China is mounting an economic and technological challenge of unprecedented magnitude with its giant auto production and export boom, including for electric vehicles (EVs).
François Godement, an expert on Chinese and East Asian strategic and international affairs, is a nonresident senior fellow in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is also senior advisor for Asia to Institut Montaigne, Paris, and an external consultant for the Policy Planning Staff of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Until December 2018, he was the director of ECFR’s Asia & China Program and a senior policy fellow at ECFR.
A long-time professor at France’s National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilisations and Sciences Po, he created Centre Asie IFRI at the Paris-based Institut Français des Relations Internationales (1985-2005), and in 2005 Asia Centre. He is a graduate of the Ecole Normale Supérieure de la Rue d’Ulm (Paris), where he majored in history, and was a postgraduate student at Harvard University. In 1995 he co-founded the European committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), which he co-chaired until 2008.
His current research focuses on trends and debates in China’s foreign policy and on Europe-China relations. His last published book (with Abigaël Vasselier) is La Chine à nos portes - une stratégie pour l'Europe, Odile Jacob, 2018. He recently authored the following Institut Montaigne’s policy papers: Europe and 5G: the Huawei Case (May 2019, with Mathieu Duchâtel), Digital Privacy, How Can We Win the Battle? (December 2019), Fighting COVID-19: East Asian Responses to the Pandemic (April 2020, with Mathieu Duchâtel and Viviana Zhu) and Europe’s Pushback on China (June 2020).
China is mounting an economic and technological challenge of unprecedented magnitude with its giant auto production and export boom, including for electric vehicles (EVs).
Now is the time, when one considers Europe’s need for economic security. Russia’s war on Ukraine, China’s increasing acquisition of sensitive technologies, its coercive use of economic leverage are all threats to Europe’s security.
While one underlines a diversification in India's arms suppliers and a transition away from Russia, the other points to a legacy of dependence that is not fading away.
How should Europe respond to the implications of its entanglement with China? The country is an inescapable partner, yet it poses a challenge to the sustainability of our economies, our principles for international action, and ultimately our security.
Therefore, it is clear that, for reasons related in part to these risks, in part to the potential damage to their reputation, Xi and his colleagues have chosen to stick to the most prudent course in human terms. That choice is also consistent with their obsession with geopolitical risk.
But criticism comes in all shades and nuances. The case of China is unique. Its media supports Russia’s entire case for the "special military operation" and even relays Russian propaganda and fake news.
Media and published views are only a proxy for what China’s leaders think. As Xi Jinping likes to recall, the press has a duty to educate the people along lines that the CCP sets.
There are several explanations. The overarching one that’s not covered enough in the media is their obsession with Ukraine and their basic misjudgment of its importance for Russian foreign policy.
Since the coronavirus outbreak of early 2020, and even more since early 2021, China has maintained restrictive policies for the public budget, credit and interest rates. There may therefore be more margins for government action and support to the economy than generally recognized.
The possibility of a China-Russian alliance is traditionally downplayed. Certainly, the two countries already form a "negative coalition" through their UN vetoes, and share an aversion to color revolutions. They trade extensively - Russian arms and gas, Chinese consumer goods.