Discussion on the mood among Russians as Vladimir Putin starts a fifth term in power.

Russia’s ruling mechanism—bureaucratic institutions—may outlast the current personalism. This vast network of civil servants, technocrats, and administrators forms a modestly resilient framework that endures beyond individual political decisions, providing continuity and ensuring the steady day-to-day functioning of the government.

Join Aaron David Miller as he sits down with Carnegie’s own Andrew S. Weiss and acclaimed Russian political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann to discuss the future of the Russia-Ukraine war.

The Russian government’s brutal treatment of opposition leader Alexei Navalny has provoked widespread international anger. Yet support for Navalny at home remains surprisingly thin.

Is the world misreading the potential threat that the coronavirus represents for the Russian political system and President Putin’s hold on power? Are we overlooking the sources of resilience and inertia that are helping bolster a regime in its hour of greatest need?

Political elites enjoy the best possible social status by virtue of their position, and by definition cannot want change. Long-term planning therefore shouldn’t be viewed in absolute terms, even if it’s reform-minded. Democratization is much more likely to be accidental, occurring when the regime takes steps intended to increase its authority that weaken it instead.

Some degree of isolationism—“sovereignty,” in official political parlance—is necessary for every authoritarian regime to survive. But elites and societies as a whole don’t want full-blown isolationism. In Russia and elsewhere, “authoritarian internationalism”—an alliance of quasi-democracies—has come to the rescue.

Contemporary Russia has developed into an autocracy without some of its most overt elements, relying on a secretive "nod-and-wink" collusion between rulers and ruled. It is a personalist regime but one that still takes care to follow procedural niceties