Frédéric Grare is senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), where he works on Indo-Pacific issues, and nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. At Carnegie, his research focuses on Indo-Pacific dynamics, the search for a security architecture, and South Asia Security issues.
Prior to joining Carnegie, Grare served as advisor at the Center for Analysis, forecasting and strategy of the French ministry of foreign affairs, and as head of the Asia bureau at the Directorate for Strategic Affairs in the French Ministry of Defense. He also served at the French embassy in Pakistan and, from 1999 to 2003, as director of the Centre for Social Sciences and Humanities in New Delhi.
Grare has written extensively on security issues in Asia, in particular South Asia. His recent books include India Turns East: International Engagement and US-China Rivalry.
Berlin is still in the early phase of its Indo-Pacific journey. While the war in Ukraine has not changed its path, it is Berlin’s relationship with Beijing that will ultimately determine the credibility and depth of its Indo-Pacific engagement.
This article explores the economic and political determinants of India’s greater naval involvement in the Gulf region since the turn of the century.
When India abstained from condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it caused unease in Europe. But the EU should focus on what it can reasonably expect from New Delhi, and that means looking for cooperation on dealing with Beijing not Moscow.
Ultimately the EU should consider its relationship with India in the larger Indo-Pacific context and, for the moment, place any unhappiness at India’s position on Ukraine to one side.
The EU has failed to recognize the strategic dimension of its own interventions in the Indo-Pacific and therefore to frame a proper strategy that would consider the interplay of economic interests, resources access and power competitions in the maritime domain.
An analysis of the emergence of the Indian Ocean as security complex and a strategic space of central importance and its prospective future.
The best security guarantees for the EU’s sea lines of communication lie in the convergence between its interests and those of India and the United States.
The Gwadar protests are more than just a story of manipulation of the food insecurity and frustrations of the local population. They also illustrate the failure of an economic development strategy based on fallacies.
The AUKUS move is likely to drive Europeans even more deeply into passivity when it comes to Indo-Pacific security matter.
It will likely take more than a strong push from France, Germany, and the Netherlands to ensure that the EU implements a long-term strategy in the Indo-Pacific.