Last month, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was re-elected to a third term, tempering the hopes of many in the West for a reset. Below, three Carnegie experts discuss Erdoğan’s priorities and moves in the early days of his new term.
Erdoğan delivered tough and, at the same time, unifying messages during his inauguration. Based on that speech, what will be the distinguishing features of his new term?
Marc Pierini: The foreign policy arena likely will be managed within the existing superpresidential architecture, where two longtime aides to the president—the new foreign minister and the new director of intelligence—will now tackle the most sensitive issues in close coordination with Erdoğan. Domestically, the messages pointing to a unifying attitude among the entire Turkish society have created an expectation for an acceptation of diverse or even dissenting views. Here, time will tell where the practical implementation will lead.
Alper Coşkun: Erdoğan currently has three main priorities. The first is to stabilize the economy. He appointed a respected finance minister and gave him the authority to walk back the previous disastrous policies under the challenging, if not impossible, condition that the economic hardship for the masses is minimized before the upcoming local elections in March 2024.
Connected to that is his second priority: winning those elections and regaining control of major cities, especially Istanbul. His strategy will be to divide the opposition by assuming a conciliatory posture on the domestic scene in the hopes of luring conservative elements within the opposition to his side.
Normalization with the regime in Damascus to enable the return of Syrians to their homeland (while addressing Türkiye’s perceived security threats from Syrian territories) will be his third priority. Erdoğan will likely seek international support and funding for the repatriation of Syrians, which is among several reasons why he will not want to rock the boat with the West. We can expect a dynamic period in Türkiye’s international relations, where Ankara will refrain from disruptive and escalatory actions while leveraging its geopolitical weight, including in the context of the war in Ukraine.
The composition of the new Turkish parliament is overwhelmingly conservative and nationalist. How will this affect the country’s trajectory?
Alper Coşkun: Erdoğan will look at his new term as a legacy moment and try to use his final five years in office (under the current constitution) to define his imprint on Türkiye. One way he will attempt to do this is by drawing up a new constitution, an idea he has already spoken about and for which he needs strong legislative support. His alliance of conservative and right-wing parties took 323 of the 600 parliamentary seats.
Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) will court the conservative and nationalist-leaning figures among opposition lawmakers—of which there are many—during legislative efforts, including in any potential constitutional rewrite. The executive presidential system grants Erdoğan vast powers, and the role of parliament is secondary. But in any case, Türkiye’s legislative processes and foreign policy trajectory will be informed by the nationalist and conservative mix in parliament and the appeal of these sentiments to the public.
Marc Pierini: The more conservative and nationalist mix in the parliament may, on the one hand, lead Türkiye to distance itself from its Western allies, especially from a political standpoint. On the other hand, Türkiye is governed by an executive president, who will have to work toward his proclaimed goal of strategic autonomy and restore confidence with Western economic and financial partners that are key to Türkiye’s prosperity.
What can be expected of the Turkish economy in this new era?
Marc Pierini: The appointment of Mehmet Şimşek as treasury and finance minister has sent a reassuring signal to international financial markets. The appointment of a new central bank governor close to Şimşek constituted another positive signal. The duration of their respective mandates and the freedom they will have to return to predictable economic and monetary policies will inform the judgment of Türkiye’s Western economic partners. However, the appointment of the former governor of the central bank to the banking supervision agency sent a signal in the opposite direction.
Francesco Siccardi: Türkiye’s economic trajectory in the next months and years will be closely connected to the country’s system of international alliances. A return to orthodox fiscal doctrines would be welcomed in Western capitals that have much to lose from Türkiye’s poor economic performances. But a U-turn on interest rates will not be enough: the new Turkish government is also expected to make progress on the country’s overall rule-of-law record to reassure Western investors and facilitate trade dialogue with the EU. Conversely, any muddling through or ineffective reform would probably prompt Ankara to seek further financial support from its non-Western sponsors, Russia the first among them. This would, in turn, deepen the rift between Türkiye and the West.
How should Türkiye’s Western allies calibrate their approach to Erdoğan 3.0?
Marc Pierini: Türkiye’s Western partners have already stated their desire to work closely with Erdoğan, as the leader of a strong and strategic ally within NATO, at a time when war is back on the European continent and when both NATO and the EU are directly or indirectly under attack. Here too, time will tell Türkiye’s foreign and security policy direction.
Alper Coşkun: We are witnessing realpolitik at its best. Türkiye is a pivotal state, and notwithstanding certain irregularities and the uneven playing field during the elections, Erdoğan prevailed. Everyone, including some of Türkiye’s allies and partners who may have had other preferences, is adapting to the reality, and that is the right thing to do.
Türkiye’s NATO membership and its place in the West, including in the economic domain, will continue to matter for Erdoğan. So will the idea of maintaining an unconfrontational, albeit competitive, relationship with Russia and China. This implies that Türkiye’s engagement with its Western allies will mostly be transactional, and when it comes to dealing with a revanchist Russia and a rising China, contain some elements of congruence. Türkiye’s Western allies should focus on nurturing a positive agenda and enhance bilateral cooperation where possible but temper their expectations for a genuinely qualitative improvement in relations in this new Erdoğan era.
Will Erdoğan’s reelection affect Türkiye’s engagement with Russia?
Alper Coşkun: Russian President Vladimir Putin had Erdoğan’s back in these elections, and Erdoğan will not forget that—just as he never forgot Putin’s immediate support after the 2016 coup attempt, when many of Türkiye’s Western allies balked. The personal rapport between these two leaders has allowed them to manage the historic rivalry between their nations and their ongoing competition in places such as the southern Caucasus, Syria, and Libya. They will maintain this posture and continue to empower each other.
The silver lining for the West is that Erdoğan’s commitment to Russia is a function of his own interests and is limited by Türkiye’s priorities elsewhere, including as a country that boosts its deterrence through NATO membership and has an economy and foreign investment portfolio overwhelmingly identified with the Western world. Hence, Ankara will continue to walk the fine line between the West and Russia, presenting opportunities and challenges in both instances.
Marc Pierini: There is another dimension to the Türkiye-Russia relationship: how the Kremlin’s political and strategic objectives could constrain Ankara in making decisions not consistent with its own goals. Depending on specific circumstances, this could theoretically affect Türkiyey’s policies with regard to energy supplies, trade and financial flows, defense industry development, or NATO. The very concept of strategic autonomy will imply achieving a delicate balance in the respective relations with the West and Russia.
Sweden’s NATO bid and Syria policy are areas where Türkiye and its allies diverge. How will these events play out?
Francesco Siccardi: On the Syrian front, a continuation of the status quo should be expected. Türkiye will keep working toward two objectives. The first is to create the conditions for the repatriation of part of the 3.6 million Syrian refugees currently living in Türkiye—a topic that was at the center of the electoral campaign. The second is to diminish the Kurdish influence within Syria and create a buffer zone along the Turkish-Syrian border to prevent attacks from Kurdish groups into Turkish territory.
To achieve all this, Türkiye likely will make further steps toward normalizing relations with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. But, so far, Damascus’ request that Ankara leaves all the Syrian territories it has occupied between 2016 and 2019 has been hindering any concrete progress in the dialogue.
Russia’s influence might be key to move past the deadlock. Any changes on the Syrian chessboard will have huge implications for the European Union, which spends billions of euros to support Syrian refugees in Türkiye, and the United States, which both work closely with the Syrian Kurds to keep the Islamic State in check.
Alper Coşkun: Türkiye does not have a strategic interest in blocking Sweden’s NATO membership and, in that sense, does not disagree with its allies. And with the elections out of the way, the domestic political value of the issue is remote. Sweden has taken legislative measures to assuage Türkiye’s concerns regarding terrorist funding, recruitment, and propaganda activities, and if concrete implementation follows, Türkiye can be expected to green-light Sweden’s entry into the alliance, as it did for Finland.
Though not directly related, Ankara will concurrently be keeping an eye on its F-16 request to Washington, which represents its desire to remain in the Western defense industry ecosystem. As such, the request merits support from the United States.
The Syria file is complex and will be a priority for Türkiye. Despite years of disagreement, the potential remains for Türkiye and the United States (and its Western allies) to find common ground around the notions of fighting terrorism and full support for Syria’s territorial integrity. The key criteria there will be for all sides to embrace these goals without any convenient exception. With ex–spy chief Hakan Fidan taking the helm of the country’s diplomacy efforts, Türkiye can be expected to push this agenda. Of course, while doing so, Türkiye will leverage its engagement in Syria with Russia.
