split in three different ways. Since the 1990s, the EU had always maintained surface unity on a two-state solution, a return to the 1967 borders, and condemnation of Israeli settlements. But in recent years some countries had developed closer ties with Israel, motivated by history, growing bilateral economic and business ties, and in some cases political affinity among far-right political leaders. The war seems to be showing that the consensus among governments has shifted, making it harder for the EU to take a clear position on the conflict.
The scale of Israel’s retaliation and the number of civilian casualties of Israel’s incursion into Gaza has caused huge protests across Europe, revealing another split between public opinion and governments. French diplomacy, given the largest Jewish and Muslim communities in Europe, has had to balance different voices. While the conflict resonates differently in each country—from Germany’s historic solidarity with Israel to Ireland’s identification with the colonized, some general trends are emerging: Governments are shifting closer to Israel’s point of view, even as public opinion, especially the younger generations and shaped by a large Muslim minority, is shifting in favor of the Palestinian cause.
With emotions running so high and divisions becoming deeper, it is hard to see what role the EU can play. But there are a few areas for action. First, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, has taken on the responsibility of putting the traditional EU position on the conflict into action and has traveled throughout the Middle East to meet Israeli and Palestinian representatives as well as those of neighboring countries. The EU has never been well-positioned to influence a political solution to the conflict, but can facilitate the regional dimension of diplomatic dialogue. This can involve supporting efforts to prevent a regional escalation of the conflict.
The other area where Europe as a whole can be helpful is in preparing the ground for a “day after” scenario. The EU and its member states have not been willing to leverage their economic relations with Israel, which have grown considerably in recent years, but remain the most important donors to Palestine. Any political agreement will require huge investments in reconstruction and in building the democratic infrastructure to make a political solution sustainable.
Finally, and building upon the sentiments and activism that the war has triggered in Europe, there is a special role to play in supporting civic engagement and nongovernmental networks committed to a different future for the region. None of this is an alternative to a long-hoped-for political solution. But if such a position is reached, Europe has a long history of cementing coexistence, human rights, and democracy, and even reconciliation.
How Might the Gaza War Affect Europe, Particularly Its Concerns About Ukraine?
Judy Dempsey, nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe, editor in chief of Strategic Europe
On foreign policy and security issues, the European Union (EU) is not known for its unity. Russia’s war on Ukraine, which began in February 2022, changed that. The EU is providing substantial financial assistance and military support to Kyiv. It has placed sanctions on Russia. It has ended its dependency on Russian gas. The EU—especially Germany and France, which used to have very close ties with Russia—no longer looks at its eastern neighbors through the prism of the Kremlin.
Indeed, Ukraine’s determination to defend its independence changed the mindset of most European governments. The view is that the war and its outcome are about the security of Europe. If Ukraine doesn’t win this war or enter peace negotiations from a position of strength, Russia will be in a position to threaten Moldova, tighten its grip on Belarus, and ramp up support for the pro-Russian government in Georgia. Pro-democracy movements in these countries would resist attempts by Russia to regain or strengthen its political foothold in the former Soviet space. Such scenarios would lead to instability on the EU’s eastern borders. That is why European support for Ukraine affects Europe’s security.
The war in Gaza poses a radically different security and political challenge for Europeans. They have little credibility. They never used their soft power tools—mostly financial assistance—to influence the Palestinian Authority (PA), which is based in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. Worse yet, the EU bankrolled the PA at the expense of supporting genuine independent civil society and pro-democracy activists. And its support for a two-state solution has been toothless. The EU became a passive bystander as the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and previous governments expanded Jewish settlements, which are illegal under international law, in the West Bank.
The Gaza war has confirmed that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the EU’s most divisive foreign policy and security issue. Germany, because of its past, unconditionally supports Israel. Ireland, the most pro-Palestinian state in the EU, wants a ceasefire. These polarizing divisions have several security implications for Europe. One is the security of Jewish communities. Growing antisemitism is associated with Israel’s attack on Gaza. The second is growing Islamophobia. Pro-Palestinian protestors are associated with supporting Hamas and being anti-Israel. The third is the potential for terrorist attacks. The fourth is how Russia could use Europe’s disunity and preoccupation over Gaza to increase attacks on Ukraine.
For security reasons, the EU needs to maintain unity over Ukraine, its direct neighbor. At the same time, it needs to accept that is has no influence over the Gaza war.
How Is the Gaza War Perceived in the Caucasus Region?
Thomas de Waal, senior fellow at Carnegie Europe
In the South Caucasus, everyone interprets other people’s conflicts in their own image.
For three decades, Armenians and Azerbaijanis, obsessed with presenting their side of their protracted conflict to the outside world, each made claims comparing themselves to the perceived victims of other conflicts such as those in Kosovo or Ukraine.
When it comes to Israel and Palestine, in the 1990s Azerbaijanis used to feel themselves akin to Palestinians: They were the “invisible” victims of mass displacement whose story was overshadowed by the Armenians’ historical genocide. Some Armenian military leaders, such as former president Robert Kocharyan, impersonated Israelis, speaking the language of victory, absolute security, and “Never Again!”
In the past few years, the South Caucasus has become more entangled not just in the politics of Europe but of the Middle East as well, with Turkey, Iran, and Israel all increasing their engagement in the region. Azerbaijan has forged a mutually beneficial alliance with Israel, Azerbaijan supplies around half of Israel’s oil and gas, while Israel has shipped weapons to Azerbaijan. In March, Azerbaijan reaffirmed the relationship by opening an embassy in Israel.
This is very much about Iran, with which Azerbaijan (which is nominally Shiite but highly secular in its politics) has a suspicious and adversarial relationship. Armenia and Iran, conversely, have a good relationship and a shared agenda of keeping open transport connections that are not dominated by Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Armenians accuse Israel of complicity in the military takeover of Nagorno Karabakh in September, causing the displacement of the entire 100,000-strong Armenian population. Armenian-Israeli relations are also blighted by the row over the Armenian Quarter of Jerusalem, 25 percent of which is now threatened with a takeover by Israeli settlers.
The longer the conflict continues, the more problems it will pose for Azerbaijan, however. Its public diplomacy is much less vocal in support of Israel, despite the strong elite-level contacts. This is hardly a surprise in a 99-percent Muslim republic. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s closest ally is Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The fact that they have diametrically opposite positions on Israel has not yet hurt their relationship, in public at least. But a few cracks may begin to appear in their alliance if Israel continues its war on Gaza with the same intensity.
How Might the Gaza War Impact the West’s Commitment to Ukraine?
Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
Difficulties in securing much-needed financial and material Western support to sustain Ukraine’s defense needs had started to appear even before the Gaza war. Some Republicans in the U.S. Congress questioned the size of American defense support packages, as well as the overarching logic behind high levels of support for Kyiv. Squabbles on Capitol Hill derailed essential aid, and before the Hamas attacks of October 7 it was clear that the White House was fighting an uphill battle in convincing Republicans.
Since the launch of Israel’s invasion of Gaza, the most immediate material impact on Ukraine has been the allocation of U.S. resources: specifically, much-needed 155mm artillery shells. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has publicly acknowledged that deliveries of Western ammunition have slowed down because of Gaza. House of Representatives speaker Mike Johnson has indicated that the United States should not allow Russian President Vladimir Putin to win in Ukraine, but firm financial commitments passed by Congress have yet to materialize.
The situation in Europe, another key player enabling Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression, was also worsening before October 7. Since that time, the outlook has become even more grim—and the war in Gaza is not the only factor clouding the prospect of enduring support for Kyiv. Germany’s Constitutional Court ruling on climate spending by the governing coalition has plunged the EU’s largest economy into a budgetary crisis, and debates in the European Council about levels of financial commitment to Kyiv have been accelerating.
Beyond material resources, senior U.S. and EU national security officials must also dedicate precious time to the Middle East—at the expense of other priorities, including Ukraine. The amount of time the U.S. president and other Western leaders were able to spend on Ukraine in 2022 was behind many of Kyiv’s wins last year. Now the situation will be different, and the need to focus on the war in Gaza, among the mounting domestic crises in key Western countries, contributes to the problem.
The compounding weight of multiple internal problems limiting the amount of resources the West can provide to Ukraine has also been exacerbated by the Gaza tragedy. The only player that stands to gain from this situation is Russia.
WHAT ARE THE CONTINUITIES AND DIVERGENCES IN AFRICAN RESPONSES TO THE WAR IN GAZA?
Jane Munga, fellow in the Africa Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Zainab Usman, director of the Africa Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
An array of viewpoints regarding the war in Gaza has surfaced within the African continent. African reactions expressed in multilateral forums and through official statements have generally called for a cessation of military action and reiterated their respective countries’ support for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, there are specific national differences in whether countries choose to take an explicitly pro-Palestinian or pro-Israeli position, or avoid overtly taking any side.
At the United Nations, African countries have overwhelmingly voted to support resolutions calling for a humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza. The UN General Assembly adopted a non-binding resolution calling for a humanitarian truce by a vote of 120 for and fourteen against, with 45 abstentions. According to an analysis by Development Reimagined, over one third (39) of the countries voting in favor of the resolution were African. Only six African countries abstained, and not a single African state voted against the resolution. A Canadian amendment to this resolution—backed by the United States and Israel—to unequivocally condemn the October 7 terrorist attacks by Hamas garnered the support of only seven African states, with 23 African countries feeling so strongly about the wording that they voted against it. Ultimately, the Canadian amendment failed to get the required two-thirds majority from the 193-member General Assembly.
The African Union, representing the 55 countries of the African continent, reacted to the flareup in Gaza in a manner consistent with its official and long-standing position on Israeli-Palestinian tensions. A statement issued by Moussa Faki Mahamat, the chairperson of the African Union Commission, expressed concern for the lives of civilians, appealed for an end to military hostilities, called for a return without conditions to the negotiating table to implement a two-state solution, and urged the international community to facilitate peace and guarantee the rights of both Israelis and Palestinians. The statement aligns with the African Union’s decades-long position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, even as Israel has sought to secure and maintain an observer status at the pan-African organization.
Some of the most explicitly pro-Palestine statements have been issued by South Africa as well as North African states, whereas several countries in west and southern Africa remain sympathetic but have been less vocal about the Palestinian cause. In an audacious move, South Africa has petitioned the International Criminal Court alongside Comoros, Djibouti, Bangladesh, and Bolivia to initiate an investigation into purported war crimes perpetrated by Israel, including the death of South African nationals in airstrikes in Gaza. Countries that have explicitly demonstrated sympathy with Israel, including Kenya and Ghana, issued strongly worded condemnations of the Hamas attacks and acknowledged Israel’s right to defend itself against terrorism. Many African countries have followed the path of Nigeria, opting for carefully worded diplomatese in advocating for dialogue as a peaceful means to resolve the conflict.
The divergence of viewpoints among these individual countries stems from an assortment of factors, including historical experiences, political, economic, and cultural connections, and national interests. For instance, South Africa has drawn parallels between the Israel-Palestine conflict and its own recent experience with settler colonialism during apartheid, while Kenya has evoked its recent encounters with terrorism. Ambassador Martin Kimani, the permanent representative of Kenya to the United Nations, stated during the 39th Plenary Meeting of the Tenth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly that “Kenya is well acquainted with the severe consequences that follow terrorist attacks” and that terror should never be used to advance a cause.
Yet since the Hamas attacks on October 7, some African leaders are modifying their national positions, perhaps to adapt to changing public sentiment. Kenya itself is a notable example of this. In a speech during a Saudi-African summit in Riyadh, Kenya’s President William Ruto appeared to soften his country’s initially strong pro-Israeli stance to include support for “a two-state solution as a means of resolving conflict,” an adjustment that was viewed by analysts as having been occasioned by the audience. This suggests that national positions on the conflict are not immutable and may be fine-tuned to reflect both changing national interests and public sentiment.
In short, the war in Gaza has generated a variety of reactions in Africa, and it is worth observing how these sentiments will evolve—if at all. Some states have remained clear and resolute in their stances, others have adopted a guarded and diplomatic approach, and a few are still tweaking their national positions to fit changing circumstances. As the Israel-Gaza conflict continues, it remains to be seen how African countries will adapt, and whether divergences persist or a convergence emerges.
What is the Impact of the Gaza War on Growing Anti-Immigrant Sentiment Across Europe?
Marc Pierini, senior fellow at Carnegie Europe
The sentiment across Europe against irregular migrants and refugees has grown since the massive 2015–2016 arrivals from Syria. This feeling has also been fed by human trafficking networks bringing mostly economic migrants from West Africa, the Horn of Africa, and South Asia.
The tragic events unfolding since October 7 in southern Israel and Gaza will not have a direct impact on migration flows, but may contribute to resentment not only against Hamas, but also, and more irrationally, against Palestinians, Arabs, or Muslims in general. The emotions triggered by the Hamas incursion into Israel and its murder of civilians may end up creating reactions that conflate terrorists, irregular migrants, and asylum-seekers, in a general mood of xenophobia.
Most Europeans have no detailed knowledge of the politics of the Middle East. However, they have a lingering fear of the consequences of wars in the region, based on the exodus of civilians who fled the Syrian civil war. In today’s context, several political factors may add to these fears.
First, the policy currently pursued by Israel’s war cabinet leaves no realistic hope of a political outcome for Palestinians based on a two-state solution. On the contrary, the indications are that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants Palestinians to leave Gaza and the West Bank.
Second, Egypt and Jordan have stated that they are unwilling to host displaced Palestinian populations from Gaza or the West Bank, respectively.
Third, Europe’s extreme-right populist politicians may well exploit the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the absence of a politically acceptable prospect for a Palestinian state, in order to make electoral gains based on fears unrelated to the conflict itself.
Fourth, this political trend might also gain traction in Germany following the visit of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on November 17. During the visit, he took a position on Hamas that was opposed to that of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and was described by his communications director on X (formerly Twitter) as “the voice of global conscience.”
The Gaza war is unlikely to have a direct impact on the flow of migrants or refugees to Europe. But Europe’s populist circles may well try to make political gains based on the fears it has created among their followers.
What Is Brazil’s Stance on the Israel-Hamas Conflict in Gaza?
Oliver Stuenkel, nonresident scholar affiliated with the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Brazil’s president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, better known as Lula, has long sought to position Latin America’s largest country as an important actor on the international stage, with a seat at the table of the powerful and the capacity to set the agenda of the global debate. In 2010, he sought to negotiate, alongside Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a nuclear deal with Iran’s then-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which generated considerable friction with the Obama administration. In 2023, upon returning to the presidency, one of his initial foreign policy priorities was to find a way of ending the war in Ukraine, and several of his comments generated perplexity among Western partners. In the same way, Brazil, which held the Security Council’s rotating presidency at the time of the terrorist attacks by Hamas on October 7, quickly sought to negotiate a United Nations Security Council resolution that would help to deescalate the situation.
Underlying these strategies is a deep-seated conviction that global decisionmaking processes, especially in the geopolitical realm, have too long been dominated by a small number of (mostly Western) powers, and that countries in the Global South, such as Brazil, deserve more of a say. This includes discussing how to resolve the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas. From a Brazilian perspective, this is all the more necessary given the perception that Western powers, such as the United States, despite their universalist rhetoric, often apply global rules and norms in a selective manner. Critics of Brazil, of course, at times point out that while Brazil is welcome to participate in negotiations to address geopolitical challenges, it has not been willing, during the past years particularly, to provide significant amounts of global public goods. For example, while Brazil took the lead in the United Nations’ peacekeeping mission to stabilize Haiti 20 years ago, it has declined to play a leading role in the most recent support mission in the country, which will be led by Kenya.
Like many other developing countries, Brazil has seen, since the beginning of the Gaza war, a double standard in the West’s decision to condemn an illegal occupation in Ukraine while also supporting Israel, which has occupied the West Bank and Gaza since 1967 and maintains settlements in the former, which most countries regard as illegal. While it is unlikely that Brazil will play a relevant role in mediating between the two warring parties, the Lula administration can be expected to continue to weigh in on the issue.
As in many other countries in the world, the Israel-Hamas conflict has deeply polarized Brazilian society, and Lula has been careful to articulate a balanced approach. While Brazil has not designated Hamas a terrorist organization, Lula not only condemned the attacks on October 7, but also described them as acts of terrorism. Yet he has also expressed great concern about the increasing number of civilian deaths in Gaza and recently argued that Israel’s response was “as grave” as the Hamas attacks.
How Might the Gaza Conflict Exacerbate India’s Domestic Fault Lines?
Milan Vaishnav, senior fellow and director of the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
The conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza comes at a time of heightened political polarization in India. This polarization is driven by dueling visions of Indian nationhood in the 21st century. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) of Prime Minister Narendra Modi champions an ideology of Hindutva (literally, “Hindu-ness”), in which Hindu culture is viewed as synonymous with Indian culture. The Indian National Congress (INC), which remains the largest opposition force in the country despite its underwhelming electoral performance in the two most recent general elections, champions a secular vision in which no single religion is given pride of place. While the broader political opposition is too internally heterogeneous to be easily characterized, its balance of sympathies arguably rests with the INC’s position.
The current conflict serves to reinforce this divide in Indian society. India, unlike other countries in the Global South, has assumed a diplomatic stance that tilts more toward Israel than Palestine. After decades of developing closer relations, the Modi government has brought ties between India and Israel “out of the closet,” as evidenced by its unambiguous expression of solidarity with Israel in the immediate aftermath of the October 7 attacks. This tilt is driven by important structural shifts. In recent years, Israel has become a valued defense partner of India. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Israel accounted for nearly 10 percent of Indian arms imports in 2022. Bilateral trade and investment linkages have also grown, with the two sides’ technology sectors leading the way. In addition, the Modi government harbors a deep sympathy for Israel because it sees both countries as victims of decades of violent Islamic extremism. Finally, Indian Muslims are not an integral part of the BJP’s electoral coalition, a reality that allows India to expand its ties with Israel without worrying about domestic political blowback from within its own ranks. While the Modi government remains a staunch supporter of a two-state solution, it has not allowed that declared commitment to dictate its diplomatic agenda.
However, elements of the opposition, civil society, and general public are outraged by Israel’s intense bombing of Gaza and the humanitarian crisis that has ensued. The Indian government has responded by suppressing pro-Palestinian protests and cracking down on social media posts expressing solidarity with the Palestinians’ plight. If the war intensifies or engulfs neighboring nations, these divisions will deepen. Otherwise, with general elections only months away and absent a renewed crisis involving its longtime rivals Pakistan and China, India’s political battles will most likely revolve around domestic issues.
How Has the Gaza War Exacerbated Polarization in the United States, Particularly Within the Democratic Party?
Jake Walles, nonresident senior fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
The Israel-Hamas war has set off an unprecedented intensity of public reaction in the United States, with large protests filling the streets of Washington, D.C. and other cities in support of one side or the other. In political terms, much of the debate in the United States on this issue has been concentrated within the Democratic Party, pitting two important constituencies against one another: Jewish Americans on the one side and progressive forces on the other. Two important questions arise out of this situation: How will this debate influence the position of the Biden administration on the war, and what impact might it have on the presidential election in 2024?
From the start of this war on October 7, with the Hamas attack on Israel, the Biden administration has maintained its steadfast support for Israel’s military response. This has continued despite pressure from the progressive wing of the Democratic Party to adopt a more balanced approach and support a ceasefire. Over time, however, the administration has adjusted its public statements to place more emphasis on protecting innocent civilians, providing humanitarian assistance, and reestablishing the two-state solution as the basis for ending the conflict. This suggests the Biden administration is seeking to balance the competing pressures it is facing—responding to the pro-Palestinian outcry from the left while still maintaining its fundamental posture of support for Israel. Going forward, the gap between the American and Israeli positions on some operational issues could widen, but the underlying U.S. support for Israel will likely remain intact.
With regard to the presidential election in 2024, it is premature to draw any firm conclusions. Americans rarely vote based on foreign policy issues, and support for Israel remains broadly popular among Americans voters. Yet the strong opposition to President Joe Biden’s approach from Arab Americans and among progressives portends problems for the president’s reelection effort. Particularly troubling is the sharp decline in Biden’s polling support among young voters. While these trends may not reflect widespread shifts in overall voting patterns, the election is likely to be close and even minor swings may have an impact on the outcome. In Michigan, for example, a state with a large number of Arab Americans, a shift of about 150,000 votes could swing the state’s electoral votes out of the Democratic column.
Do You Expect the United States to Shift Its Position on Israel’s Response in Gaza?
Sarah Yerkes, senior fellow in Carnegie’s Middle East Program
In the wake of the October 7 Hamas terror attack against Israel the Biden administration was clear: The United States stood by Israel and would give Israel the space it needed to return the hundreds of civilian hostages and prevent Hamas from carrying out a similar attack in the future. In the weeks since, as Israel’s air and ground campaign in Gaza has come under wide global condemnation and accusations of war crimes over the mass civilian casualties, including thousands of Palestinian children, U.S. public messaging has shifted, making clear that daylight exists between the Biden and Netanyahu governments.
However, domestic U.S. constraints are likely to prevent any sort of radical change in Washington’s approach to the conflict. First, the United States is less than one year away from a presidential election that is likely to see a rematch between President Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump. While there has been a growing chorus of Americans—particularly on college campuses—critical of Biden’s handling of the war, in an NBC News poll conducted on November 10–14, nearly half of American voters believed Israeli actions were justified, compared with just 30 percent of American voters who believed they were not justified. Additionally, Americans generally do not vote on foreign policy. And, while Biden has been losing some support in key states, there is no data to back the argument that a U.S. position more critical of Israel would win him votes. Those most critical of Biden’s handling of the war are Republicans—70 percent of whom disapprove of the Biden administration’s approach—but who would prefer Trump. If elected in 2024, Trump promises a new, expanded ban on Muslims traveling to the United States.
Second, the conflict has exposed polarization across the United States and contributed to a dramatic rise in antisemitism and Islamophobia. In the first month following the October 7 attack, the Council on American-Islamic Relations reported a 216 percent increase in incidents of bias against Muslims in the United States. And the Anti-Defamation League reported a 388 percent increase in antisemitism since October 7. Antisemitism in social media had already been on the rise prior to October 7—with vicious antisemitic rhetoric championed by Elon Musk on X, the social media platform he owns.
Third, there are an estimated ten Americans among the remaining hostages held by Hamas, and at least 35 American citizens were killed on October 7. While the Biden administration does not want to get directly involved in another Middle East war, the presence of American hostages in Gaza has forced the administration’s hands.
Finally, at the end of the day, Israel is a longstanding U.S. ally, fighting a U.S.-designated terrorist group holding Americans hostage in an election year. To expect the United States to dramatically shift its position within this context is simply unrealistic.
How Will Polarization over the Gaza War Impact Western Democracies Already Struggling With a Rise in Populism?
Richard Youngs, senior fellow in Carnegie’s Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program
It is self-evident that the conflict in Gaza has polarized opinion in European democracies. It has widened political divisions in many European societies along a fairly clear left-right cleavage. To a degree, the Russian invasion of Ukraine provoked such division, but the Ukrainian conflict has not lodged itself at the heart of European domestic divides to anything like the same degree as events in the Middle East.
The flare-up in the Israel-Palestinian conflict has had such a corrosive impact in part because it falls on the fertile soil of an already polarized political climate. It is one issue among many that amplifies already-embedded polarization. It is also important not to exaggerate in this sense: The conflict’s impact on the brittleness of European democracies is considerable, but it is of a secondary order alongside the slew of other crises that have nourished illiberal populism and identity divides over the last decade.
Indeed, the counterpoint to this polarization is the standard position of more centrist opinion, which has condemned violence and excess on both sides of the Israel-Palestine conflict. The prevalence of this line partly offsets the divisiveness of the conflict on domestic politics. Yet, this line also comes with a wariness about any kind of involvement in trying to resolve the crisis.
As both sides of the conflict routinely charge Europeans with bias or even discrimination against them—perceptions grounded in Europeans’ past errors and responsibilities—the European Union (EU) is condemned to walk a diplomatic tightrope. Of course, the effect of any hands-off equidistance is not neutral on the ground, given the power imbalances between the Israeli and Palestinian sides.
All these sensitivities compound an EU reluctance to get deeply involved in the conflict. Despite some diplomatic initiatives and ritual talk of “returning to a two-state solution,” the main EU concern has been to mitigate the conflict’s spillover to the several crises that currently command policy attention within Europe itself.
What Role Might China Play After the Gaza War, Given Its Expanding Middle Eastern Role?
Tong Zhao, senior fellow at Carnegie China
China has demonstrated a growing ambition to mediate tensions in the Middle East. This has been driven in recent years by a proactive foreign policy approach in order to assert Beijing’s global geopolitical influence. A pertinent question today is whether the Israel-Hamas conflict, which has only highlighted the inherent complexity of Middle Eastern disputes and the substantial political risks for external parties wishing to intervene, will moderate China’s ambitions and deter further involvement.
China will likely concentrate on bolstering its geoeconomic power in the Middle East. Despite the war, Beijing senses a shift in most Middle Eastern countries from a traditional focus on regional security struggles to prioritizing domestic economic development. This shift, in China’s view, accounts for what it describes as a recent “wave of reconciliations” in the region. For Beijing, this is a prime opportunity to intensify its geoeconomic investments in the Middle East, leveraging its economic strength to enhance its geopolitical influence.
On the other hand, the future of China’s role in regional security will be significantly influenced by the dynamics of the U.S.-China relationship. As the Gaza war evolves, China has benefited from staying on the sidelines and maintaining an image of neutrality and seizing the moral high ground, in contrast to the United States, which has incurred substantial costs in influencing major actors’ behaviors and has faced international criticism and domestic division over the conflict’s humanitarian impact.
So far, Beijing’s position appears to be largely driven by an intent to diminish the reputation, legitimacy, and influence of the United States and its Western allies, evidenced by government newspaper headlines, such as “Pro-China Is Pro-Peace and Pro-U.S. is Pro-War.” Notably, Chinese President Xi Jinping addressed a special, unprecedented ad hoc BRICS summit convened to discuss the Israel-Hamas conflict, aiming to elevate the voices of non-Western organizations.
In Beijing, there is widespread suspicion that the U.S.-supported Abraham Accords could reignite Arab-Iranian tensions and fortify U.S.-led security alliances, potentially leading to a NATO-like alliance in the Middle East. These concerns about U.S. influence constitute the primary barrier to U.S.-China cooperation on regional security matters.
However, if China is indeed adopting a more conciliatory approach toward the United States, especially after the recent bilateral summit at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum meeting in San Francisco, there are significant areas of potential collaboration. Beijing’s and Washington’s mutual endorsement of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for instance, offers a solid foundation for joint U.S.-China efforts to foster lasting peace in the region, if the leaderships of both countries demonstrate a genuine commitment to this outcome.
