Recent analyses have pointed to the potential implications of a thaw in India-China relations and have also suggested that a new understanding is indeed underway. They argue that in building up ties with India, the United States should keep in mind that India may not assist it during a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and may thus be a “much less committed American partner.” However, the ground realities of India-China ties tell a different story—that India and China will not be reaching a détente anytime soon. Second, India-U.S. cooperation is not limited to the Taiwan question, and India’s reliability as a counterweight to China should not be reduced to this.
First, although deep economic ties are put forward as a reason for an India-China détente, they are hardly a metric to judge the health of relations by. Trade is extensive but lopsided, with a deficit of $101.02 billion. Thus, in recent years, economic ties have become a source of concern rather than a factor of stability. As far back as 2017, then commerce minister and current Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman informed the Lok Sabha that India’s trade deficit with China was a “matter of concern” and that the government was working to reduce it. This was echoed by commerce minister Piyush Goyal in 2018, who detailed India’s efforts to reduce the trade deficit in a written reply to the Lok Sabha. Notably, this was three years before the Galwan crisis. The incentive to reduce dependency on the Chinese economy, and efforts to this end, have only increased since then.
Second, a careful analysis reveals that the keenness to “defuse their quarrel” only seems to be present on the Indian side. On the contrary, China has a keen interest in keeping the border active. Retaining the initiative and engaging in proactive coercion on the border is intended to underscore China’s strength relative to India. It is undertaken to show the United States and the rest of the Indo-Pacific, particularly South Asia, that India is unable to manage its own security at its frontier. Therefore, it cannot be relied upon to bolster deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, or to be a net security provider in South Asia.
Third, within the context of the current standoff in Ladakh, it is claimed that India and China are only left with “two major frontier hotspots” to resolve. However, disengagement in these locations, the Depsang Bulge and Demchok, is of as much concern to India as any of the other friction points. Together, the two areas in question amount to nearly 1,000 square kilometers of land that India used to patrol up until the summer of 2020. China, for its part, has “refused to accept” that these are problems, terming them legacy issues that predate the 2020 standoff. In the “two steps forward, one step back” strategy that China seems to have employed, Depsang and Demchok seem to be the one step Beijing hasn’t yet walked back from. Additionally, four days after the eighteenth attempt to resolve these friction points at the corps commander level was made in April 2023, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh told his Chinese counterpart Li Shangfu that the violation of border management agreements had eroded the entire basis of bilateral relations. Given this logjam, an early resolution seems unlikely. While efforts are on to arrive at a breakthrough, disengagement at this time in these locations is likely to be tactical. This would be with a view to create an atmosphere conducive for Chinese President Xi Jinping to visit India for the G20 Summit in early September. Tactical disengagement, if it were to take place, would still not be anything close to the broader strategic détente that recent analyses have envisioned. On a related note, the assessment of the PLA’s “former antagonism” is off the mark. China has built up its infrastructure and troop count in the eastern sector of the India-China border, complicating matters in addition to those in the western sector (Ladakh). Most recently, after the two sides agreed to establish no-patrol “buffer zones,” reports surfaced of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army violating this pact and pitching tents in a buffer zone in eastern Ladakh.
Fourth, the seemingly “obvious interest” in good India-China relations does not seem to be present in Beijing. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a conflicting interest; according to former Indian National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon, its legitimacy is increasingly dependent on nationalism. This has resulted in the India-China border becoming a platform for the assertion of sovereignty rather than simply a matter of territory. This connotation makes it difficult for Xi to walk back from a hardened posture on the border. On the contrary, seizing the initiative on the border with India betters Xi’s strongman posture.
Fifth, détente requires reaching an understanding. As I have argued elsewhere, the gaps in understanding between India and China at this point in time are quite considerable. Beijing has put the blame on India for the chill in ties and is pressuring India to move on. It has signaled that it will not be softening its posture at the border. This runs contrary to the key Indian demands of status quo ante and peace in the border areas.
It must also be noted that India and China did not “set their territorial dispute aside” for the three decades between 1988 and 2020. There was a clear understanding that relations would be normalized while both sides would undertake to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas. Discussions to resolve the boundary question would proceed apace. India and China continued working on their border dispute, with agreements in 1993, 1996, 2005, and 2013. As mentioned before, the Indian side has charged China with the violation of these border agreements, saying that it has eroded the entire basis of bilateral relations. In late July 2023, Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval too conveyed to Wang Yi, director of the CCP’s foreign affairs commission, that the situation at the Line of Actual Control had “eroded strategic trust.”
In conclusion, India and China do not appear to be reaching a strategic détente anytime soon. Then, the question of India acting as a balancer to China is not solely about India’s assistance to the United States in a Taiwan conflict, and neither should it be reduced to this. U.S. policymakers are clear that, at minimum, they see India and the United States complementing each other in deterring China in separate theaters of the Indo-Pacific, even without India’s entry into a Taiwan conflict. In April 2023, Kurt Campbell, the Indo-Pacific coordinator at the U.S. National Security Council (NSC), stated that “a huge part of the Indo-Pacific equation is what is happening at 20,000 feet, in forsaken, very challenging border areas. How that plays out matters a lot about what happens in the Indo-Pacific.” Further, John Kirby, coordinator for strategic communications at the U.S. NSC, also said, “India is a sovereign independent state” with its “own foreign policy” and that India has “challenges with China on their own” that it would address on its own. He added, “They have legitimate concerns in the Indo-Pacific that they’re addressing through their own vehicles as appropriate.” Thus, while it is highly unlikely that India will sit idly by in a Taiwan conflict, a powerful India would already be serving U.S. interests even if it did nothing, as it would be independently deterring China.