The outcome of the events that have reshaped Syria was a surprise to many, including Russia. Moscow was unprepared for such a scenario, and its actions were largely reactive. The result was a significant failure in Russia’s Middle Eastern policy, but not a strategic defeat. Russia’s primary focus remains defeating the West in Ukraine, which is essential for its security and status as a great power. If Russia succeeds in doing so, it could regain influence in other regions, including Syria and the Middle East. Until then, the Russians will likely strive to limit their losses, maintain access to the Mediterranean, and remain relevant on the international stage, until they achieve victory in Ukraine.
Russia’s presence in Syria provided it with many advantages. First, the success of its military operations in 2015–2024 and its footprint on Syrian territory cemented Russia’s great-power status, which had two stated pillars: success in the fight against international terrorism and the presence of military bases in the “far abroad,” beyond the traditional Russian sphere of interest along its borders. The Syrian platform in the Eastern Mediterranean served an important logistical function, among them providing access to Russian assets in Africa. Other advantages were that Russia gained credibility as a mediator, a role it could potentially play elsewhere in the region. It also gained leverage in negotiations with Iran and Türkiye over the region. Russian sway in Syria allowed Moscow to block potential natural gas pipeline projects from the Persian Gulf to Europe, which could circumvent Russia. And its presence allowed it to contain terrorism on its “far frontiers.”
With Bashar al-Assad’s downfall, many of the stated advantages Russia enjoyed were either lost or reduced. Moscow’s immediate efforts have been focused on averting a complete disaster. This began with extricating Assad from Syria, which demonstrated the Russian willingness and ability to guarantee the safety of its ally. Providing a safe haven to the ousted president indicated that, despite its setbacks, Moscow showed a willingness to fulfill its commitments to Syria’s political elite, even if this proves to be an irritant in its relationship with the new Syrian government.
Second, Moscow avoided a complete humiliation, despite a serious loss in image and its failure to provide security. It reached agreements to safeguard the security of its diplomatic staff of its diplomatic staff and cut back military personnel among Russian forces in Syria. The advancing factions did not damage Russian military bases (particularly in Tartous and Hmeimim). To a lesser extent, this allowed Moscow to save face as much as possible in a context of failure.
Additionally, from Moscow’s perspective, what happened in Syria was primarily a defeat for its Syrian allies, rather than for Russia. When weakened, the Russians tend to shift the blame onto others. Their calculation is that a victory in Ukraine is possible in the short term, therefore defeats elsewhere will eventually fade, much as the reputational damage from the United States’ withdrawal in Afghanistan did.
Because defeating the West in Ukraine is the main strategic objective that will guarantee Russia’s security, existence, and long-term status as a great power, losses in other regions are viewed as secondary. For instance, a year ago in the South Caucasus, Russia withdrew its peacekeepers following Azerbaijan’s offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh and the subsequent forced displacement of the local Armenian population. That was not to Moscow’s liking, yet it did not divert resources to the Caucasus. From the Russian viewpoint, Ukraine is the main arena where it concentrates its resources and where the West seeks to impose a decisive defeat on Russia. Therefore, victory there is essential for restoring Russia’s position in the Middle East and the post-Soviet sphere.
With respect to Russia’s priorities in Syria, beyond damage control and risk mitigation, Russia has a number of concerns. One immediate concern is the management of terrorist threats. Various groups that fought the Assad regime and were opponents of Moscow included citizens of Russia and its neighboring states. Moscow used to regard Syria as a magnet that attracted radical elements, allowing it to distance perceived terrorist threats from its own borders. Today, it no longer has that option. Therefore, two alternatives exist: to negotiate with the anti-Russian groups or to focus on international counterterrorism cooperation.
With regard to Syria’s role as a stepping stone to Africa, Moscow will seek alternative entry points to the continent in order to maintain its presence. The most suitable option is Libya. In eastern Libya, Moscow has intensified its presence since the spring of 2024, including transferring arms and equipment from Syria. Libya’s access to the Mediterranean and its land borders with African countries give it an advantage over other nations. However, the country’s unstable military situation could again jeopardize Russian positions down the road.
At the same time, Russia’s dependence on Türkiye for logistical opportunities will continue to grow. Access to Libya will remain possible only through the Turkish-controlled Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. While Russia may focus more on Africa, it will likely try to preserve its presence in Syria. The outcome will depend on agreements between Ankara and Moscow. One condition for retaining Russian military bases in Syria could be that they not be used against any party inside the country, but instead serve logistical purposes, in return for adjustments to Moscow’s position toward the new Syrian authorities.
In the aftermath of the Assad regime’s collapse, the Syrian conflict has entered a distinctly different phase. Russia’s direct involvement is expected to remain minimal as it awaits the emergence of a more stable balance of power among the factions involved. Once stability is achieved, Moscow may facilitate political dialogue, especially as its diplomacy has shown Russia’s readiness to negotiate with groups it previously labeled terrorists or targeted during the conflict, demonstrating flexibility in pursuit of its strategic goals.
A key driver of Russian engagement could be the need to provide external stabilization, particularly if the United States withdraws its forces entirely from Syria, as was contemplated during Donald Trump’s previous term in office. Russia could leverage its bilateral relations with various factions and revive the defunct Astana format as a basis for revised mediation efforts. Much will depend on the outcome of talks between Russia and the dominant forces in Syria—those who will ultimately shape the political process and assert control over strategic assets such as the Hmeimim airbase and the Tartous port.
If Russia makes a political decision to regain its position in Syria, it will identify points of return. These may include protecting ethnic and religious minorities or acting as a neutral external balancing force. Moscow’s policy in the Middle East is likely to become more flexible. If necessary, it can cooperate with organizations it considers to be terrorists, as it did with the Taliban. Therefore, Russia’s withdrawal from the Middle East is unlikely. Rather, it may wait out the storm and propose conflict-resolution initiatives, replacing hard power with diplomatic influence. From its perspective, a victory over the Western countries in Ukraine would provide momentum for a shift toward a polycentric world order and imply that Russia’s revitalization in the Middle East remains possible in the long term.
