What Should We Expect During Putin’s Third Term?

Putin has returned to the Kremlin, but he faces a significantly different Russia, because the country's situation has changed drastically. The previous Putin’s consensus between those in power and society has fallen apart.

by Mykola Siruk and Lilia Shevtsova
published by
Day
 on May 15, 2012

Source: Day

On May 7, The Day of President Putin’s inauguration, civil activists made an attempt to gather around the Manezhnaya Square in Moscow to express a protest against the inauguration of the elected president. The Moscow police arrested about 120 people at the event. “For an attempt to hold an unauthorized picketing,” the police representatives explained later.

Famous defender of human rights Lev Ponomaryov and member of the opposition Boris Nemtsov were among the arrested ones. On the eve of the inauguration the “March of Millions” was held with more than 70,000 people participating in it. According to different sources, the police detained from 400 to 600 people. It is said in social networks that they are charged with violation of the administrative law, and may be liable to a fine or a 15-day-long confinement. The Left Front leader Sergei Udaltsov who had earlier been hospitalized from the police department and diagnosed with peptic ulcer, now was released. The Magistrate Court ordered the oppositioner to pay a fine of 1,000 rubles for civil disobedience. TV show host Ksenia Sobchak noted in her blog on the radio station Ekho Moskvy, “After the march I realized that the only way to avoid the intensification of the radicalization is to start the reorganization. There is only one possible scenario that would allow the prosperity of my generation of 30-year-old active working people who think and do not wish to take aggressive steps. This is the scenario that would include the URGENT NATIONWIDE REFORMS in the country,” she emphasized.

The Day asked the leading expert of the Carnegie Moscow Center Lilia Shevtsova to share her predictions on what can be expected during Putin’s third presidency, considering the fact that Moscow and other Russian cities have constant protests going on, to tell us if Russian government is capable of the reorganization, and to evaluate the possible new stage of relations between Ukraine and Russia, when Putin is going to rule from the Kremlin for the third time.


“It might look paradoxical, but we have the same political leader in the Kremlin with probably the same crew, the same psychology and the view on life, policy, and society. And at the same time, Putin is in absolutely new circumstances. He comes to rule in an absolutely different Russia. At this moment it still remains unclear if he fully understands that the situation has changed drastically. Russia now is not what it was when it first faced him in 2000, re-elected him in 2004, and did put up with him at first, and later a large part of the population probably even supported him and believed in him – but that Russia is no more. The previous Putin’s consensus has fallen apart. He lost Moscow and a considerable part of educated people in other cities during this rigged election. And the mere fact that more than 70,000 people joined the protest at the Bolotnaya Square and Yakimanka, a number that took even the opposition by surprise, is evidence that Putin really lost Moscow. Now he is going to rule from behind the Kremlin walls, because on the other side of them he is going to live in a constantly hostile environment. And the fact that the authorities applied cruel and violent measures against the demonstrators, and this could only be Putin’s doing (this would have never happened without his and Medvedev’s interference), all of this shows that Putin understands only one type of government logic: you cannot open the window, not to mention the door. Because otherwise it would be impossible to hold against the wave of discontent. He drew conclusions from Gorbachev’s reign. Gorbachev’s perestroika led to granting freedom to the society. Putin is afraid of this and does not want it to happen. That is the reason why the authorities were ready to apply force. They used all the possible causes to use brute force against women and elderly people. Hundreds of protesters were beaten up. For the first time in long years, since 1993, the government has seen that a part of the society is ready for the radicalization and resistance while facing the police. That is, an absolutely new generation of people who are not yet afraid of violence and are ready to apply tough measures while confronting the government. Basically the ‘March of Millions’ was Putin’s inauguration, his arrival to a new country with a generation that is ready for a missionary and active fight against his government. And of course, the government itself caused the radicalization of this protest. Now there can be no understanding and round tables between Putin’s Kremlin and the major part of the protesters. But naturally, at the same time not only the radicalization of the opposition’s protests and the increase of the level of its intransigence are to take place. Of course, there still will be a significant part of the politically aware intellectuals who are afraid of the streets and will prefer to serve to the existing government.”

And what about the challenges?

“There is only one task Putin sets for himself: to preserve and extend his rule. And perhaps he realizes that he cannot rely on the educated part of the society, people who let him understand during the elections that they do not support him anymore and do not think him to be the legitimate president. That is why Putin has only one way left, the one that was always available for other Russian rulers who tried to preserve their political power and life after their value to the society ceased to exist. Putin is going to try to rely on the traditionalistic part of the population that needs to be constantly fed. And the budget pie is constantly shrinking and depends on the price of oil. But it is doubtful he will be capable of keeping all the promises he made to retirees, rural Russia, social classes of the city area, and state employees during his pre-election campaign. In the end, when there are only crumbs left of the budget pie, he will have only one way to preserve the power – the application of repressive mechanisms. He also knows from history of Russia and other countries that corrupt police, secret agencies, and army authorities are never going to try to support the system with a leader that loses ground.”

What can you say about Putin’s promise to “consolidate democracy and expand the society’s participation in the process of governing” after he took office?

“(Laughs.) Is this not sweet? I listened carefully to the speeches of both presidents: the former and the new one. Dmitry Medvedev served as a mask for Putin, who still held the reins. They both mentioned civil rights, democracy, and the desire to expand democracy. They both remind me of the end of Brezhnev’s rule, and especially of Chernenko, an absolutely old, impotent, and sick leader with his rhetoric about democracy and predictions that soon the Soviet Union is going to reach the communist affluence. This resemblance only enhanced the feeling of sickness I got from listening to the speeches. This hypocrisy of both leaders who are going to work together and their cynicism compound to an extremely powerful factor that will intensify the feeling of sickness caused by discontent with the regime not only within the intellectual stratum, but also among people from rural areas.”

What legacy does Medvedev leave? Because it was him the educated people put their hopes on.

“Medvedev demoralized the society to the great extent, promoted the degrading of elite by the gap between a constant chatter about modernization, rights, reforms, liberalism, and so on, and the fact that Russia is moving in the opposite direction. The role of repressive authorities and aggressiveness of the corruption in the offices developed in Russia. This break caused even greater estrangement between the society and the government. That is why the things said by Putin and Medvedev during their speeches in the Kremlin are not likely to bring anything promising and optimistic. Moreover, it is even less likely to strengthen their support within the society.”

What is your impression of the inauguration?

“When I watched the inauguration process, I noticed the organizers made a horrible mistake: the inauguration was broadcasted on all six channels, just the way it was done during Brezhnev’s era, and they showed the video that was shot from the helicopter. And Moscow was absolutely empty. On the way from the government building to the Kremlin, the cortege of the former prime minister and newly elected president had to go through a rather large part of Moscow, and not a single person was in the streets. You could see from above that the police are equally spaced along the route. And there was not a single other soul around, not even a cat or a dog. Nobody, except for the police. It looked like a neutron bomb was dropped on Moscow. The buildings are standing, the sun is shining, the cortege is moving, but the Russia is not there, the people are not there. It was an evident picture: the government cleared the streets of Moscow from people, from the city dwellers.”

You said that the educated part of Russia’s population has very little faith in Putin’s third presidency. What can you say about things Ukraine should expect during the “Russia under Putin-3” stage?

“I think that Putin faces a dilemma: on the one hand, of course, he does not want to close the border and look like some vampire Dracula, sitting in the Kremlin Palace. Because Putin understands that the survival of the ruling class depends on open borders with other countries, on how conveniently his ‘family’ (in its Sicilian sense) clan can use those countries to lead a comfortable life. That is why such people like Schroeder and Berlusconi were present at the inauguration. In other words, Putin does not want to look like the representatives of the Korean dynasty Kim and wants to preserve constructive relations with other countries for himself. But on the other hand, there is the logic of the Russian autocracy development. Nobody changed it, Putin will not change it either, and he understands it: Russian autocracy can survive only on one condition given – if it feeds not only on the obedience of the population within the country, but if it also tries to imitate a state with its spheres of interests and spheres of influence. Therefore, the great-power statehood (especially neo-imperialism) is the most essential core of Putin’s autocracy. That is why Putin is going either to imitate, or really preserve Russia’s dominating influence on other CIS countries. He constantly talks about the Eurasian Union, and during his inauguration speech he said that he wants to position Russia on the international stage as a center of gravity in Eurasia. And this is a new form of neo-imperialism. I do not think Ukraine will be able to live unattended by Kremlin’s attention or will receive Russia’s approval of its sovereign status. During the last few months we watched the Kremlin’s numerous attempts to involve Ukraine in being a member of this Eurasian Union. Since the Eurasian Union is going to look incomplete without Ukraine, they say. So, I want to congratulate you on the fact Ukraine is going to receive a lot of tender attention from Putin’s Kremlin. And it is up to you, Ukrainians, to decide, if you want to end up in the Kremlin’s embrace or not.”

The president of Ukraine was not present at the inauguration. What do you think this means?

“I think that the absence of Yanukovych is not a sign of some revolutionary changes in this very strange type of relations between the Kremlin and Yanukovych. In my opinion, if Yanukovych was present at this inauguration, it would limit Ukraine’s ability to maneuver between Europe and Russia. Especially, considering this complicated matter for Yanukovych that concerns his way of dealing with the Tymoshenko problem.”

This interview originally appeared in The Day.

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